When success demands outlasting the adversary, the attitude that is an advantage in the sprint mutes into a handicap in the mile run. What victory in Iraq requires is endurance and the stoic absorption of a steady flow of relatively insignificant losses.
While lecturing Europeans about the US, inevitably references are made to America as an economically, politically and militarily determining player on the global scene. Here it will be noted that power is more than the sum total of the components of might. Effective power is also a question of intent, which, in turn, is a derivative of culture, perceptions and of the local way of doing things. About none of the above is the average European properly informed. Nevertheless, most people here — not knowing what they do not know — are convinced that the insinuation about their “under information” is wrong. In most instances visceral anti-Americanism originates from disinformation, just as the writer’s sympathy issues from what he claims to be a firm grasp of these matters. A mirror is needed too see oneself the way one is and as one might appear to others. The current crisis that radiates out of the Near East justifies an attempt to depict in words the image the mirror might show. Looking while acting promises to be of advantage.
However, before comparing the image of self perception with that existing in the mind of outsiders, the critical situation, as it appears to the writer, should be depicted.
Initially, based on faulty, but at the time plausibly best intelligence, the US took military action against Hussein’s Iraq. Regardless of the pundits, the victory in the military phase of the confrontation was quick and decisive. Thereafter, largely unforeseen by the original supporters and detractors of the undertaking, problems arose. Some of these came about by overestimating the demand for genuine freedom hidden under the sand. The average Iraqi’s political consciousness needed to take control over the country’s affairs and to protect his society against the violent partisans of secular tyranny and religious zealots, proved to be below expectations. Looking back now, it is obvious that the overthrown Baathist dictatorship did not express the vigor of the oppressor as much as it did articulate the lack of a civil society.
Concurrently a further error crept into the picture. Historically, free societies have generally manifested difficulties in dealing with those totalitarians in their midst who were smart enough to exploit freedom’s rights — such as free press, assembly and speech — to further their cause. These rights restrained action against those intending to misuse their freedom to abolish the liberty of others. America’s role in occupied Iraq suffered from a comparable handicap. From the outset, the military-political policy was, on account of self-imposed restraints, too benign not to provoke the resistance we have come to know. This resistance accomplished two things. 1. Attacks, if successful, had regardless of their military worth, significant political benefits. 2. The retaliation was, due to its guiding concept, limited in its strategic intent and of reduced effectiveness in its tactical implementation. Succinctly: self-restraint distilled from democratic American ideology made violence against the US profitable, while restrained US retaliation discounted the costs and risks involved.
Handling the Jihadists — and their tacit supporters — as though they would be judicious gentlemen resorting to legitimate protest with corresponding means, has stimulated the resistance. This, in turn, made the human costs of occupation rise.
In the case at hand, the partisans of dictatorship have again demonstrated that their understanding of the political process of democracies is superior to their adversaries’ comprehension of their methods. Correspondingly we must suspect that the goal pursued in initially killing GIs and now Iraqis, is not the deed’s local impact on civilians and troops, whose strength is to be sapped morally and numerically. Much rather the target is the home scene where US policy is formulated. The impact on the US’ internal affairs is what promises to be decisive for prevailing psychologically, because on the battlefield the insurgency has no chance of winning.
If the insinuation that with America as an adversary, the battlefield of choice is not the “front” abroad but the inland scene is true, then we have found the Achilles heel of the US. It is a fickle public opinion swayed by the uninformed and the collective impact of the forces that shape its putty, namely the printed and the electronic media. No outsider can defeat America as decisively as she can prevail over herself. It is in this context that the “mirror” mentioned at the outset needs to be held up.
As things stand, there is what is rated as a steady flow of “bad news” from Iraq. Actually, the developments, while not cheerful, are not really devastating. It is only when America’s reaction — that evolves out of her home context that is wrapped around the news from the battlefield — that the progress of things becomes crushing.
The US is by its own nature a “sprinter.” This sprinter often finds itself in a field of mile runners. In acting as though the distance would be 400 meters, America is in jeopardy of not making it to the finish. This has already happened in Viet Nam. Now there are signs from Congress and opinion polls that it might be repeated in the Iraq case, too. The question arises, what is the context in which reverses, that could otherwise not be achieved, get so skillfully forged?
The core of the matter seems to be that America is the country of quick solutions. Unless you deal with the INS or the IRS things are done quickly. Not accidentally, the term “instant gratification” is American in its origins. If something does not work at once, one tries something else. This inclination to search for something else somewhere else is reflected in the high percentage of the population that moves yearly. In numerous areas this attitude can be a source of strength. The current economic boom reflected in high growth rates and low unemployment of the US, once compared to other mature industrialized societies, is a consequence of the flexibility that is the trademark of the American “sprinter.”
There are conflicts that are of long duration. This is the case when the struggle pits culture against culture, and especially when the political culture of American democracy precludes the full utilization of the full palate of her instruments of power. When success demands outlasting the adversary, the attitude that is an advantage in the sprint mutes into a handicap in the mile run. What victory takes there is endurance and the stoic absorption of a steady flow of relatively insignificant losses. These are apt to become packaged and labeled as being of an intolerable weight once processed through the filter of the national perspective. America in conflict is much too slow to react to threats and provocations. When she reacts she does it by exploding out of the starting block. Then, alas, quickly boredom sets in, the original cause is “forgotten” or interpreted into insignificance — this seems to be happening to 9/11 now — finally America gets tired and she turns to a new distraction.
In college, as the ‘50s turned into the ‘60s, I began to become cognizant of the US’ weaknesses. It was then that I concluded that for the long haul and the sake of a lasting lesson, it would have been better for America had the price of her negligence leading to Pearl Harbor been greater. When defeat in Viet Nam — with the reverses being manufactured in “Washington” — approached, I used to proclaim that this defeat will, some day, cost the life of many more people than the advocates of “withdrawal” care to imagine. America has recovered with amazing speed and ease from Pearl Harbor and from ‘Nam. Nevertheless, it is to be feared that these cases involve “lessons” to friend and foe that are likely to imperil America and free men everywhere.
Here is the RX for the foe, such as the insurgency in Iraq represents. To begin with, avoid massive provocations (Twin Towers) that help to lure Americans otherwise busy with pursuing their individual happiness, away from their personal affairs to rally in the public arena. Second, exploit the inhibitions created by the American system; rely on the tools of international mobilization against the US, for it bends to this kind of pressure; play for the stands in the American stadium. Given time, you will find your best apologists in this crowd. First it will jeer you, then after some time it will tolerate you to finally cheer you. The country, being a democracy, is incapacitated if it lacks the consensus of the inattentive, and that will; therefore do the rest needed to limit its effective might. Third, wrap your goals amounting to capitulation into a package labeled as “peace.” The greater your audacity the louder should you talk about being “reasonable.” Fourth, by applying imperfect means with dogged consistency, through the means of limited war, the political pre-conditions for your full and ultimate success will emerge.
For America, the delusion derived from her defeats whose consequences she could overcome in the past, are quite threatening. First of all, the tendency to just give up pretending “it does not really matter,” encourages further and ever more strident challengers. Iran and Korea come to mind. In the past the price of ignoring enemies or of letting foes prevail has not prevented the States from getting into the ring for a second round — and to win at a time of her own choosing. Past patterns might be revealing but there is no natural law determining that history will, because it “must,” repeat itself. In Iraq America is in a warm-weather version of the Bulge. That makes this the time and that the place to stand and fight. Finally, here is a word directed to those who will tell this critic of the tactics of occupation that “Iraq is not worth it.” Right they might be. But this is not about Iraq. No convenient, good sounding cop-out will change this fact.
George Handlery is an historian. He has lived and taught in Europe since 1976.
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