Terror exercised by movements striving to gain power has an ideological foundation — whether religious or secular, the terrorists oppose modernization.

When one wades through the letters submitted in different countries to the Editor, the causes of terrorism emerge as a main topic of interest. Following the pundits, terrorism is often tied to the anger of the Arab/Muslim street. It is generally alleged that historical injustice, colonialism, poverty and the like are at the root of the phenomena.

When evaluating individual terrorists and their organizations these factors appear to have only a casual connection to terrorism. If the theory would hold water then the capitals of terrorism should be in places such as Niger. Often there is no correlation between facts and theory, such as when a (but for his parents’ origins) Western middle-class youth decides to blow up his neighborhood. As in the case of historical examples, such as Russia’s terrorist movements in the 19th century, poverty and oppression are accompanying conditions and define the context in which the terrorist acts. As a personal motive, however, these criteria will not do. A correlation that is close enough to suggest a cause and effect nexus, forces one to mention what is unmentionable in PC-terms. Our time’s terrorism correlates with mutations of Islam. Whether these are the main stream or aberrations is an issue beyond the limits of this article.

Terror exercised by movements striving to gain power has an ideological foundation. It makes little difference whether the ideology is a “secular religion” or embedded in what is conventionally called a religion. One similarity that exists in the modern era between these world views is that — among other things — they oppose modernization.

Opposing modernization has become possible only with the waning of the Middle Ages. Till that time the gap separating “world neighborhoods” was not of a dynamic nature and had little impact on the ability of the less developed to prevail against more advanced systems. In power-terms, being less advanced did not imply military inferiority. Examples — such as the primitive Germanic tribes smashing the advanced West Roman Empire  – abound. Making use of this, the Ottoman Empire (in terms of our day’s conditions it is of significance that it had been Moslem) conquered the Byzantine Empire, then South-Eastern Europe and much of Central Europe. Once Europe’s West invented progress and created political and social conditions to make it thrive, the laggards in the industrial-science-research area became weaker in the military — and, significantly — in the civilian realm. Once a “developmental lag” became possible, it developed a dynamic of its own and became the determining factor of “history” as it unfolded. This is why Turkey’s colonial advance stalled around 1550, then was reversed in 1683 and ended with the loss of all her historical conquests by 1919. Ditto for the defeat of moribund Russia by progressive Japan in 1905. The law working in the foregoing is also the cause of the repeated victories of tiny Israel over the retrograde sea of traditionalist Arab states around her.

Along with “democracy” and “nationalism,” the deepest impact of the West on the world is its unintended export of the idea of “progress” and “modernization.” This pertains in the positive as well as the negative sense. Quite regardless of its people’s pigmentation, some systems reacted to modernization by fighting it as did Tsarist Russia, or by proclaiming to join the process at an accelerated pace that became, at least officially, the goal of Russia in her Communist era.

Through the spreading of the idea of progress, modernization has become a norm by which several contemporary systems justify themselves — regardless of whether in reality their policies further or hinder catching up with the modern world. Still, the achievements to overcome the developmental lag as promised differ significantly.

Superficially viewed the task of closing the gap appears to be simple. Throughout the long period from the late Middle Ages — when Europe was a “Third World” zone — to the modern era, the West played a pioneering role as it had to invent the “wheels” on which its advance could roll. Today’s underdeveloped societies merely need to copy the achievers. However, the chance to copy the successful is seldom exploited. Why do the failures (Russia) outnumber the successes (Japan, Korea, et.al.)? The key is the affinity for “cultural learning,” the predisposition to utilize/ reject foreign solutions. 

In the process or modernization, the past of developed societies corresponds to the future of the belated movers. Due to this time-gap the problems encountered diverge. While the modernization of the initiators is organic, the followers respond to an external challenge. Frequently, reactive modernization originates from the perception of inferior power which translates into a threat. The elites leading the process are motivated not by modernization’s public welfare aspects but by more might as governors and increased influence on the international scene. This progress becomes separated from the emancipation of society. The more so since in the progress oriented dictatorships authoritarian rule (The Kims, Mugabe, Lenin/Stalin, Mao) ) is regarded as the prerequisite of advancement. In the case of the pioneers — and some late starters — a bit of progress was followed by another morsel of freedom. Belated economic upgrading detached itself from democratization. The process is often commanded by leaders who are above society. Progress correlates with the growth of national power and not with that of individual liberty. In these cases the era of modernization becomes the era of dictatorship.

The system of belated advancement is the autocracy of forced modernization. Society’s wants, declared to express “false consciousness,” are replaced by the will of the “enlightened.” Their Party “cannot err,” whereby the atrophy of coercion parallel to economic growth is canceled. The managers of power (1) act to close the power-gap, (2) regard an irrepressible conflict with the forces blamed from underdevelopment and political feebleness as the locomotive of history, (3) see life dominated by a struggle between the “good” (we the underdeveloped) and the “bad” (they, the advanced). Thereby the goal becomes not “to live better” but to “fight effectively.” Such progress’ support is weak: its results do not register on the personal level. When individual advantage can not be enlisted as a motivator it is terror that will have to replace it. Due to the separation of individual and official interests, the dictatorship becomes systematic. In successful societies the economy’s sectors are in equilibrium. Dictatorial modernizers raise the level of the power-relevant areas by depressing the civilian realm.

Besides modernization, nationalism is the other Western idea that has engulfed the world. However, nationalism and modernization are, while potentially complimentary, in practice also contradictory forces. Although triggered by the need to struggle effectively against alien incursion, effective modernization also presupposes integrating the foreign. Meanwhile, the masses are mobilized by the need to struggle against a hostile outside world. In doing so folkways which defy progress can become iconized. This way the desired result collides with the rejection of the means to achieve it.