While this book starts off with an objective discussion of Bush's unilateral style of foreign policy, the authors' liberal biases inevitably emerge, apparent by their lack of discussion of the re-emergence of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow alliance, or any meaningful discussion of Europe.

Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, two alumni of the Clinton Administration's National Security Council, have given us a very useful — and strikingly even-handed — synopsis of President Bush's foreign policies. "America Unbound" takes us from the campaign up till the summer of 2003. Using their expertise, these two gentlemen, who now have senior jobs at the generally centrist and occasionally liberal Brookings Institute, provide us with almost all the information a reader could hope for. Several regrettable limitations reduce the impact of what could have been an outstanding work, but nonetheless nearly any reader will gain much from reading this book.

(I feel it's only fair to state my own prejudices at the outset. While I disagree with many of his domestic policies and some of his foreign actions, I strongly support Bush's conduct in Iraq and the war against terrorism, and I plan to vote for him come November.)
Daalder and Lindsay argue that Bush's approach to foreign policy constitutes nothing less than a revolution in the field. They say that it "was not a revolution in America's goals abroad, but rather in how to achieve them. In his first 30 months in office [Bush] discarded or redefined many of the key principles governing the way America should act overseas. He relied on the unilateral exercise of American power rather than on international law and institutions to get his way. He championed a proactive doctrine of preemption… he downplayed America's traditional support for treaty-based non-proliferation regimes… he preferred regime-change… he depended on ad hoc coalitions of the willing … and ignored permanent alliances." [p. 2] Not only that, "By re-writing the rules of America's engagement in the world, the man who had been dismissed throughout his political career as a lightweight left an indelible mark on politics at home and abroad." [p. 3]

Daalder and Lindsay briefly and neatly trace the evolution of America's foreign policy, from Washington's disdain for foreign entanglements to Wilson's decision for war. They quote Wilson saying: "It was as if in the Providence of God a continent had been kept unused and waiting for a peaceful people who loved liberty and the rights of men more than they loved anything else, to come and set up an unselfish commonwealth." [p.6] Speaking at the Reagan Library in 1999, Bush said "America, by decision and destiny, promotes political freedom — and gains the most when democracy advances." [pp. 36-37]

Daalder and Lindsay then point out the emergence of an important split in the American approach to foreign affairs, a split in which three factions emerged. After the First World War, the traditional isolationists, like the Republican Senator Borah, the multilateral internationalists, like Wilson himself, who favored the development of permanent international institutions, and, lastly, the unilateral internationalists as epitomized by another Republican senator, Henry Cabot Lodge espoused fundamentally different ideas for America's approach to dealing with a suddenly smaller world. Lodge strongly favored America's involvement abroad, but disliked the long-term commitments and restrictions that organizations like the League of Nations would entail. Lodge preferred to keep a free hand so that America could pick its involvements according to its own interests. [pp.7-8]

The Lodge perspective carried the day until well into the Second World War, when America led the creation of the new United Nations. President Truman then created another innovation when he said that "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." [p.9] Truman then supported the creation of a raft of international bodies: in addition to the UN, he helped create the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the Organization of American States. [pp.9-10] These organizations played a very prominent role in American foreign policy until, in Daalder and Lindsay's view, the demise of the USSR took away the strength of the multilateral position and helped the unilateralists. The chronic Soviet threat, and the perceived power of the Soviets, had forced America to cultivate and cooperate with allies. [p.12] In the view of the authors, the foreign policy debates of the 90s were not internationalist vs. isolationist, isolationists like Pat Buchanan having sunk "without leaving a ripple" [p.12] Rather "[t]he real debate was…over … how the United States should engage the world". [p. 12] Clinton, they argue, was Wilsonian, supporting such agreements as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, and the creation of the International Criminal Court. [p.12]

Bush differed substantially from Clinton's approach. The authors say his views rested on two beliefs, firstly that the world was a dangerous place and America needed freedom of action, and secondly that, in the authors' words, "an America unbound should use its strength to change the status quo in the world…the Bush philosophy argued that America should go abroad searching for monsters to destroy. That was the logic behind the Iraq war, and it animated the administration's efforts to deal with other rogue states." [p.13]

In the campaign, Bush argued for pre-emption, saying "the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past… we cannot let our enemies strike first." [p. 14] While other presidents had engaged in regime change — successfully in Iran in 1954 and Serbia in 2000, unsuccessfully in Cuba and Nicaragua — "[w]hat was different in the Bush presidency was the willingness, even in the absence of a direct attack on the United States, to use U.S. military forces for the express purpose of toppling other governments." [p.14]

Daalder and Lindsay emphatically reject the notion that George W. Bush is dumb or the tool of people and interests beyond his control or understanding. They quote Jason Epstein writing in the May 1, 2003 issue of the New York Review of Books calling Bush "the callow instrument of neoconservative ideologues" and Michael Lind in the April 7, 2003 issue of the British magazine The New Stateman wondering if "George W. fully understands the strategy that Wolfowitz and other aides are unfolding." Daalder and Lindsay dismiss this, saying that in his "first thirty months in office [Bush] was the puppeteer, not the puppet…George W. Bush led his own revolution." They also credit Bush with "tremendous self-confidence". [p. 33] and say that "Bush's approach to managing his national security team rested on having advisers who would be unafraid to push dissenting views." [p.53] Bush wanted his advisers to disagree amongst themselves in order to "sharpen his policy choices." [p.61]

In their discussion of the campaign, Daalder and Lindsay point out that Bush assembled a very interesting team of advisers: in Condoleeza Rice (a history Ph. D. specializing in the Soviet military), Richard Armitage (a former assistant secretary of defense under Reagan), Robert Blackwill (a senior adviser to the elder Bush), Stephen Hadley (an assistant defense secretary under the elder Bush), Richard Perle (yet another assistant defense secretary, under Reagan), Dov Zakheim (an undersecretary of defense under Reagan), and Robert Zoellick (an under-secretary of state and assistant White House chief of staff under the elder Bush), and Paul Wolfowitz (who held a wide variety of jobs under four presidents) Governor Bush assembled a team whose experience and expertise could hardly be surpassed. [p.22] These advisers "supported international engagement and free trade" and were "for the most part intelligent hard-liners". [p.31]

The authors say that "[t]he logic that underlay Bush's foreign policy has its roots in a strain of political thinking best labeled hegemonist. At its most basic, the hegemonist argument contends that America's immense power and the willingness to wield it, even over the objections of others, is the key to securing America's interests in the world." [pp.40-41] They write that hegemonists believe in five central propositions: that it's a dangerous world; states are the key actors and they act in their self-interests; power is the coin of the realm and must be more than just capability, it requires the willingness to use it; multilateral institutions can be a hindrance; and America is unique. [pp. 41-43] Daalder and Lindsay write that most of Bush's advisers were in tune with this approach, the notable exception being Colin Powell whom they label a "pragmatic internationalist." [p. 45] They say that the only real neoconservatives in the administration were Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, and they prefer to label them "democratic imperialists", that is, people who wish to remake the world in America's image. [p. 46] The other key administration officials were deeply sceptical of nation-building. [p.47] This team had an obvious weakness: while they all had a lot of experience in Europe, they knew relatively little about the Middle and Far East.

As the first year of Bush's presidency shaped up, domestic issues, especially the tax cut and an education initiative, were central and foreign issues secondary. Daalder and Lindsay point out that in February of 2001 Bush said that there would be no extra money for defense that year, and retained Clinton's proposed 2002 budget of 310 billion. [p.63] In May of 2001 Bush gave a speech in which he lay the groundwork for withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. [p. 63] That spring he met with President Putin of Russia, and emerged from the meeting proclaiming that "I was able to get a sense of his soul." [p.64] Throughout this period he did little regarding Iraq except alter the policy of economic sanctions to a regime called "smart sanctions" that would allegedly hurt Saddam more while hurting the Iraqi people less. [p.65] In March of that year Rice met with a group of European ambassadors and told them that Kyoto was dead. [p.65] In addition to Kyoto, Bush opposed a new protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the International Criminal Court. Daalder and Lindsay call this the "just say no" foreign policy although they don't weigh the merits of each decision. [p.66] In early 2001 the Middle East peace process was on hold [p.66]
Bush encountered his first major foreign policy problem on March 31 when a Chinese plane collided with an American plane, a collision that destroyed the Chinese plane and killed its pilot and forced the American plane to make an emergency landing in Chinese territory. Bush at first struck a hard line but as the problem escalated and it seemed that it could greatly damage the U.S.- Sino relationship, Bush relented and agreed to the so-called letter of the "two sorries" in which he said he was "very sorry" for the loss of the Chinese pilot (even though the collision was his fault, he was a known hot dog) and that he was "very sorry" that the American plane had landed in China (even though it was severely damaged and the pilot had no choice) Daalder and Lindsay commend Bush for his actions, saying that his conduct "attested to Bush's own flexibility and decisiveness … instead of compounding the problem, he moved to cut his losses." [p. 69] The authors contrast Bush with Reagan, whom they view as indecisive and frequently unwilling to choose between conflicting advice presented by his advisors, and their former boss Clinton, whom they say "always saw every side of an argument". They say that Bush "dominated" his subordinates, and that in the opening months of his administration Rumsfeld, Powell, Christine Todd Whitman, and Paul O'Neill all saw at least one of their initiatives or public comments countermanded. [p.74]
Throughout all this Bush rarely mentioned terrorism. [pp. 74-75] Daalder and Lindsay write that "[l]ike most people in American political life before September 11, he offered no plan for improving what we now call homeland security." [p. 40]

"A week before his inauguration, [CIA Director George] Tenet met with Bush, Cheney, and Rice. He told them that Al Qaeda was one of the three gravest threats facing the US and that this Ôtremendous threat' was Ôimmediate'… The other two grave threats were the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and China's rising power." [p. 75] The authors quote General Hugh Shelton, who at that time was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as saying that the Bush team moved terrorism "'farther to the back burner'" and say that "O'Neill actually suspended American participation in a multilateral effort to track terrorist money flows." [p. 76] They quote Bush himself saying that in the area of terrorism "…I didn't feel that sense of urgency". [p. 77] Wolfowitz later said that he and his colleagues had thought that terrorism was "a sort of evil that you could manage but you couldn't eliminate." [p.81]

Daalder and Lindsay believe that 9-11 "did more to reaffirm Bush's view of the world than to transform it." [p. 79] They write that in the immediate aftermath of the attack Bush had little interest in foreign offers of assistance except those that came from the UK and Australia, and that when a (unnamed) foreign leader suggested that he consult broadly, listen to others, and adapt to accomodate their views and interests, Bush replied, "That's interesting. Because my belief is the best way that we hold this coalition together is to be clear on our objectives and to be clear that we are determined to achieve them. You hold a coalition together by strong leadership and that's what we intend to provide." Bush did not place great value on the coalition he eventually came to lead, saying "At some point we may be the only ones left. That's okay. We are America." [p.86] In the end, "[a]fter initially rejecting many offers of help, the Bush Administration eventually accepted troop contributions from nearly twenty countries". [p.116] The authors neglect to explain what lay behind this major change of policy.

Bush and his team viewed previous American responses to terrorism as "timid," except for Reagan's decision to attack Libya in response to a bombing of a Berlin discoteque in 1986. [p.83] (The obvious problem with Reagan's action was its lack of follow-through. The attack left Qadafi alive to strike again, as he notoriously did by bombing the Pan Am flight that crashed in Scotland and killed hundreds. In my view, Reagan's action was just another half-measure.)

After 9-11 Bush had to decide what to do, and had to sort through conflicting advice from his advisers. Powell urged him to attack "terrorism in its broadest sense, "Cheney suggested that the focus be on states, Wolfowitz wanted to go after Iraq, [p.104] and Rumsfeld had no plan at his fingertips, the notion of going into Afghanistan in a big way having been preposterous on 9-10. [p. 100] One day after the attack Tony Blair sent Bush a five page memo proposing that the Taliban be given a chance to hand over Al Qaeda operatives and shut down their whole operation or face the consequences, and he pledged virtually unlimited support. [pp. 102-103] George Tenet had a plan that the CIA had been working on for months: CIA paramilitaries and military commandos having worked in Afghanistan for years, they had a decent familiarity with the place and knew the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban types. They could go in, scout around, and call in air strikes as needed. [p.100]

Daalder and Lindsay indicate that Bush and his team had no great confidence in the Afghan operation. On October 21 General Myers said "It may take till next spring. It may take till next summer. It may take longer than that." At times Bush described American actions there in very limited terms: we would make the terrorist "pay a price…disrupt the use of Afghanistan…make it more difficult" for the terrorists to prepare their attacks. [p. 106] At first there was no clear objective. The authors write: "Was it to get Osama bin Laden? To destroy Al Qaeda? Topple the Taliban? Ensure Afghanistan would never again be a terrorist haven? Send a message to other terrorist supporters? All of the above?" [p.107]
By mid-December the Afghan war had essentially been won, and that brought on the next phase: nation-building. Daalder and Lindsay write that Bush and his team has "an ideological distaste for nation-building," that "the president and most of his advisors are assertive nationalists, not democratic imperialists". On October 9, 2001, Rumsfeld said "I don't think that leaves us with a responsibility to try to figure out what kind of government that country ought to have. I don't know people who are smart enough from other countries to tell other countries the kind of arrangements they ought to have to govern themselves. One would hope and pray that they'd end up with governments that would provide the best possible for the people of those countries." [p.112] On October 12 Bush said privately that "[o]nce the job is done, our forces are not peacekeepers". [p.115] Indeed, even after the American government came to terms with the obvious and began a major nation-building initiative, the Ô04 budget "failed to include any funds for Afghan reconstruction". [p.114] In the end reality was reality, and having reluctantly conquered Afghanistan that country was ours to nurture whether we liked it or not.

In October of 2001 came the series of anthrax attacks. Daalder and Lindsay resist the temptation to speculate about the psychological consequences this had on Bush and his subordinates, but they quote from a series of statements that provide us with clues.

In his State of the Union address in January, 2002, Bush stated that "[t]ime is not on our side… the United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." [p.120] Also in that year Rumsfeld said "[t]he best, and in some cases, the only defense, is a good offense" [p.121] and in July of 2003 he said "[w]e acted because we saw the existing evidence…through the prism of our experience on September 11." [p.164] In the 2003 State of the Union speech Bush said "[t]he liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity," and he said at about the same time that "[a]fter September the eleventh, the doctrine of containment doesn't hold any water, as far as I'm concerned". [p.125] These statements obviously indicate an approach that can yield only one policy. Daalder and Lindsay see Bush's attitude as evolving somewhat in this period, as moving more in the direction of the democratic imperialist approach: "The essence of the Bush stategy … was to use America's unprecedented power to remake the the world in America's image." [p.123]

This brings us to Iraq. The authors believe that "[h]ad terrorists not attacked America on September 11, Iraq would likely have remained a secondary issue in American foreign policy." [p.129] They quote Bush saying to his advisers on September 17 that "I believe Iraq was involved". [p.130] In December of 2001 Bush met with General Franks, and rather than focus on Afghanistan — the meeting's ostensible purpose — Bush brought up Iraq. [p. 131] Daalder and Lindsay believe Bush had made up his mind by March of 2002, and they quote him saying to Rice: "Fuck Saddam. We're taking him out." [p.132]

Most of Bush's top advisers agreed, with Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage being the primary dissidents.[p.132] In part the difference was based on varying assesments of the nature of American power. Rumsfeld, for example, believed America's power was very great, whereas Powell was much more skeptical and therefore favored continuing the policy of containment. [pp. 132-133] Tenet's primary concern was that if Saddam believed he was facing extinction, he would be much more likely to hand WMD to terrorists. [p.133]

Having decided on a course of action, Bush had to decide whether to go to the United Nations to try to get authorization for military action. Cheney worried that going the UN route would result in the creation of an inspections trap wherein Saddam could offer the international community just enough crumbs to maintain the illusion of cooperation while in fact hiding his weaponry, and thus drag the process out in perpetuity. [p. 136] Former Secretary of State and Bush family friend James Baker then weighed in, and he favored going to the UN. Another Bush family counselor, Brent Scowcroft, disagreed entirely with the notion of attacking Iraq. In the August 15, 2002 issue of the Wall Street Journal, he published an article entitled "Don't Attack Saddam" in which he argued that "an attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global anti-terrorist campaign we have undertaken." Lawrence Eagleburger, another former Secretary of State under the elder Bush, thought the same. [p.137] In the end, Bush decided to go to the UN, at least in part because Prime Minister Blair, having established his credentials as America's most important ally, could not carry his Labor Party with him without at least trying to obtain UN permission. In his speech to the UN in September of 2002, Bush stated that "[t]he Security Council resolutions will be enforced… or action will be unavoidable." [p. 139] Whereupon the United States found itself in a lengthy negotiation with the other members of the Security Council, especially France, which initially favored a contemptibly toothless formula that said that if Iraq failed to comply with the resolution, the Concil would reconvene to "consider the situation". [p.141]

Finally, on November 8, the Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, which Daalder and Lindsay call a "remarkable victory for America". [p. 141] They unfortunately neglect to provide any facts or analysis of how this victory was achieved.
Then ensued the seemingly endless period that finally ended in war. 1441 required that Iraq disclose all its WMD weapons and programs, but in late December Iraq submitted a 12,000 page document that everybody agreed contained little more than falafel recipes. Daalder and Lindsay say that in this period Bush's diplomacy "failed most spectacularly". [p. 143] They say that Powell did nothing to woo Russia and Germany away from France, and hardly dealt with Mexico and Chile, two more-or-less pro-American countries that had seats on the Security Council. [p.144] Jorge Castaneda, the foreign minister of Mexico, said "[m]ost officials in Latin American countries today are not anti-American types. We like and understand America. But we find it extremely irritating to be treated with utter contempt." [p. 190] Whereas Baker visited 41 countries on 5 continents in the run-up to the first war with Iraq, Powell seldom travelled, preferring instead to communicate by phone, fax, and email. This absence of public diplomacy hurt America's relationships with other countries because all countries are led by politicians who need to cater to their own constituencies and need to look good and authoritative. [p. 192]
On the other hand, Powell's speech to the Security Council was nothing less than spectacular. He spent the better part of four days and nights at CIA headquarters sorting through intelligence in order to make sure that his claims were fully supported. In his speech he asserted, among other things, that "Saddam Hussein has biological weapons … 100 to 500 tons of chemical weapons agent… he has a cadre of nuclear scientists with the expertise [to make atomic bombs] and he has a bomb design." [p. 159]

The authors note that France's foreign minister Dominique de Villepin, in his remarks to the Security Council delivered after Powell concluded his address, confirmed he had evidence of Iraq's "capacity to produce VX [nerve gas and] the possible possession of significant stocks of anthrax and botulism toxin, and possibly a production capacity". [p. 160] In addition, Daalder and Lindsay, both former senior officials on Clinton's National Security Council staff, state: "The belief that Saddam Hussein was actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction was so pervasive that any piece of information, however questionable the source or uncertain its meaning, was presumed to reconfirm what was already known to be true. This was true not just of Bush, but also his senior advisers, of the American intelligence community, of members of the Clinton Administration, of the American media and opinion makers, and, indeed, of many foreign leaders. No one seriously considered that Saddam might have destroyed most or all his weapons in the early to mid-1990s. The possibility simply did not enter anyone's calculation." [p. 166]

In the end, 50 countries supp