Democratic political theory assumes that craving for freedom is innate to man; the crisis in the Ukraine confirms this theory.

The struggle of progressive society’s adherents against Communist reactionaries in the streets of Kiev has not yet ended in an irreversible victory.  The entrenched troglodytes still have cards and might play them out. In this case it will not be over until it is over. Even so, after numerous tactical victories by the democrats, a few insights, embedded in the evaluated facts, arise. Their lessons transcend the boundaries of the issue of the moment, of the country and of the region.

The likely developments in the Ukraine that can be anticipated as this is written support the hope of an eventual stabilization on a democratic basis. Quite like other succession states of the defunct inner and outer Soviet empire, the Ukraine — after Russia the largest one in this category — has also started out on her left foot. Decades of oppression and an industrial base that, thanks to Communist central planning, was burdened with antiquated means of production — left behind in a dilapidated condition — geared to grinding out what no one wanted, are only a part of the picture. It is completed with an agriculture reduced to such a low efficiency that it could not meet the consumption needs of a region that, prior to Socialism, had access to export markets as its major problem. In general, we talk about a system that could and would not use the price mechanism to regulate distribution and so relied on permanent institutionalized scarcity to reduce demand. The corresponding poverty and the backwardness, paired with skills taught that were designed to meet the needs of the 19th century, made the new beginning thorny. Add to this brew the lack of capital.

Mainly, however, the problem of culture and of an accustomed way of life must be emphasized. The only kind of entrepreneurial spirit that manifested itself, due to the circumstances created by the system, was the skill to pull political strings and to use the power of the “office” to channel funds to the “owner’s” own benefit. Succeeding due to Party politics rather than through working according to the demands of a free market of free consumers, misdirected talents and it replaced capitalism with crookedness. (That this might conform to Marx is of no consequence. Decisive is that it contradicts the proven path to success.)

An example demonstrates the crushing nature of this legacy. When the Germanys were re-united in 1989, the modern sixty-million Federal Republic admitted East Germany (mislabeled as the German Democratic Republic) of seventeen million. The chances for integrating and upgrading the “new member states” seemed excellent. Just consider the common language, nationality, a shared tradition interrupted for only forty years and, significantly, the billions that the economically robust West could invest to improve the devastated East. Fifteen years and rivers of money later the gap between Germany’s East and West is almost intact. Only the new thinking of a new generation will overcome the inherited handicap tucked under the skulls. The problems of the rest of the successor states, there being no Federal Republic of Russia, Poland, Hungary etc., loom much larger than those of the old GDR.

The dismal beginnings have found a matching continuation. Just look at the results of relatively free elections! Everywhere, the in-name-only reformed Communists have been proven at least “electable.” Why? They promised an “iron rice bowl.” For little work you got limited incomes for all, not a “share the wealth,” but at least a “share the misery.” This equality made life bearable as its terms affected even the striving and the capable, so that indolence’s reward became the diligent’s punishment.

It is against this backdrop that the events in the Ukraine appear to be unexpectedly positive. In case you missed out on something far away but nevertheless significant: 1. there was a leadership that came from the CP and that ruled — except for the PR part — in the old style. (Translation: the big crooks help the little crooks while the peons toil.) 2. Elections — regarded to be a formality — were held. Through them, as usual, the official candidate of the governing party was to be legitimized.  3. It worked on November 21st in the Ukraine, too, but only with cheating and that with a callous openness that would have even embarrassed Mayor Daley in 1960. Then came the bombshell. The difference between Yanukovych (the Party guy) and Yushchenko (the good guy) was infinitesimal. And in total contradiction with the massive results of the exit polls that put Yushchenko ahead. At that juncture the customary scenario suggested some protest followed by the continuation of the old kleptocratic regime run by the “partycrats.”

It is at this point that the actual story (surprise!) begins to diverge from the customary scenario. In the course of the elections, departing president Kutchma used every means of the government to cheat his designated successor into power. Even so the ordained winner could only eke out a narrow plurality. Here the reader could ask, “where is the news.” Well, that is about to follow. Society, provoked by transparent falsifications and the impertinence of the claims of the winner, arose. The protest of the streets — in sub-freezing weather — paralyzed the country. The “insolence” of the subjects being so unexpected, the reigning oligarchs became confused. Having been caught unprepared, after eleven days they capitulated by accepting the mediation of the Poles, the Lithuanians and the EU, all whom urged new elections. This is where relating the facts can be ended.

As so often, it is not the facts of the case that talk loudest. It is the meaning behind the data that frequently only the insider can discern that spices the dish. Let us begin with the positive side. Regardless of the tradition of tyranny we have, this is an encouraging case of a majority defying, in the name of freedom, the holders of economic and political power. Democratic political theory assumes that craving for freedom is innate to man. The Ukraine confirmed the theory. (Concurrently, the gap between the hoped for and actual reaction of the Iraqis to liberty served on a platter suggests that the premise is, alas, not always accurate.) The odds that the evolving political maturity might help to make East Europe and the West converge have grown considerably.

To the extent that the latter expectation is correct, a break with the tradition that made Europe’s East the home of reaction and underdeveloped backwardness has a chance of happening. If this occurs Europe’s freedoms will stand on a much firmer footing than any time since before World War I. Previously, NATO has only arrested temporarily the extension of dictatorship. Then 1989 brought disorder into the camp of unfreedom. However, the newly independent entities that replaced the USSR only furnished an opportunity for rejoining what belongs together. Meanwhile, the record was ambivalent at best. Giving finally independence a content of freedom, (independence is a perquisite of liberty but not its lawful consequence) as the events in the Ukraine to promise, a potential foundation for security, freedom and ultimately economic well being seems to be laid.

If you read this while residing between Vienna and Vancouver, you might think that you are hearing about the problems of far away peoples. Even though this view is shared by many, it nevertheless holds about as much water as the bursting bubble of “exuberant expectations” when stocks take a dive. Most of the actual and near-catastrophes of the last century are global outgrowths of the local ailments of Central and Eastern Europe. In reality, since about 1700, no order of Europe is secure if Russia does not fit into it. The same is true about our globalized world. It is this axiom that leads us to the negative aspect of the lessons that the crisis in Kiev points to.

Russia is an axle around which much turns. So, the inclination of her governors, the institutions they create and the means by which they project the perceived national interest, determine her welfare — and the fate of its neighbors. Admittedly, the loss of the Ukraine has been a hard blow to Moscow. After all, the Tsars — and then the Commissars — stole it from its natives a long time ago. Even so, Putin’s role during the crisis bodes badly for his agenda and Eurasia’s stability.

Moscow has done everything during the campaign to influence the election in favor of its candidate. After the balloting but before official results emerged, Putin interfered in the outcome and prematurely congratulated Yanukovych for having won. Once the population went on the street and refused to accept the “results,” the Kremlin did everything to strengthen the departing Kuchma and to depict the demonstrators in true Bolshevik style as being influenced by conniving foreigners. Concurrently the foreign observers of the balloting were accused of having caused the turmoil. Besides these signs that the “imperial instinct” of Moscow is still forceful, Putin’s actions provides signs that he has a hard time letting go of what was once Russia’s.

Even when it became likely that there would be a new, more honest election, and that therefore Moscow’s man will lose, Russia remained irrationally unyielding. At the Sofia gathering of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Foreign Minister Lavrov delivered in tantrum polemics against “interference.” (As a result no closing communiqué could be issued.)  This comportment, besides revealing the survival of the old “imperial temptation,” suggests that the Kremlin’s foreign policy assessments are of questionable quality. Russia’s reluctance to accept the autonomy of her neighbors and her apparent difficulty in not setting goals that regard the domination of more land and more people as desirable is menacing.

The world and Russia would be well served if her leaders could muster the courage to come to terms with a lesson of history. It is that most of the successful societies of our day share a trait that allowed them to become prosperous, secure and not zones of devastation. After recent reverses, Japan, Germany, but also Sweden in 1709 the Swiss in 1515, recognized the limits of their power and the boundaries of their interests. England’s tradition of common sense bore fruit before paying the price of folly by shedding blood for a chimera or marching through victories into bankruptcy. These are the cases that one wishes that those who rule Russia should analyze, and apply the conclusions for the benefit of the people they are pledged to serve.