Payday loans
Cialis
Car insurance

The Other Minutemen: Missile Defense Arrives, Just in Time

As we celebrate our day of independence and freedom, we should be thankful for our new minutemen and the men most responsible for them — Ronald W. Reagan and George W. Bush.

Every day brings news of the Minutemen on Mexico’s border; and on this 230th birthday of the American idea, we recall the original Minutemen, who stood ready to meet the British threat at a moment's notice.

But little noticed even by those conservatives who hungered for its creation since long before Ronald Reagan’s 1983 “Star Wars” speech, another Minuteman stands ready this Fourth of July. And in its job, minutes are the difference between life and millions of deaths.

In 1776, the British were determined to strangle America's freedom in its cradle; but even so, they shared more values with the colonials than not, and defeat, however tragic, would not have meant the wholesale slaughter of the U.S. population.

Today the threat is very different indeed. An evil assortment of equally resolute foes — foes of both our liberty and that of the rest of the world — directly seeks our annihilation. Just this Monday, North Korea, that sick cross between 1984 and Atlas Shrugged, threatened America with nuclear war. Iran looms, the Indian Subcontinent seems forever on the brink, and weapons technology continues its spread.

But finally, we're ready.

Late last month, George W. Bush “turned on” America’s missile defense. For the very first time, Reagan’s vision is a reality: America’s small but growing missile shield is fully operational. And the best is yet to come.

When Bush was sworn into office on January 2001, despite large majorities who believed the contrary, America had no defense against incoming missiles at all. 

That's because we were legally committed to the deranged doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD).  Embodied in the 1974 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, MAD proposed that the best defense was none at all. Rather, the superpowers relied on a "balance of terror" to deter one another, with each holding the other’s civilian population hostage to instantaneous vaporization.

MAD was, well, mad, and utterly morally reprehensible. But even more relevant for today, MAD took two to tango: rational leaders playing a complex global game who could realistically be deterred.

But what if there are more than two players, with radically different goals and endgames in mind? And what if the enemy is demonstrably unstable or irrational, like the leaders of North Korea and Iran? Who really knows what Kim Jong Il, purposely presiding over an unending North Korean famine, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, seeking to bring about the firey return of the Hidden Imam, might do?

This much is certain, though: nuclear blackmail is a lot harder against a country which can shoot your missiles down.

Thus, in December 2001, President Bush scrapped the ABM Treaty, a courageous step even Ronald Reagan never took.  And this was no idle thing: he immediately began deployment of a missile shield, today consisting of 11 ground-based interceptors at sites in Alaska and California. Talks are under way for a third site in Eastern Europe (to protect against Iran), and Japan just signed on as well. This is just the beginning, both in quantity and quality; from the Airborne Laser (ABL) program to the sea-based, upgraded AEGIS system this column has promoted for years (and which was successfully tested off Hawaii just last week), the President is moving rapidly to make a nuclear 9/11 as unlikely as humanly possible.

He’s not a moment too soon.  Amid recent reports that North Korea is preparing to launch its Taepodong-2 ballistic missile — its first true ICBM, capable of reaching Hawaii, Alaska, or even California — the shield’s necessity couldn’t be clearer.

Some question the system’s accuracy; and while Lt. General Henry "Trey" Obering, the builder of our system,  says he's "very confident" that our current shield can shoot down any missile launched from North Korea, questions certainly remain.

But some missile defense is self-evidently better than no missile defense. It adds uncertainty to the calculation of any potential attacker: who really wants to bet against America’s technical proficiency?  And as the technology keeps improving, and more layers of redundancy are added to the system, accuracy will grow better and better as well.

Bottom line: our wives and daughters are safer this week because of George W. Bush. Like the famed Minutemen on the eve of the American Revolution, his missile shield stands ready to defend us at a moment's notice. As one Pentagon official told Reuters, "It's good to be ready."

Indeed.  As we celebrate our day of independence and freedom, we should be thankful for our new minutemen and the men most responsible for them — Ronald W. Reagan and George W. Bush.

Happy Independence Day.

Share

21 comments to The Other Minutemen: Missile Defense Arrives, Just in Time

  • Chris Crawford

    While I agree that the end of the Cold War has rendered the MAD doctrine obsolete, I think missile defense is a waste of money. You spend X dollars to obtain Y percentage of shooting down an incoming missile. But remember that your enemy can spend Z dollars to build more missiles to penetrate your defenses. The problem here is that the relationships between X, Y, and Z are very much in favor of the attacker. He can always build more missiles to obtain greater success rates for less money than it costs you to maintain your standard of protection.

    Consider: suppose that we spend a trillion bucks to get ourselves a system that has a 90% chance of stopping a single incoming missile. Those numbers are in the right ballpark with current technology. The problem is, once your enemy has obtained the basic capacity to build ICBMs, his economies of scale are excellent; ten ICBMs will cost your enemy very little more than one ICBM (all the cost is in R&D). Let’s say your enemy can build a decent little ICBM for a marginal cost of $100 million. So for an investment of $1 billion your enemy can obtain a 65% chance of getting one missile through your defenses. To cut that probability in half, you’ll need to spend, say, another trillion dollars. So he spends another few billion and you’re right back where you were. He can drive you into economic ruin this way — exactly the same way that the containment policy drove the Soviet Union into economic ruin.

    Missile defense makes no economic sense. It makes people feel safe, but in the long run, you get more “unbang” for your buck with other methods.

  • The American people would rightfully never forgive an administration that couldn’t defend America even if that defense fell short.

    Also… tyrannies can risk their own people, so North Korea illustrates mathmatical calculations do not make suicide a moral strategy.

  • Defense costs are relative to the size of your economy so the ’10′ missiles built by North Korea cost them much more as a percentage of GNP then the ABM’s required to shoot them down.

    But the mathmatical calculations done by Mr. Crawford are exactly backwards.

    The “cost” is the damage done by the missile that penetrates. No one cares that an ICBM cost $100 million, they care that the ICBM does $ Trillions in damage to the target city, the national economy as well as the tens of thousands of lives lost.

    So the defense against that incoming missile is cost/effective when compared to the damage it could do and even if we out spent North Korea 100 to 1 it would still be less of a burden against our GNP then against theirs.

  • Chris Crawford

    DANEgerus, your point about the cost of a missile hit is exactly my point: we cannot accept anything less than 90% effectiveness, and in fact we need something closer to 99% effectiveness. The problem here is that the costs of a system increase astronomically if you want to get that high. The system that we have right now has effectiveness well below 50%; it’s really a PR stunt, not a defensive shield.

    You’re quite right that we could afford to outspend North Korea by 100 to 1. But could we afford to outspend them 1000 to 1? At the 99% effectiveness range, the ratios of spending go through the roof. More importantly, wouldn’t a diplomatic approach (if successful — a big if) be immensely cheaper than a military approach? If the diplomatic approach has a 10% chance of success, and costs a few million, then wouldn’t that be a better approach than a military approach that costs a few trillion and gives us only a 90% chance of success?

  • Mike

    What has not been discussed in the Comment Section is the deterrent value of the Missile Defense Systems (MDS). Will North Korea (et. al.) make the investment of 10 ICBMs with a 65% chance of ONE warhead hitting it’s target, knowing that it is then subject to FULL U.S. retaliation? Game Over.

    MDS does not need to be perfect. It just needs to make the other guy think twice about hitting the button.

    Which is the more catastrophic outcome: MDS serves as sufficient deterrent and we never need to use it -or- We actually have to employ MDS and visit retribution on the state that tried (and failed) to test it?

  • Chris Crawford

    Mike, is it the deterrent value of the counterstrike that protects us or the anti-missile system? If the former, then we don’t need the latter. North Korea’s will face a counterstrike no matter how successful their strike is. So if they are deterred by the threat of that counterstrike, we don’t need an anti-missile system. The only justification for the anti-missile system is the belief that an enemy with ICBMs would not be deterred by the threat of a counterstrike.

  • Mike

    CC- The essence of deterrence has always been the threat of a counterstrike. Missile Defense adds an additional dimension to deterrence that we did not enjoy during the Cold War.

    Of course we do not truly know if the likes of Jong Il or Ahmedinejad can be deterred simply by threat of a counterstrike. MDS offers the option of a full nuclear response in the event of a (likely) failed strike, or a more politically acceptable limited retalliation.

    Either way, MDS proves it’s value by reducing the likelihood of a successful first (and probably last) strike against the US or our allies. Additionally it provides a justifiable causus belli for taking action against these states without having to needlessly sacrifice an American (or allied) city in the process.

    …and at the end of the day if no weapons are launched, then its money well spent.

  • Chris Crawford

    Mike, let’s go through your reasoning carefully:

    “Missile Defense adds an additional dimension to deterrence that we did not enjoy during the Cold War.”

    During the Cold War, we deliberately eschewed missile defense because it destabilized MAD, making war more likely, not less likely. What we “enjoyed” from the absence of missile defense was greater security.

    “MDS offers the option of a full nuclear response in the event of a (likely) failed strike, or a more politically acceptable limited retalliation.”

    No, that option is available to us regardless of whether or not we have a missile defense system. The existence of a missile defense system in this scenario plays no role in deterrence whatever. Historically, it played a destabilizing role in our deterrence relationship with the Soviet Union — but that was solely because of the problems of transition. If we anticipated that North Korea might in the future attempt a first strike against our missile silos, then a missile defense system for those silos might be a prudent course of action. But it is highly unlikely that North Korea will ever have the resources to mount a disabling first strike.

    “Either way, MDS proves it’s value by reducing the likelihood of a successful first (and probably last) strike against the US or our allies.”

    What do you mean by “successful”? Any strike by North Korea (or Iran, for that matter) will be a limited strike against our cities, attempting to inflict heavy casualties. They will not attempt a disabling strike against our missiles, so they will have to face our counterstrike — which is certain to be far more destructive than their strike. Ergo, the only scenario we have to fear is the “crazy dictator” scenario in which the attacker simply doesn’t care about the counterstrike. But a crazy dictator can launch a dozen missiles and have a good chance of getting one through — unless we are willing to spend trillions of dollars on a multi-layer system. Don’t you think that diplomatic efforts would be more cost-effective than such a system?

    “…and at the end of the day if no weapons are launched, then its money well spent.”

    Indeed so. And if no weapons are even built, then it’s diplomatic effort even better spent.

  • Mike

    Chris-

    Point 1). I would tend to agree with the author on the point of MAD being an inherently flawed policy.

    “MAD took two to tango: rational leaders playing a complex global game who could realistically be deterred.”

    Fortunately cooler heads prevailed during the Cold War’s close calls. It was the political leadership-not the policy that prevented nuclear annihilation.

    Point 2). I agree it is unlikely that North Korea will ever have the resources to mount a disabling first strike [on our missile silos]. That is not the concern. The concern is a North Korean (or Iranian) missile reaching an American (or Allied) city which will precipitate an American response. If they attack, successful or not, we will hit back.

    Point 3) By “successful” I mean a foreign nuclear weapon delivered via ICBM detonating in an American or allied city. A crazy dictator could launch 12 missiles and yes, only one might get through. Would you prefer him to be able to get all 12 weapons to their targets?

    Point 4) It is the “diplomatic efforts” you cite that are not making any real progress (e.g. Iran, North Korea). How effective do you expect diplomacy to be if we have no politically viable alternative?

  • Chris Crawford

    OK, so we agree that the concern is the crazy dictator who desires only to incinerate innocents, and that this dictator cannot be deterred by the threat of a counterstrike. So how are we to stop him? I would rank our options in this order:

    1. diplomacy
    2. air strikes
    3. invasion
    4. missile defense

    That is, I think that missile defense is the least likely option to yield fruit for any given amount of money spent. Instead of spending a trillion bucks on a missile defense system, why not bribe North Korea with $100 billion? We could accomplish our objective with greater confidence for a tenth the cost of the missile defense system.

  • Chris Crawford

    An additional thought: Kim Jong Il is reputed to be quite the movie fan. Why don’t we offer to have Hollywood make an action-packed thriller with him as the kung-fu hero in return for him dropping nuclear weapons development? A grade-A Hollywood movie costs a few hundred million these days. We could spend a billion making the world’s most splendiferous movie presenting Kim Jong Il as the Savior of the Universe, the smartest, strongest, fastest, sexiest hero of all time, send him the reels, and defang one nasty dictator for a tiny fraction of what a missile defense system would cost! ;-)

  • I agree that if no missle defence system were put into place, the American people would never forgive any administration for failing to do so. As the old saying goes “half a loaf is better than none.” Yes it is not perfect, howver putting what we have in place is a start. And continuing to aim toward perfecting that system is in my mind a noble goal. I don’t see how diplomacy, however more preferrable it may be, has been effective. During the Clinton administration we tried that, and the North Koreans were probably laughing their heads off before the ink had even dried.

  • Mike

    Chris-

    The question I need to ask you then- both for this thread and the Iran article- is exactly what feasible alternative do we have when and if diplomacy fails? With both Iran and North Korea we are dealing with characters who are irrational by nature- it matters not whether this is a psychosis or sheer showmanship. Would any “non-Crazy Dictator” let this situation drag out this far?

    1. Negotiations- Fruitless now and will continue to be so. In the absence of a realistic and politically acceptable penalty for refusal, the world’s “crazy dictators” will continue to thumb their noses at us, with a “what are you gonna do about it” attitude. North Korea and Iran are no exception. I have a very difficult time buying the idea that North Korea and Iran are willing to negotiate with us in good faith. They are simply buying their time and waiting for us to strike first and deal with the stigma of being the aggressor.

    2. Airstrikes- Clearly, US pre-emptive strikes on nuclear facilities- both conventional and nuclear- carry with them grave repercussions, which may very well precipitate a devastating global conflict.

    3. Invasion- Same as (2) above. We’ll get the nukes, topple the regime, and maybe pick up an oil field or two. Don’t expect too much international help on this one– especially considering the political liability Iraq has become. Oh yeah—and better brush up on your marksman skills….

    4. Missile Defense- Like it or not- we have it now. It can intercept most inbound ballistic missiles, and affords some level of protection to likely vulnerable targets. It also provides us with an attractive third option in the event the unthinkable should happen. The other two options in this case is nuking our aggressor back to the stone age OR letting him pick off our cities one by one.

  • Chris Crawford

    Richard, I’m not so certain of the political palatability of a missile defense system. The relevant aphorism is not so much “half a loaf is better than none” as “half a crumb is better than none”. The problem is, when that crumb costs a few billion bucks, the taxpayers are going to start wondering whether it’s worth it.

    Mike, the key point of issue here is your assertion that negotiations will always and forever be fruitless. I agree that negotiations have been fruitless so far, and I further agree that neither the Iranians nor the North Koreans will make any concessions unless they see some benefit it them. Although our position is weak, we have several things in our favor. The most important of these is that, in diplomatic terms, time is on our side. That is, just now world support for our diplomacy is weak, because nobody sees much threat, but with the passage of time people are growing steadily more concerned about the Iranian program. If we just keep pushing, showing all sorts of good faith and good will, then a few years of Iranian intransigence will so poison their own diplomatic support that we really will be able to get sanctions through the UN Security Council. Right now both Russia and China are opposed to sanctions, each for their own separate reasons. However, it is not in the long-term interest of either country to see Iran get the Bomb, so they will reverse course when they think the time is right. The problem is, we just have to wait until they decide that the time is right. In the meantime, we have to keep our noses clean.

    The basic problem is that we have destroyed our diplomatic power and no longer have the ability to make things happen, so we have to defer to other powers such as Russia and China. My guess is that both countries will extract sizable concessions from us to get us out of this hole we got ourselves into.

  • Mike

    Chris-

    For the reasons you just described, I for one cannot rely too heavily on diplomatic efforts alone to resolve our current crises. To put it quite simply, I do not trust these characters to negotiate with us and our partners in good faith. I wholeheartedly agree that Russia and China each have their own agenda to push, and I fear the UN will only screw us again as they did with Iraq. I cannot think of any other nation that has suffiecient bargaining leverage and the wherewithal to act unilateraly should the situation come to that.

    I disagree that time is on our side. The more time passes, the better the chances of these pariah states have in gaining the weapons that they desire. Heaven help us if these nations decided to ally themselves formally.

    Your comment above about diverting all missile defense funds into the diplomatic effort was obviously in jest, but it does bring us to another issue: Why are we party to an economic support package for regimes that are openly hostile to the United States? Does that not perpetuate the problem? Instead of making these nations back off from “the brink”, in my opinion, it merely encourages more hostile behavior. I could be wrong on this and I’m sure you’ll tell me why I am.

  • Chris, it may be only a crumb, but let just one US city get nuked, and that billion dollars will, in retrospect, seem like a drop in the bucket.

  • Chris Crawford

    Richard writes, “it may be only a crumb, but let just one US city get nuked, and that billion dollars will, in retrospect, seem like a drop in the bucket.”

    Indeed so. We MUST prevent any kind of nuclear attack. Our problem is that the cost of building a truly bullet-proof missile defense system will exceed the value of any single city. If we knew that diplomacy was doomed to failure, and that we had no pre-emptive options, then we’d have to build the missile system and accept the huge degradation of our standard of living that it would entail. But I think that there are vastly cheaper ways to solve this problem.

    Mike, I agree that diplomatic methods are not certain to work; I further agree that the North Koreans and Iranians have not dealt with us in good faith (although, to be fair to the North Koreans, we did drag our feet on living up to the terms of our earlier agreement with them). This is one of these “choose the lesser of many evils” situations. There is NO good solution. Diplomacy is the cheapest and safest of the lousy solutions, so it’s the first one we should try, and we should give it a fair chance. The biggest issue right now is an American promise not to attack. North Korea and Iran quite understandably want such a promise before they disarm themselves. We won’t give them such a promise. I think we should be willing to give them such a guarantee, hedged by some sort of UN waiver.

    Yes, buying off North Korea and Iran is a strategy that leaves a bad taste in everybody’s mouth. But it’s still immensely cheaper than fighting it out with them.

  • Do we really want to trust the UN to get involved in this? I would suggest that any endeavor to build the missle defense program would create jobs for one, and quite possibly create spin-off technologies that would also create jobs.

  • Mike

    Chris- Doesn’t the hard and fast adherence to diplomacy-without the credible threat of force- just reek of appeasement a`la Kennedy/Chaimberlain?

    I can just see it now. In six months, after all of the wrangling and posturing Mr. Kim and/or Mr. Ahmedenejad agree to terminate their nuclear weapons programs, and we will have ‘peace in our time’. Then what? It will surely come at a cost to US prestige and treasure. Since these characters have proven themselves to be un-trustworthy we must be able to independently verify that their programs have been halted as advertised. The UN? Not with Iran and North Korea’s two biggest benefactors-China and Russia- sitting on the security council. As with Iraq, don’t expect any serious penalties for non-compliance from the UN.

    What if it doesn’t stop with nuclear weapons? As crazy and unlikely as it sounds, can you imagine a formal, NUCLEAR ARMED Iranian/ North Korean alliance that starts making territorial demands?

    Off the wall, maybe.. but something to think about….

  • Chris Crawford

    Mike, I agree that diplomacy gives no guarantees of success — are you arguing that diplomacy is guaranteed to fail? We have already agreed that the other options are guaranteed to produce disasters. Diplomacy costs very little and might just work. Why not give it a chance? We can always resort to military action if diplomacy is a complete failure and they get close to the bomb.

    Richard, a missile defense program will generate jobs and spin-off technologies — but so would a program to build automatic penguin-killing robots. There are much cheaper ways to generate jobs.

  • Chris, the need for penquin-killing robots is not as neccessary as a missle defence. Had the Clinton administration not gutted the GPALS program, and with President Bush being apparently none committal to restoring it again, we’d have a decent program in place about now. Instead we are scrambling around to get our act together .

    Traditionally, Americans have made sacrifices in life styles in order to support ideas and projects,and I believe if it were properly explained to them they would make them again. In fact we are told today to conserve gas and other fuels as much as possible.

Leave a Reply

Articles Archived by Topic