The European Union is in danger of extending beyond its proper geographical and cultural limits.

Frankly, this title is misleading. The issue raised by Turkey’s joining the European Union is, at its core, a “what to be or not to be” matter. Although Washington urges Europe to admit Turkey into its imperfect union, America herself is rather unaware of the issues.  Wrongly so. Accepting, rejecting or just dragging out (this is the policy of the moment) the decision on Ankara’s entry will define what Europe becomes. Issues such as these will be answered: is the EU limited to what geography regards as Europe? Is the Union a club of the western and central zones of the Continent? Is it an association of nations who shared the western variety of Christianity, then the Renaissance and the Reformation? Is it a conglomerate of entities significantly exposed to the industrial revolution? Furthermore, are democracy and a consciousness that does not regard the norms of liberty as a peril to state and nation, required?

In the light of the above, the European Union is in the process of extension beyond these limits. Success after 1945 has convinced many here that everything is obtainable. The process of expansion — supported by the idea of countering “American hegemony” — is regarded as a demonstration that through “sharing the wealth,” problem cases can be nurtured to success. In reality, however, the limits of healing through memberships are confining. Unified Germany’s eastern region proves this. The confusion reminds one of the problem with welfare. Legitimate help to the deserving is likely to be replaced by welfare on demand as a right. Decline is programmed once that happens.

Turkey brings from the era of the East-West conflict a treasury of merit. At that time, given the similarity of interests in facing the Soviet threat, the possibility of membership had been extended. Add to this that the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk made the modernization of the country — like Peter the Great of Russia — into a national goal. To achieve it both men used dictatorial means to combat their people’s cultural heritage. Neither of them completed the task. It is legitimate to mention this when writing “opinion” — this writer always had good experiences with Turkey and Turks. Ancestry — our related peoples have been enemies for so long that it mutes into a bond for the present — contributes to the sentiment of amity. Even so, the next sentence must begin with “Regardless… .”

Regardless of the foregoing, the limits of Europe’s interest and means, the capabilities of Turkey to integrate and be integrated, as well as a number of Turkish interests speak against full membership. At this juncture, the sense that membership is a “must” also needs to be questioned. Norway and Switzerland are quite European, wealthier than the Union — and not members. (They are bid for but refuse to sign up.) In time there might be nations that will wish they had not joined and will act. Those who opt to stand aside have a close regulated relationship to the EU.  So, there is a pretty good life outside the EU. What non-members naturally do not get is support payments for their decayed industries. Turkey already benefits from such a privileged relationship: it could be extended and deepened.

So, what is the problem with full Turkish membership? The economic one is weighty but relatively of the least gravity. Soon there will be a hundred million Turks. Half of these, instead of 3-5%, will be engaged in subsistence agriculture. This will make Turkey expensive. It is a good question whether the expected subventions will facilitate structural change or consolidate a traditional economy by making antiquated activities profitable.

More serious than the economic predicament that can be “solved” by throwing money at it, is the political one. With Turkish membership, its territory being 94% in Asia, through its largest member the EU would transcend the Continent’s boundaries. Thereby the EU would become a direct player in the turbulent Near East. This is a role played from a position of disadvantage in a rough neighborhood for which Europe has neither the power nor the will to cope. Quite a problem, since Western Europe’s luck since WWII has been development under the American umbrella. It will be hard to create one's own shadow once the heat rises and the going gets tough. The record in the crisis of disintegrating Yugoslavia supports the reservations.

Not only does Turkey drag Europe off its own orderly block; the country’s dowry includes an internal crisis of the violent sort. In its latest expansion the EU has already accepted members by using colored lenses so as to ignore traits that, if admitted, would have hindered admission. Without mentioning names, a thorough confrontation with the past since 1919 and during the Nazi, then the Communist era has not been insisted upon beyond a cursory level. Furthermore, persons and parties with a criminal past — at least through association — were accepted as negotiating partners and, by implication, as deliverers of democracy. Even worse: members were admitted and new entries are now negotiated with multi-ethnic entities that govern themselves as majoritarian dictatorships. If and when the first bomb explodes there will be reason to regret the hushed up ethnic oppression. In Turkey’s instance the minorities’ problem fits under no carpet. Both in absolute numbers and percentage-wise, the Kurds’ case is more serious case than new Europe’s harassed minorities’ is. The persecution of the Kurds is far more intensive than in the latter case. Here, the Kurds being a people partitioned also among Iran, Iraq, Syria, gives an international aspect to a seemingly local sore. Prudence and integrity demand that the Kurdish question be resolved prior to Turkey’s admission. The hardest part of an eventual settlement is that it is possible only by fulfilling, in the majority of the particulars, primarily Kurdish demands.

Lastly we get to the major hurdle. It is a consequence of the “Islam factor.” One component evolves within western Europe as one of domestic politics. Another one dwells in Turkey proper. The first involves the ability and the will of the tradition-bound Turkish masses to integrate into Europe and the EU’s capability to assimilate them. On the level of popular sentiment in Europe — remember democracy and the needed consent of the governed — the experience with Turkish (and generally Muslim) immigrants is a negative one. Regardless of the dictatorship of PC and suppressed statistics, the average person sees the typical Turk as “not making it” and living a life in a style imposed by a value system that pre-programs failure. The self-imposed ghetto’s loud and demonstrative rejection of the majority’s way of life is disturbing and resented. That facet of this rejection that flout the host’s laws by endorsing even honor killings or which calls for the stoning of the violators of the sharia, are provocations. Demanding tolerance for the intolerable as the host’s principle is forbearance does not help here. National referendums over Turkey’s admission — France and Austria are already committed — will likely to be determined by society’s reaction to intolerance toward the majority, welfarism and criminality. In Germany’s approaching election this matter will be a decisive issue. Regardless of scores of successful Turks, the SPD will lose because its leadership supports Turkey’s inclusion to get the vote of tens of thousands of settlers.

Cohabitation with masses of immigrants has not worked within Europe for either of the parties involved. The longer the uprooted from eastern Anatolia (meaning an element that has been impervious to modernization prior to emigrating) are in the West, the more radical they become. And the more radical the immigrants the more agitated the natives. A collision of assertive and hardening traditions is furthered through signals revealing that the “guests” dislike and despise the surrounding majority. Will a partnership that failed to develop when involving only tens of thousands of guests work for 70 + million members on their own turf?

This will largely depend on what happens in Turkey. There are two Turkeys; one is modern, that is, quite “European.” It is correspondingly secular, a product of Atatürk, who went so far as to call Mohammed a perverted migrant. The other Turkey is touched mainly detrimentally by change and is stuck in a backward looking tradition. Thus it carries joyfully the burden of dogmatism represented outwardly and visually by its females hidden under cloaks. Quite possibly, modern Turkey, the one of the separation of State and Mosque is in the process of losing to the advocates of the Caliphate. Whether the reverses are temporary and tactical, or whether the slide is the beginning of an avalanche is still unclear. Nevertheless, the disturbing signs are numerous.

The signs of re-Islamization of those who are left behind — largely because they refuse to move on — multiply. Outwardly, the Mosques are multiplying and the headscarves proliferate. This is more than fashion or folklore. The phenomenon comes with movements that rather openly advocate the politicizing of religion and favor a state that implements Islamic norms. This gets us to the (probably decisive) Erdogan-bit of the jig-saw puzzle. What the Premier personally stands for and what the mass of the iceberg whose tip he might be, matters more than all the rest of the issues raised here.

Erdogan claims to be a moderate Muslim. Moderate Islam is not a foe of the modern world. Islam is only a threat in case it cannot, once in a position of strength, remain moderate. If Erdogan is a moderate then he might be the best thing for his country and even benefit Europe, which has an interest in a bridge to the Muslim world. Alas, the comfort one might take from Erdogan’s self description is conditional. For one thing, the dividing line between church and state is being slowly weakened. No surprise, since much of the vote that elected Erdogan came from circles whose moderation is, well, suspect. And finally, there is the man himself. A few years ago he was a not-too-lowly member of an indubitably extremist movement. He is even on record reciting a poem which called the Faithful the army and the minaret its bayonet. Having served a jail term for sedition, Erdogan emerged as a moderate. This propelled him into power. We are left with this question: how temperate will he be when he gets what he could only attain as long as he played the role of moderation? This caveat has also an implication for the EU. What if, due to Erdogan’s secret agenda, or his weakness in crushing the extremist wing of his supporters, through an Islamist counter revolution, Turkey, a member of the Union, becomes an Islamic state?