The lack of U.S. action in response to the October 2000 attack on the USS COLE best underscores the ineffectiveness and weakness of the Clinton administration NSC.

The story of the Military Intelligence group “Able Danger” and� last year’s� Katyusha missile attack on the Kearsarge Expeditionary Strike Group, by recalling the attack on the USS Cole,� put the national security policies of the Clinton administration under the scrutiny.� While there are many incidents that can be used as evidence of the Clinton-era� National Security Council’s� failure to deal with international terrorism, the lack of U.S. action in response to the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole best underscores the ineffectiveness and weakness of the Clinton administration NSC.

THE TRAGEDY AT ADEN

The USS Cole (DDG 67), an Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer, left Norfolk Naval Station on August 8, 2000 for a standard six month deployment to the Fifth Fleet Area of Responsibility (AOR).� 505 feet long, with a crew of 249 Sailors, it was one of the most advanced warships of the U.S. Navy.ⁱ�

To most of the officers and crew, this would be a routine deployment.� There were no major wars being waged; and the actions that were taking place around the globe would not require the ship to be up close and personal with the enemy.� On October 12, 2000, while refueling at the port of Aden, Yemen, that would all change.�

In order to better understand the attack on the USS Cole in the context of contemporary American foreign policy, a description of the issue and an analysis of three major elements involved in that issue is required.� Describing the issue, namely the attack on the Cole itself, will serve to emphasize the major events and the actors involved in the incident.� In addition, a description of the issue will allow one to identify the major research problem that requires resolution; specifically, the reason, or reasons, why no action was taken by the Clinton Administration in response to the attack.� In an attempt to accomplish such a resolution, the subsequent analytical sections will be focused on answering this crucial and fundamental question.� � � �

The Clinton administration’s foreign policy in effect at the time played a pivotal role in the development of the forces that combined and acted that fateful day in October.� The foreign policy identity that best explains this sequence of events is the doctrine of Global Meliorism, a doctrine that pervaded the Clinton administration’s foreign policy apparatus.� The major elements of Global Meliorism will be reviewed, its expectations assessed, and an analysis of how these expectations contrasted with the actual course of events will be presented; with the outcome of the analysis being the fact that adoption of such a doctrine served to weaken the ability of the United States to respond effectively to the attack on the Cole.�

Next, our study will scrutinize the role played by the Clinton National Security Council (NSC) in response to the attack on the Cole.� Frozen into inaction by waiting for “clear and compelling”� evidence,ⁱⁱ the major actions expected of the NSC will be reviewed, and those expectations contrasted with the actions actually taken by the Clinton administration’s NSC.� This will show that the NSC did not act in accordance with its assigned role because it was pervaded by Small Group Decision Making and Group Think Syndrome.

Finally, a review of the subsequent reactions of the Clinton NSC will show that future American foreign policy must be able to react without having to wait for “sufficient provocation.”ⁱⁱⁱ� � An issue that will be sure to spark debate, reaction to attack assumes that available intelligence is reliable.� Thus, the American Intelligence Program is expected to be effective, and in the case of the attack on the Cole, careful analysis will show that it was.� But the debate will center not on intelligence, but on one crucial issue: the future foreign policy identity of the United States.� Will America be a Crusader State, and all that implies, or will the future of American foreign policy lie in the realm of Realism, where national security interests take precedence over the socio-economic ills of the world?

OCTOBER 12, 2000: A BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL

The Cole is a $1 billion dollar command and control ship equipped with the latest version of the Aegis air warfare defense system.� It can track more than one hundred aircraft, ships and missile targets at the same time; and link this data to other ships and stations to present a realtime, coordinated picture of the battlespace.^iv� � It boasts an impressive array of weapon systems: anti-aircraft missiles, anti-ship missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles, torpedoes, 5 inch 50 Caliber machine guns and the 20mm CIWS Vulcan Gatling gun.� While impressive, such weapons would be of little use against two suicide bombers in a small boat.

The Attack

The Cole had passed through the Suez Canal and into the Red Sea at the beginning of October 2000.� Following standard procedure, the ship’s Executive Officer contacted the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a, the capitol of Yemen, in order to gain country clearance and confirm the ship’s stop at Aden on the 12th to take on fuel.� � She would be two months into a six month deployment with the Fifth Fleet when she pulled into the port of Aden to take on fuel.� Not a liberty port, the crew would remain onboard while the ship refueled.� The time that the fuelling would take would be less than six hours.� At 10:30 AM local Aden time, on October 12, she began to take on fuel.^v� � At 11:18 AM, 48 minutes later, disaster struck.�

A small craft, identical to the numerous fishing boats that populated the harbor, gunned its motor and headed directly for the Cole.� The suicide bombers seemed to be aiming at the center of the ship; a point located between the two exhaust towers that rose from the destroyer’s deck.^vi� � In the last moments before the impact, the attackers stood up and saluted.
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The bomb exploded amidships.� The attackers had succeeded in blowing a hole over twenty feet high and over forty feet wide in the Cole’s hull.^vii� � Seventeen American Sailors were killed, and thirty wounded.� The ship stayed afloat, but badly damaged.� It was later concluded by CIA analysts that with slightly more skilled execution, “…the bomber’s would have killed three hundred [Sailors] and sent the destroyer to the bottom.”^viii�

The Actors

There was no specific intelligence or tactical warning that the Cole was going to be attacked.� The Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), headed by Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clark, had been concerned with the security of ports in the region; and had no idea that U.S. Navy ships were making port calls to the country of Yemen.� As stated by Mike Sheehan, the State Department representative to the CSG, “Yemen’s a viper’s nest of terrorists.� What the [expletive deleted] was the Cole doing there in the first place?”^ix� � This assessment made it obvious that if the CSG had known that U.S. Navy ships were making port calls to Yemen, they would have strongly recommended that such port calls be discontinued.� But the Defense Department had not presented the Aden port visit for interagency review; and as a result, they had no idea.^x� As it would turn out, Richard Clark and his CSG were the only actors that were forward leaning and constantly warning Clinton’s NSC about the dangers Al-Qaeda posed.� Within the NSC, Clark would be marginalized by the principals and be the lone voice of dissent; a voice calling for military action against Al-Qaeda in reprisal for the attack on the Cole.� He knew exactly whom to blame and punish.

President Clinton himself was loathe to attack Al-Qaeda and their Taliban guardians without positive proof that it was indeed Al-Qaeda behind the attack.� According to his memoirs, Clinton “…was very frustrated that I could not get definitive answer as to who was behind the Cole attack.”^xi� � While the investigations of the FBI, CIA and the CSG all pointed to Bin Laden and his network, President Clinton felt that there was no definitive link that tied Bin Laden to the attack (the tie would come months later in 2001).� As a result, Clinton, “…did not think it would be responsible for a president to launch an invasion of another country based on a preliminary judgement.”^xii� � So, although the mounting evidence had already concluded that there was a link between the Cole attackers and Al-Qaeda, with his requirement of clear and compelling proof that Bin Laden was involved, he would take no action.� With the exception of Richard Clark (who was not a principal member of the NSC), this was the attitude of the entire NSC staff.

Another key figure was Samuel “Sandy” Berger, National Security Advisor to the President, who echoed the sentiments of the president.� This is strange, because it was Berger himself who tied Al-Qaeda to the Cole attack.� On November 25, 2000, Berger wrote President Clinton, stating that “…although the FBI and CIA investigations had not reached a formal conclusion, they (he and Clark) believed the investigations would soon conclude that the attack had been carried out by…members that belonged to Al-Qaeda,” but, “Bin Laden had not been tied personally� to the attack…”^xiii

Secretary of State Madeline Albright also toed the Clinton line when it came to the issue of a military response against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.� She was against reprisal for diplomatic reasons.� “We’re desperately trying to halt the fighting that has broken out between Israel and the Palestinians,” Albright said in a conversation with Richard Clark, “bombing Muslims won’t be helpful at this time.”^xiv� � But this is a contradictory statement –- two weeks earlier, Ariel Sharon had visited the Temple Mount, which had already touched off the second intifada and was already threatening the Clinton administration’s hopes for a Middle East peace settlement, and Secretary Albright was aware of this fact.
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Most surprising of all, Secretary of Defense William Cohen did not call for retaliation against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.� As Defense Secretary, it was his Department that had been hit hardest.� According to Cohen, the direct attack on a U.S. National Asset, the death of seventeen Sailors, and the wounding of thirty more did not� provide “sufficient provocation”^xv� for a military strike against Al-Qaeda.� In addition, General Anthony Zinni, then the commander of CENTCOM, did not desire or see the need for a retaliatory strike.� He did not want to upset the U.S. military relations with the nation of Pakistan.�

The views of Cohen and Zinni were in perfect accord with the views of the president, his National Security Advisor, and the Secretary of State; in fact, it was the view shared by the entire National Security Council, with the exception of Clark.� In the end, for the reasons presented, the principals were against the retaliation plan proposed by the CSG by a margin of seven to one.� This is perplexing.� Sheehan said it best: “This phenomenon I cannot explain.� Why didn’t they want to go hit back at those who had just murdered American servicemen without warning or provocation?”^xvi� � This raises the question that requires resolution: why didn’t the Clinton administration respond to the attack on the USS Cole?� This is an important question, because in the aftermath of the attack, terrorists all over the world were left with one crucial lesson: American warships could be attacked with impunity, and the world’s sole superpower would not respond.^xvii

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND GLOBAL MELIORISM

The Clinton administration’s reluctance to use force can be directly tied to their adoption of a foreign policy based on the doctrine of Global Meliorism.� Indeed, the bombing of the Cole was not the only incident that the administration did not respond to.� During his administration, Al-Qaeda had attacked U.S. interests a number of times: in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia and even the United States.� None of these attacks were taken seriously; and they were treated from a law enforcement perspective.� This was because the Clinton foreign policy was not based on concrete national security elements, but on the desire to rid the world of social and economic strife, and the development of human rights.� Military force was used for these ends, and was always reactionary in nature because Humanitarian Assistance (HA) missions were never undertaken in a preemptive manner.� They were always a response –- the Operations in Haiti and Somalia are prime examples of this.

Major Tenets of Global Meliorism

Writing in Foreign Affairs, Walter McDougall explains Global Meliorism as follows: “Global Meliorism…is the socioeconomic and cultural answer, for it aims to make the world a better and safer place through the promotion of economic growth, human rights and democracy.”^xviii� � It is based on the assumption that the root causes of aggression and radical ideologies are poverty, ignorance, oppression and despair.� President Clinton and his advisers, realizing that there were no major geopolitical threats to the United States immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, came to the conclusion that Meliorism was the method best suited for his administration’s foreign policy.

America, viewed through the eyes of a Global Meliorist, is not just an exceptional nation.� It is a Crusader State, with the duty to bring deliverance to a planet divided by the human evils of violence, strife and war.� As a guide for the Clinton administration it shaped its foreign policy, and the president and his advisors worked their foreign policy process based on the certainty that the elements that threatened U.S. National Security were products of subjugation and misery, and the administration acted to attack the causes of these symptoms.�

Meliorist Expectations

Based on the tenets of the Global Meliorist, one can see that the response (or non-response) of the Clinton administration in regards to the attack on the USS Cole was completely in keeping with those tenets.� Opponents of Clinton’s approach noted that he seemed eager to intervene abroad only when U.S. National Security elements were not engaged, and this indeed was the case with the Cole.� The Clinton administration would rather mount efforts against what they believed were the causes of the attack: the poverty in Yemen, its low literacy level, and the prevalence of radical Islamic ideologies in the region.� Add to that the fact that Clinton was attempting to broker a peace settlement between the Israelis and Palestinians, a presidential election was imminent and his two term presidency was ending, and one can see that any plans at retaliation were never seriously considered.

Contrasting Expectations and Reality�

The Global Meliorist policy of the Clinton administration fits in precisely with its actions during the entire Cole affair.� Indeed, the non-response of the administration is the expected outcome predicted by a Global Meliorist foreign policy identity.� As stated by McDougall, “Global Meliorism rests on the conviction that most of the phenomena that threaten U.S. security are products of oppression and poverty, and that a wise foreign policy will attack the causes rather than the symptoms.”^xix� To President Clinton, a reprisal attack would not have solved anything.�

CLINTON’S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The primary members of Clinton’s National Security Council (NSC) were the President himself, Secretary of State Albright, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, Secretary of Defense Cohen, and while not a principal, head of the CSG Richard Clark.� As previously stated, the entire council voted against Clark’s recommendation of reprisal against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.� This was because of the Global Meliorist mentality that pervaded the Clinton administration; and it was also because of the spheres of influence and intrapersonal politics within the NSC.� Clinton’s NSC fell subject to the pitfalls of the Small Group Decision making policy model; and became trapped in its decision making by Group Think Syndrome.

The National Security Council: Expectations

The Committee known as the National Security Council (NSC) was the result of the 1947 National Security Act.� As written in its legislation, its function is to advise the president “with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.”^xx� While the nature of the day to day work within the NSC is bound to change from administration to administration, there is one expectation that the American public assumes is inherent within the body: the ability and determination to take action to protect American interests, assets and lives; and if attacked, to respond with force to ensure that future attacks are deterred.�

Debate is another expectation inherent within the NSC; and it is the nature of any government bureaucracy to have serious debate when making crucial and far-reaching decisions.� It is because of this expected debate that one assumes that good decisions will be made.� At the level of the NSC, one expects bureaucratic turf battles to be put aside; and real problem solving to take place.

In the case of the Cole attack, Clinton’s NSC was the actor most influential in there being no response to the outrage.� This is especially noteworthy, because all of the major bureaucracies involved in the administration of the U.S. government have representatives on the NSC.� In the case of the Cole, all of those bureaucracies were unanimous in their recommendations of there being no reprisals toward Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.� Which once again poses the question: Why did the U.S. Government not respond?

NSC Actual Events and Expectations: The Contrast

The two major expectations previously discussed were not executed by Clinton’s NSC in response to the Cole attack.� The first expectation, that of the NSC recommending strong action in response to attacks on U.S. interests to the president, did not occur.� The second expectation, debate in order to come up with and propose the best decision relevant to the situation to the president, also did not occur.� Why not? These two crucial expectations did not come to pass because the NSC staff had locked itself into the Small Group Decision Making process and Group Think Syndrome.�

As written by Hastedt, “Advocates of this perspective (the Small Group Decision Making Model) hold that many critical foreign policy decisions are made neither by an individual policy maker nor by large bureaucratic forces.”^xxi� � This is indeed the case when applied to the Clinton administration NSC.� However, in spite of its advantages (absence of significant conflict, free and open exchange, swift and decisive action), the NSC was trapped into a unanimous defective decision regarding the Cole attacks because of the presence of strong in group pressures for all members to concur with the overall group decision, which was to not respond to the Cole attacks.� This is known as Group Think Syndrome.^xxii� � Because of the Meliorist mindset within the NSC, all members (except for Clark) did not desire to counter the attack, and the entire NSC believed this was the best response to the issue.� Blinded by Group Think, they did understand that not responding to the attack on the Cole would embolden Al-Qaeda terrorist operators, and cement their belief that they could attack American interests with impunity.� In addition, Clark was marginalized and his recommendation for reprisal was not even debated within the NSC.� � Thus the two major expectations that one would anticipate from the NSC, the recommendation for a forceful and deterrent response and a structured and true debate regarding all options, never materialized.� Once again, in the actions of Clinton’s NSC, we see that Global Meliorism plays the key role; and that its responses to the Cole attack were defective because of the weaknesses inherent in the Small Group Decision Making Process and symptoms of Group Think Syndrome.� What was expected from the NSC in this episode did not come to pass.

DEBATING THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The attack on the USS Cole puts into stark relief the debate facing Americans today in regards to foreign policy.� If we are to accept Global Meliorism as the key foundation of American foreign policy, we have to be aware that there are certain assumptions that the doctrine takes into account.� As reported by McDougall, “Meliorism assumes that the United States possesses the power, prestige, technology, wealth and altrusim needed to reform whole nations…[and that] the United States knows how to uplift the poor and oppressed.”^xxiii� � Herein lies the nature of the debate: does America truly have the assets and spirit required of it to carry out these awesome tasks?�

Or do we look at the issue from another perspective: does the United States need to be a Crusader State?� Should it not adopt a Realist approach and take into account true national security interests?� If the attack on the Cole is an indication of the nature of the current world order, one would have to say that the current state of world affairs will not be kind to the United States if it adopts a Global Meliorist attitude.� � �

Another aspect of the debate involves the pitfalls of policy making bodies like the National Security Council.� Is it truly proof against the negative aspects of the Small Group Decision making process?� Or will it fall prey to Group Think, and fail to recommend to the president well thought out and debated recommendations?� These are vital questions –- questions that affect the well being of all Americans.

CONCLUSIONS

On October 12, 2000, seventeen American Sailors were killed when their ship, the USS Cole (DDG 67) was attacked by terrorists while taking on fuel in the port of Aden Yemen.� For all of the modern weaponry that this American warship was outfitted with, it was not able to repel the attack of two suicide bombers in a makeshift skiff armed with an improvised, shaped charge.� The result of the attack was a gaping 40-foot hole in the ship’s port side, and the near sinking of the ship.� The reactions of the primary actors involved surprised many: President Clinton, Secretary of State Albright, Secretary of Defense Cohen, and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger all opted for no reaction against Al-Qaeda and their Taliban guardians.� Their argument was that there was no positive link between the attack and Bin Laden; however, most CIA and CSG analysts had already established links between the attackers and Al-Qaeda.� The lone voice of dissent was Richard Clark, head of the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG).� As a result, the research question that requires resolution becomes obvious: why didn’t the Clinton administration retaliate or respond against Al-Qaeda for the bombing of the USS Cole?

The foreign policy identity of Global Meliorism best explains why the Clinton NSC did not respond with force against Al-Qaeda in response to the Cole.� Global Meliorism focuses on causes rather than symptoms.� As a result, because of the Meliorist attitude pervading the Clinton NSC, no action was taken.� Other factors that stopped retaliatory action were the negative aspects of Small Group Decision making; and the level of Group Think Syndrome that had trapped the Clinton NSC.� No debate was possible, and the lone voice of dissent was marginalized.� �

Finally, the debate over the future of American foreign policy was forced to the forefront of the American mindset as a result of the Cole attack.� Absorbing and controversial, the debate will likely center on one main issue: will America become a Crusader State, and assume the burden of global savior, or will Realism triumph and American foreign policy assume a Realist identity?

In the end, it can be argued that Global Meliorism does not work, or is beyond America’s current capabilities.� Not only does the doctrine rest on the conviction that the threats facing the United States are the results of oppression and poverty, it also argues that a smart foreign policy will attack the causes and not the symptoms.� Thus, events such as the Cole bombing have a high probability of not being responded to when Global Meliorism is the identity of American foreign policy.� But most important, Meliorism assumes that Americans want to take on the burden of and dedicate their lives and fortunes to saving the world; and it is this assumption that turn out to be the doctrine’s greatest weakness.

ENDNOTES

i.� U.S. Navy, USS Cole Home Page, 10 Dec 2004, < www.cole.navy.mil/index.htm>
ii.� Richard Miniter, Losing Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton’s Failures Unleashed Global Terror.� (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2003) 226.�
iii.� Miniter, 226.
iv.� Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: The Penguin Press 2004), 532.
v.� Miniter, 217.
vi� Miniter, 217.
vii.� Coll, 532.
viii.� Coll, 532.
ix.� Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror.� (New York: Free Press, 2004), 223.
x.� Clarke, 224.
xi.� William Jefferson Clinton, My Life, (New York: Knopf, 2003), 952.
xii.� National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 195.�
xiii.� 9/11 Commission Report, 194.
xiv.� Miniter, 224.
xv.� Miniter, 226.
xvi.� Miniter, 227.
xvii.� Miniter, 229.
xviii.� Walter A. McDougall “Back to Bedrock: The Eight Traditions of American Statecraft.”� www.foreignaffairs.org, March/April 1997, Foreign Affairs, 03 October 2004 < http://www.foreingaffairs.org>, 4.
xix.� McDougall, 9.
xx.� Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The NSC’s Mid-Life Crisis” Foreign Policy, 69 (1987/88), 80-99.
xxi.� Glenn P. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy:Past, Present and Future, Fifth Edition (Upper Saddle River:Prentice Hall, 2003) 248.
xxii.� Hastedt, 250.
xxiii.� McDougall, 10.