As the march toward unification continues, the Europeans will eventually have to choose between dissolving into their constituent parts or wiping away the vestiges of sectionalism.
George de poor Handlery's article "USE or USEless?" draws many parallels and differences to the American experience of merged states. Keeping in mind, the original idea was to form, not a union, but a loose confederation; and this did not happen in a single step. To early 19th century Americans, total fusion was not the objective and success not a forgone conclusion. The Confederation preceding our present system was a non-intuitive step in an evolution toward a single nation. It was necessary for both practical and political reasons, as union did not automatically flow out of our revolt from England. The original Confederation attempted to secure the advantages of union without surrendering any state’s sovereignty. The Constitution was an admission that, if confederation were to succeed, some reduction in sovereignty must be accepted. The EU is in much the same situation as our first confederation of unsettled relations with its constituent states.
Up to the American Civil War, most Americans identified first as Virginians, New Yorkers, Massachusetts men, Ohioans, etc; and only as secondly as ‘Americans.’ This was especially true in the original thirteen with an abiding fealty to states. Robert E. Lee, when asked in 1861 to lead the union army in defense of his ‘country,’ replied “Virginia is my country.” Even passionate ‘union men’ would have hesitated had they foreseen union victory meant the reduction of the states from sovereignties to mere divisions of the federal government; whereas much of our modern preference for federalism is the product of that struggle. It was not until the 1960’s that the assertion of “states’ rights” was ineradicably drowned in denunciations of segregation (really a separate matter: northern and western states, likewise, preferred state to federal regulation in matters having nothing to do with race). It is unlikely Europeans will be more prepared to surrender national identities and loyalties, and sovereign rights than Americans in our first decades.
The thirteen colonies had, by 1783, many common traits and interests; and had not, as yet, warred internally. Yet, they remained jealously separate entities, each averse to submerging into a larger and novel entity. This is paralleled in the understandable hesitation of Europeans today. The architects of Confederation and Constitution included many leaders and heroes from the struggle for independence. Their assurance that union would not lead to a reduction of the states was critical to acceptance.
Leaders of the present European Union lack equal credentials, making union harder to gain a footing. Additionally, Europeans can see for themselves how reduced are our own states. Then, as now, there were differences of legal and cultural institutions that were seen as difficult to reconcile. There were differences in values, religious preference, ancestry, and European alliances reinforcing identification by state and region over federation. More pragmatically, there were seemingly insurmountable differences arising from the unresolved territorial claims, commerce, coinage, debts, security and slavery.
Then, as now, there were outside forces to contend with; seeking to thwart the union of the states. European commercial interests, supported by monarchies wedded to said commerce, sought to keep the newly formed states divided, the better to sustain long held advantages arising out of our rivalries. Conversely, New England favored England and Virginia favored France based on commercial ties and on the personal preferences of native statesmen. Many European ports were kept closed to American hulls to avert the loss of a lucrative shipping hegemony. Remaining opportunities to carve out new empires and existing colonies meant European interests long remained hostile to a fixed American confederation and favorable to a weak or divided America. Now, the tables are reversed, with America the commercial giant jealous of encroachment on ‘its’ interests.
There are advantages to remaining small. Change creates frictions and hardships for some while shifting advantage to others who would otherwise languish. The reunification of Germany still plagues its politics, economics, and social division. In 1789, the year of ratification, Virginia was the largest and oldest state, with claims to a territory spanning from Atlantic to Pacific Oceans, encompassing half the present day continental United States, parts of the Canadian northwest, and Alaska. Joining the confederation meant relinquishing this vast territory to contending claims in order to secure more realistic (if less tangible) advantages.
There are other advantages, but the greatest disadvantage is to liberty. Larger nations are harder to manage, and, although they may eliminate some forms of inequities, create others with a diminished capacity for redress. The larger the entity, the smaller is the individual within it. Thus, the maintenance of state sovereignty (i.e., states’ rights) was a key feature of our confederation to secure our personal liberties against a still larger and less opposable power. It was this dual sovereignty that for so long made us the freest people on earth.
A proliferation of affiliated but independent states has greater breadth for expression and experimentation. This works to advantage in two ways. First, by generating many solutions to a problem (the best of which is eventually adopted by the others); a loosely bound confederation is thus favorable to solutions that are efficient and relevant, and to which the local population readily consents. The second is in the ability to relocate from a state that puts individuals at a disadvantage to one that allows greater scope. The more burdensome state sees a loss of population and revenue disposing it to relax its regulations. The move away from states’ rights or ‘localism’ toward greater federalism has, thus, stifled our previous talent for social and economic flexibility by eliminating these differences and opportunities. That we are still relatively free is a residual matter; our freedoms slowly eroding as power flows to an undivided, unchallenged regulation.
I do not doubt a full union of the European states will take place. The timing and course of that consolidation, and the form of eventual mastery over it are harder to envision. In the short term, we can see Chirac and France have the lead, but in a generation or two, as French, Germans, Italians, and Albanians lose identity into the greater matrix, I see a day of crisis arriving in which Europeans are forced between dissolving into their constituent parts or wiping away the vestiges of sectionalism. In that day, they may win their true unification; yet lose something also of themselves and freedom. This seems to be the trend of the world. We light fires meant to set us free, only to find we are committed to systems demanding an allegiance to freedoms we no longer have nor remember how to use.
We Americans have grown ignorant of European politics; taking for granted that our interests coincide. For half a century, we’ve had little reason to pay attention as Europe was, largely, a matter of arresting Soviet expansion. With the fall of the Soviet Union, many new possibilities were born and our interests have shifted elsewhere and are commanded by other threats.
Russian participation in the EU, at face value, seems to bode greater stability and equity; and is calculated to keep Russia from acting the maverick. A shrewder evaluation would be to acknowledge Russian habits of insecurity and domination, and where those are likely to lead within the framework of union. France has the economic advantage, for now, and that is fueling French political dominance. But, that may not last if the union redistributes and augments those advantages (as is intended). Russia has never been held back for long by economics, and has an appetite for control. Russia still has China as a rival to her east, and a union with Russia may involve the whole of Europe in her rivalry. Finally, Europe has a more immediate problem dealing with Islamic fundamentalism than does the U.S., and must decide whether Europe can stand up to this threat or fall to it.
The American experiment differs in one glaring respect. The thirteen colonies that became the United States were, despite commercial interests and practical differences, formed of one people having a common heritage and culture. Regardless of the diversity of today, what cultural differences existed were minor; making union a matter of shared identity. We had a variety of churches, but the same god; and were predominantly and affectionately Protestant. Most were of English descent (most still have some British lineage). Our legal traditions all came from English common law (with residuals from Dutch law). We spoke one undifferentiated language. Although our coinage varied in value and markings, all bore the same imprint of king and language. Though we competed in commerce, we were also joined by synergies of wresting life from a raw land. We had few historical animosities between us, with most of what we did have directed at old enemies on the far side of the Atlantic; and their few countrymen this side of it. And, we had confidence in one another as fellow Americans.
Like slavery, the problem of Europe’s minorities, and how to accommodate them without succumbing to the discords they create, will prove a recurring disruption. Ethnic groups who refuse to merge or resettle, and demanding a separate body of law, make nonsense of union much as they do for states. "Ethnic cleansing" and similar experiments have already led to armed clashes, atrocity, vitriolic denunciations, and calls for separation. Yet, simplistic solutions, even when morally correct, merely set the stage for future wars. Once union becomes a reality, any failure to resolve this problem will lead to impasse after impasse as attempts are made to limit its spread. Unburdened states will be forced to participate in regulations demanded by burdened states against cherished principles. This friction will be first onerous, and finally intolerable. By comparison, slavery and race in America may prove a less intractable problem.
Europe is divided by language, laws, coinage, faiths, ideologies, commercial interests, history and trust. Britain stands out, not only by a physical separation from the continent, but, also, by a greater commonality of culture and interests with her former colonies than Europe. The EU needs Russia’s resources, but will have difficulty taming her, and has good reason to fear her. These make the realization of a true European union a greater challenge. The two factors favoring union are: a proven model (us) and a global economy that increasingly makes independent sovereignty unsustainable. Otherwise, there would be little interest in it. There are parallels in outside influences seeking to destabilize union from without. Islam has no interest in a unified Europe that checks its spread, but will favor a union that gives it a greater scope to penetrate. China’s expanding industry will see union as a threat to markets it wishes to dominate or take. And the U.S. will variously react to Europe as commercial partner, political renegade or cultural rival. Our common heritage and shared ordeals should temper that relation and make us remember we have more to gain than lose by standing with each other.
rstapler@aceweb.com
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