Fence mending serves to cover up the frays and the holes that have opened up in the transatlantic security blanket.

President Bush, elected against the will of a majority of Europeans and a perennial provocation of the Old World’s sneering political class, is about to tour the Continent. This happens although an argument can be made that he personally — his government, with emphasis on the Rice-Powell foreign policy team and most importantly the country — are the injured and insulted parties. If forgiving is statesmanlike, then this visit, during which — at least publicly — the impression of amnesia will have to be given, qualifies as a prime example of the art.

Mr. Bush has access to an endless supply of foreign policy recommendations hurled at him. In numerous cases, they come from the crowd whose frustrated members are not able to play. In many instances, scrutinizing the suggestions offered, one is tempted to insert the adjective “fortunately” into the previous sentence. This is being written in the knowledge that “W” gets plenty of unsolicited advice. Much of it is of doubtful quality. A good part of it is superfluous and a lot of it is better ignored. Convinced of this, one feels somewhat hesitant to contribute to the mixed bag the President has to lug along. Therefore, these remarks are not meant for Mr. Bush as chiding or as a recipe. These observations are directed at those, who, as laymen, are about to observe the show behind which the actual working part of the visit will be played out.

What this trip is about is fence mending, in the sense that fences have a function of covering up. Cover up what? The frays and the holes in the transatlantic security blanket. Accordingly, the visit’s optimal outcome is that Bush’ hosts will avoid telling him to his face what they have been braying till now about him in public. If the President is not forced to feel insulted and manages, by not breathing too deeply, to avoid upsetting his hosts, the atmospherics of the Alliance will be improved. This can mean that resentment will not be hung out like the dirty laundry for all to see. In other words, the verbal war could be ended, not with a peace but with a cease fire during which the caliber of the ammo used will be reduced.

Unless something unexpected happens, the upshot of the visit might be that America will act as though it has forgotten the recent past. Acting in this spirit, the US will politely reduce her bleeding from the stab wounds in her back. Whatever still seeps through will be absorbed without leaving much trace by the red carpet of diplomacy. Keeping its part of the bargain, Europe will be saying in more subdued tones what it had the habit of charging the brutal, brain damaged “Hegemonist” with. With this more polite “separation of convenience,” America’s enemies will continue to gain in significance because of Europe’s paper “neutrality” and practical support. Iran’s unfolding officially non-nuclear atomic armament program is a case that makes the point. The best of the scenarios is that Washington’s major European allies will refrain from hurting it too much under the cover of friendship.

The optimal result of the Rice-Bush trip would be a common stand in the face of common threats. At the top of the list stands, besides the war on terror, the related issue of nuclear proliferation. Facilitating democratization wherever possible is also high on the agenda. Add to this an agreed upon preparedness to present a common front in case Russia or China become tempted to use their recovery to create a new world order that accommodates their historic desire for pre-eminence.

The recent record and the apparent appeasement of Iran suggests that America would be naïve to expect significant support against threats in their early stages. In this the visit of the President will make little difference. The more so since dealing with Chirac, Schröder and Putin entail a danger. While these encounters might convince third parties of the US’ flexibility, the cheerleaders of the Bash Bush campaign could arrive at an unwanted — and ultimately unwarranted — insight of their own. Taking his cue from the folkways of American politics, Bush will be tempted to do all he can to be liked. Therefore he will attempt to project the image of a natural, unassuming regular nice guy “you can talk to.” Given the corresponding inclination, this might be interpreted as confirming the existing impression that he and what he represents do not amount to much. The intended signal of the visit can easily be misread, by taking Texas-style good-naturedness for the submissiveness of a simpleton. So Paris, Moscow and Berlin could conclude that their planned policies need hardly to consider seriously America’s likely response among their projected costs.