Only by establishing much more direct communication with Iran’s opposition groups can the United States hope to influence the course of events there.

President Bush, in his State of the Union, stated, “Iran remains the world’s primary state sponsor of terror — pursuing nuclear weapons while depriving its people of the freedom they seek and deserve. . . And to the Iranian people, I say tonight: As you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you.” Yes, Mr. President, tyranny must be demolished and people should live freely in their lands, for the world to live in peace and stability. Vice President Cheney and Secretary of State Rice both pointed to the Iranian regime as the most dangerous state that has to be dealt with — as soon as possible.

Two distinct policy options are being discussed back and forth among policy makers in the U.S. and Europe regarding the Iranian problem.

Some continue to advocate the carrot and stick policy, regardless of the fact that the policy has been absolutely ineffective in changing the behavior of the 25 year old regime in Tehran. Billions of dollars worth of trades and investments as incentives to persuade the Mullahs has produced no result. On the contrary, the policy has emboldened the criminal regime in Tehran for more killing and torturing of thousands of Iranians. Years of talk in hope of change have also given Tehran time for establishing an international terrorist network along with its aggressive nuclear program. Many believe Iran has enriched enough uranium to build its first atomic bomb this year. Appeasing Tehran has been particularly a failure when it comes to preventing Mullahs from meddling in the internal affairs of its neighbors. The dimension of Iran’s interference in Iraq is an example as how conniving the Mullahs are in any negotiation.

Some other policymakers advocate a variety of military action against Iran. Such proposals will not produce a meaningful policy on Iran. Careful strategic strikes or all out military operations may have short-term benefit, but certainly will not end America’s political conflict with Tehran. Not to mention, it is very likely that the U.S. will be alone in this venture.

Neither policy option include the Iranian people in the equation. It is impossible to apply the same policy used in Iraq or Afghanistan to Iran. In contrast to Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran has an organized and powerful resistance movement. Iranian people have been fighting against the Mullahs for the past twenty-five years and have sacrificed 120,000 of their men and women in their battle for freedom and democracy. Suppression of the Iranian opposition has always been the first request of the Iranian regime in negotiations, which was granted by Europe and US administrations in the form of labeling groups opposing Tehran as terrorist organizations.

A major complicating factor for any outsiders who attempt to deal with Tehran is that Iranians view the United States and the EU quite differently than the Mullahs in Tehran. Iranians see the blacklisting of Iran’s most organized opposition groups, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and the larger anti-Tehran political coalition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), as a handcuff on Iran’s democracy movement. Tehran, on the other hand, sees it as green light for more suppression and terror both at home and abroad. The 1997 blacklisting at the request of ayatollahs holds no legitimacy with Iranians and undermines America’s attempt to develop a sincere policy in support of democracy in Iran. To avoid unmitigated disasters for both Iranians and Americans, the administration should reject Tehran’s regime in its entirety by removing all barriers for Iran’s democracy movement. This is the third option. Instead of sending American troops to Iran or continuing to appease the terrorist regime of Iran as a legitimate government, U.S. policymakers should give the Iranian people a chance to fight their own battle.

There is no longer any question that change will occur in Iran; the question is how, according to whose timetable and with what sort of outside involvement. Only by establishing much more direct communication with Iran’s opposition groups can the United States hope to influence the course of events there. The United States will face great risk of hurting the pride and trust of the Iranian people if its direct communication excludes groups such as the PMOI or the NCRI.

Indeed Maryam Rajavi, in her recent talk at the European Parliament, outlined the democratic aspiration of the Iranian people. She confirmed: “there is a third option: Change brought about by the Iranian people and the Iranian Resistance.”