Overlooking the complaints of minority communities will not provide the central zone of Europe with time to “outgrow” its chronic illness.

This is about more than a lost opportunity. The problem of the evolving EU is that we are talking about yet another chance overlooked. Therefore, the miss is no surprise but another signal that something is going awry.

Historically, Europe’s determining problem came about by an unforeseen consequence of the national state. The idea of one people, one nation and one state sounds good. The problem inherent in the concept is twofold. One of the vicissitudes arises out of the definition of the “state” and its function. As the national state evolved in the 19th century, too much emphasis was placed on it as the expression of the alleged collective characteristics of its inhabitants and on its role as the protector of their economic well being. This nationalistically hued view of the state (notice the implications for “Big Government”) went against the ideals of classical liberalism. The implied Leviathan reduced the chances of resistance against the dictatorship of majorities, as in “people’s democratic dictatorship.” Meanwhile, awareness faded that freedom means the right to resist, in the name of individualism, in circumscribed areas and means, even the organization that claims to embody the “general will.” Accordingly, nationalism assumed that the nation and its state were automatically democratic and that individual rights did not precede it but was its upshot. Much of what conservatives in our time plea has roots in this original sin of modern-day political organization.

Beyond this conceptual weakness lurking in the genes of nationalist programs, the implementation of nationalism often produced results that were substantially worse than the concept’s built-in theoretical blemishes. In many regions in Europe — where the “ism” was invented — and in numerous places around the globe to which the idea was exported in the 20th century, a disparity appeared. It was between the unitary national state planned for a territory and the actual ethnic make-up of its population. Quite a difficult task for an entity that was prepared to grant rights based on ethnic belonging. If the nation-state was to work by securing, beyond its sovereignty, also the liberty and the welfare of its inhabitants, then it had to admit to be ethnically homogenous. Doing that meant that it ceased to be a nation’s state. Already in 1848 it became apparent that a conflict existed between historic claims to land and the rights of the ethnic groups populating it. Now, the national state tended to be nationalistic, and therefore inclined to assert that it was the expression of the collective will of an ethnic group. Accordingly, its advocates felt committed to secure the rights of the “people of state.” Consequently, the rights of groups that had “sneaked” into “the mother land” after an often arbitrarily set past date, were implicitly curtailed. The unwillingness of these persons to assimilate (change identity) or to depart was intolerable. Accordingly, local self determination, even the expression of the cultural identity of these ethnic sores, met with rejection as it endangered “national unity.”

Successful Switzerland’s case with “three-and-a-half nations” that all had national homes across the border — states that fought each other consistently — is an exception. Generally multi-national states were weakened by being poor, dictatorially ruled and correspondingly frustrated. The empires in this class (Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman one) disintegrated on account of their composition.

In Europe, the conflict between nationalistic demands projected on the clouds of imagination and the pits of ethnic reality on the ground, was most intense in central and eastern Europe. That was so because this central region that had the kind of turbulent history that mixes people to the extent that their separation — corresponding to the notions of nationalists — became most difficult. A good case can be made that the world wars were consequences of the tensions created by competing and frustrated nationalisms unfolding in the context of unstable states whose enemy without was identical with the ethnic enemy within. Suffice to say, as in the case of the recent — and still not settled — conflicts evolving out of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the indigenous have proven to be unable to find a solution characterized by stability, consensus and some equity for all.

In 1919 the victorious (Western) Great Powers had a chance to overcome the danger emanating from thwarted nationalism. To their credit they at least perceived of the problem. Nevertheless the peace, pontificated over by Wilson — a worthy precursor of Carter — and inspired by Clemenceau, did everything to replace old dung heaps with new cesspools. Given the high expectations raised, the total dissatisfaction of all was greater than before the war. A great number of successor states were set up that either wanted more than they already got or resented what they had lost. The new, often synthetic creations (chiefly of France’s grace) were as multi-ethnic as their predecessors — but less generous to their “alien” and suspected subjects. Therefore the new order provided for even less stability than known in the past. Hitler and then Stalin became the ultimate beneficiaries.

With the advent of the European Union and the peaceful demise of the USSR, therefore without a general war, the Continent had been extended a new opportunity to solve its problems. Nevertheless, the signs, alas, point to a repetition of the past.

The Union’s Western founding members possess magnetic attraction for the nations that had been freed as the result of Cold War victory from Soviet tutelage. This attraction is partly an economic one. To “buy into” a successful franchise is tempting for poor societies that have missed, while subjugated, several decades of organic development. This is a major asset and it should be used.

A further “major asset” to be made into chips to stabilize a zone with a 100 million inhabitants, is security-related. Central and eastern Europe suffers from a collective memory defined by abusive great powers and the hostility of neighbors. Historically, great powers — and local major powers — have not taken long to exploit the opportunity to trawl in a pond filled with small fish eager to bite. Understandably, the uneasiness is general. In this situation the EU — in part due to its overestimated affiliation with NATO — appears to have the power to protect the states of Europe’s central region without wanting to subjugate them. In an interesting departure from the pattern of the past, the EU (and naturally the US) is the first great power that has to be “invited in” instead of being hell-bent to barge into the region.

An affiliation with the EU being coveted, Brussels benefits from a yearning that should be converted into and asset. This political capital could have been spent to limit the chauvinistic and dictatorial tendencies elaborated at the outset. This is a command to exploit the chance of overcoming a pattern bequeathed by history, by accepting only new members that are at peace among themselves and within themselves. At this juncture we also encounter general EU interests. When extending membership, an effective union should raise the question whether the candidate fits into the existing compact. The EU’s success will not be determined by its size but by its ability to integrate new societies without lowering the original Club’s standards. Therefore, what does not fit should not be let in. Brussels should have been more selective in its past policy on membership. It would also have been wise to be more discriminating than is the case in extending the hope of admittance.

The time to implement elementary rules is before admittance and not after entry. Leverage is to be used while one has it. As things stand, it seems that in setting and enforcing its criteria, the EU concentrated on some areas and ignored others. Even within this one-sidedness, the standard of judgment regarding economic compatibility was cursory. The same goes for “democracy.” Once a few formal norms of majority rule were superficially met, political correctness dictated the handing out of a passing grade. With this approach, diverse ruling groups were saved from chiding and Brussels was spared of the hurt laments of insulted elites. Meanwhile, solving problems by politely declaring them to be non-substantial, the social-political ailments and risks passed on by a tradition that is hard to praise, remain ignored.

To be specific — while avoiding concrete country-cases — the failure to make the correct treatment of minorities a sine qua non of even candidacies, is the Achilles heel of the EU’s expansion. This is even more amazing as the past provides plenty of evidence of the damaging consequences of mismanaged minority policies. EU membership by itself will not remedy the ailment. Here the expectations of the US’ Founding Fathers that slavery would be overcome through a natural process once the union was in place, provides a good analogy. Several new and prospective members of the EU are not homogenous national states. Frequently the view of the majority — which is often a minority in some districts — is that their minorities, actually infiltrators, live where they are allowed to stay and that these are tolerated only by the grace of the people of state. Extending a few formal “privileges” is sufficient to “get away with it,” given the EU’s perfunctory supervision.

Not surprisingly, a policy to grant meaningful “rights” is hardly in place. It was not necessary in the past and it is not seriously demanded and enforced at present. Not to solve the ethnic problem by deportation or by extermination — except for notorious slip ups, some of which are remembered while others are officially erased from memory — is regarded as sufficient largesse. The free use of the minority’s language and unhindered schooling in it counts, as is often the practice of their religion, as an extravagant expectation in some capitals. This is especially the stance of political parties whose core agenda is to save the country by keeping the “foreigners” down. The demand of local autonomy and self government, such as it is practiced in the South Tyrol, are honestly considered in some countries as milestones on the road to the intended destruction of their state. In part, the force behind the reluctance to accept minority rights is based on the inherited deficiencies of the region’s political culture.

This little story makes the point. A prominent journalist known to the writer once made an experiment. He told the chauvinistic “leader” of a country that he had an idea of how to handle the large and systematically disadvantaged minority his land was “suffering from.” He then related to the man briefly the Swiss system of federalism. Naturally he did not mention that what he was presenting as a theory had been practiced for generations. The man listened carefully and opined in the end that this was nice but like all dreams, it just could not work in practice.

Unfortunately “Europe’s” attempt to deal with the problem by pussyfooting instead of applying pressure for the sake of solutions emits the wrong signal. Given the frame of mind of only too many politically uncouth local leaders, the circle made by the EU around the “inadequacy” is not interpreted as a courtesy allotting more time. It is rather registered as a conniving wink to proceed in the old and only way against the riff-raff spoiling the purity of the Fatherland.

The features to be implemented if the extended Europe is to be stable, free of tension, and ultimately prosperous, are simple to state and apparently hard to realize. What is needed is a nudge to break with the goal of overcoming existing diversity by creating homogenous national states through pressure. This demands that the role of the borders be reconsidered by most of the new member countries. Borders must become in the mind of the political classes a line demarcating political sovereignties. Borders are not ethnic boundaries. In the case of national groups who live on the “right” or the “wrong” side of the line, the boundary must be allowed to become irrelevant in the conduct of their own local affairs. For a person it should not be of decisive consequence in which country his house stands.� Just as in the case of, shall we say, Danes living Schleswig-Holstein, the border must not have an impact on personal and collective self-determination. Once this is achieved, living in minority status — probably separated only by an arbitrary line from the state of their ethnic kin — will cease to be a “punishment.” With that, people originally frustrated by being made subject to an alien state, will have a reason to feel like citizens of what evolves to become through applied pluralism, their country, too. With this the dangerous issue of contesting existing borders will be moot. Concurrently, the hysterical existential fear of those, whose possessions are in danger of being contested, will ebb.

The core-EU’s perfunctory treatment of the collective rights issue in and among its new and prospective members is only partly excused by bringing lack of information due to Soviet rule. During that intermezzo Moscow had suppressed the discussion of violated minorities — without doing much to discourage the practice. Anyhow, old and new information regarding the festering sores is available. By looking and listening, a lot more could be ascertained. Overlooking the complaints of minority communities, by politely labeling the issue as an “internal affair,” or demonstrating disinterest, will not provide the central zone of Europe with time to “outgrow” its chronic illness. Inaction will make matters worse to the point where the discord might, as it had before, rise to the surface. Ignoring the problem is only a tiny bit easier than principled action to facilitate a solution would be at this opportune juncture. Postponing action into the future will mean that effective palliative measures become difficult. Skeletons have a disturbing habit of walking out of the closets where the naïve think to have banned them.

George Handlery is an historian. He has lived and taught in Europe since 1976.

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