Iran in Crisis: Nuclear Ambitions and the American Response

 by Steven D. Laib  

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Roger Howard's treatment of Iran's government in Iran in Crisis appears too trusting, given that government's track record.

Roger Howard is an English freelance journalist.  His work has appeared in The Daily Mail, The New Statesman, The Spectator, Middle East International and Jane's Intelligence Review; the last, granting him some credibility as a defense analyst.  Iran in Crisis? is Mr. Howard’s examination of the current situation in Iran, American reactions to Iranian politics and some possible near term outcomes. 

Howard begins his investigation by attempting to examine “the American mind.” This is his only major gaffe in the book, as he indicates that hawkish attitudes in American government originate with neo-conservatives incorrectly identified by him as former Democrats or even former Marxists.  This sets a stage on which we expect to see him taking an anti-American, pro-Iranian stance.  However, as he progresses into the world of Iranian history, politics and culture we begin to see traces of apparent schizophrenia in his writing.  The problem, it eventually develops, is not with Mr. Howard’s writing or attitude, but with Iran, where the elected government, the Islamic hardliners, and the various paramilitary organizations are all fighting for control.  It is no wonder that foreign governments may have a hard time figuring out what approach to take when they are not certain who is in control and what their intentions are. 

The author certainly has done his homework on Iran, and his examination of many current problems shows their origins in historic events that continue to affect the modern scene.  This provides an extremely useful context, but many times it leaves the reader with a less than complete understanding, because Howard does not give us a sufficiently detailed account of Iranian history.  His approach can be too disjointed for the reader who does not already have a good understanding of Iran’s history, and the history of the surrounding region. 

The greatest strength of Howard’s work is in his explanation of the current Iranian government, its constituent parts, and how they generally interact.  The exposition is less than perfect, but this must be expected because it soon becomes obvious that this government does not always follow its own rules and frequently resorts to the abuse of power in attempts to maintain the status quo.  Sometimes these abuses are followed by criticism and “official investigations,” but with little or no corrective action.  From the above, Howard shows us a nation at odds with itself, its history and in some instances the rest of the world.  This is strongly evident in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which are, consistent with the rest of the government, schizophrenic.  On some occasions nuclear power is desired only for peaceful purposes, and on others, as is evident from recent events, directed squarely at military uses, with civilian power production as a by-product.  Howard is completely inconclusive as to what he believes Iranian intentions are.  Perhaps he is incapable of reaching a conclusion at this point, and adopts a “wait-and-see” attitude while waiting for things to become more clear.  This may be acceptable in the field of scholarly research, but in the real world of international politics, waiting too long may result in action after it is too late. 

Howard does provide us with some conclusions and suggestions as to what might happen or might be possible to achieve.  These conclusions are limited in scope and detail.  He seems to avoid confronting the obvious fact that Iran’s paranoia is a destabilizing factor that threatens the region and potentially the rest of the world.  His examination of the role of Islam is largely confined to Iran’s internal affairs.  He does not examine its role in international terrorism in any great detail, and seems rather dismissive of the idea that Iran’s government benefits from sponsoring terrorist groups.  In fact, his treatment of Iran’s government appears too trusting, given its track record.  Small actions such as granting ethnic and religious minorities a few seats in the national parliament seem to carry heavier weight than the actions of the hard line mullahs who occupy more powerful positions.  That Iranian officials appear to have moderated their stance toward Israel is also given a weight probably greater than it deserves, given more recent Iranian pronouncements, and the unstable nature of Iranian policy.

In conclusion, Howard has done a very good job outlining many factors affecting the situation in Iran today.  His ambivalent attitude and occasionally dismissive style, combined with the instability of Iranian policies, interfere with his ability to form conclusions, and this reduces the value of his work to a certain extent.  What is also troubling is that the one conclusion he seems to reach, that leaving Iran alone would be the best policy, appears to fly in the face of many years of British experience in that part of the world, which appears to dictate that confronting a situation directly, with the ability and will to use the military option usually brings the best results.  Based on this, it appears that giving Iran a free hand and overlooking its stated intent to develop and use nuclear weapons would be a mistake.  Howard may have his own reasons for taking that position. 

Iran in Crisis can be obtained through Amazon.com as a special order item.  

Iran in Crisis is available on Amazon.com.

Book Reviews, Foreign Affairs, National Defense

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