Once the terrorists at Gitmo — who systematically fight by ignoring the rules of warfare, humanism and decency, not bound by any rule or international law they care to violate – are captured, good liberals consider such outlaws "soldiers."
Recently the Supreme Court decreed that the captives held at “Gitmo” cannot be put before the new tribunals designed for their — originally unanticipated — deeds. Some, and that includes many in Europe, rejoice. The misdeeds of the hard-core activists held there are hard to prove in an American court. So the pleasing implication for the Gutmenschen is clear. They must be let go. Once at large, their deeds will claim new victims. No problem, for by then the lenient measure making new crimes possible will be conveniently forgotten. In actual fact, the implications of the decision diverge from what reporters ignorant of the US system allege. Instead of having to close Gitmo or needing to let the captives go, Bush – pronounced by the salivating pundits as “destroyed” by the Court – needs to find authorization in Congress to deal with unusual culprits in a tort that, eons ago, was unforeseeable.
To this non-lawyer the problem seems to have two components. One has to do with the lawfulness of military tribunals. This is an internal US issue. The other one concerns the status of persons that US forces have captured in war zones close to hostile activities aimed at the forces apprehending them.
The reason for not coming to a quick agreement regarding the rights of this element is manifold. The rules of war are akin to a football game’s. The normally identifiable members of a military representing a state in a declared war are assured of POW status. Unless the captor violates POW rights — as did Nazi Germany and then the victorious Soviet Union – the captives cannot be handled as criminals and have a right to return upon the end of the hostilities. The last I heard, irregulars lacking identification are considered to be unprotected by the rules of warfare, for they had violated these by their comportment. This meant that if captured they were given long sentences or were executed.
In the war against terror there has been no official declaration of war. Using the football analogy, the conflict had no official start — and it is unlikely that we will hear a whistle after the elapse of the proscribed periods of play. Contrary to the wars regulated by accepted rules, this match does not have a clear venue. While the playing field is everywhere, there are no bleachers for what could be, by the mutual effort of the contending parties, protected bystanders. In fact, involving the bleachers and demolishing the area outside of the “field” is a feature of the new war. So, the struggle takes place everywhere and is not limited to a battle field. This flexibility of open-ended operations amounts to more than a mere occasional foul by handling the ball while out of bounds. The departures from the kind of contest the prevailing rules regulated add up to a new ball game. It seems to be of significance that this new type of contest has not been invented or first practiced by the intended victims of terrorism, such as the USA or Israel.
At the same time, a selectively upheld part of the rules are, in themselves, becoming an effective auxiliary PR-weapon of the new type of war being waged. It seems that the camp consisting of leftists, Islamists, multi-culti Gutmenschen, anti-modernists, anti-Americans and the apologists-of-success wherever it may raise its ugly head are effectively using the “Law” in two, if analyzed, contradictory ways.
If the “misdemeanor” is caused by “them,” then it is to be overlooked because the perpetrators were “frustrated” and outraged by “centuries of exploitation” blamed by elegant associations on the victims. Since the prevailing law ignores this feature of the act, the “Law” normally regarded as applicable, is to be suspended. Once the issue of retaliation arises the victim’s reaction is subjected to a prejudiced application of what the “Law” should be. The result is a convenient, albeit distorted, world represented by a verbal flexibility that might defy reason but qualifies as good PR. The occasional and legally sanctioned abuse of prisoners by the US is (properly) called a crime. The media-reaction: great upset. After all, our principles were violated. The Jihadist-advertised torture followed by murder of their victims is called an execution. The result: end of sentence from the pundit. No wonder, since they acted strictly according to their faith. Let us now put the generalization about this oxymoronic systematic inconsistency into a concrete setting.
The two-timing evaluation and the application of skewed judgments that alternate between pusillanimous “understanding” and chest-beating “condemnation” — depending on who is helped by “tolerance” respectively by “denunciation” – seems to follow a pattern. Pertaining to the case of detainees, the blueprint is as follows. When it is to the advantage of fighting armed Islamists they are “soldiers.” When in the course of their actions they systematically and by policy fight by ignoring the rules of warfare, humanism and decency they are, as civilian insurgents, not bound by these or any other rule they care to violate. Once these fanatics — who have, by word and deed, repudiated civilization — are captured, they are again to be considered as soldiers. As such they are protected by the international law on warfare and by the due process rules of the (otherwise despised) Americans.
This state of affairs makes one close the exposition with two propositions. The first one: you can have it both ways but only by getting away with it if opposed by fools and not by right. Second: “due process” might just be the process that is due because it is deserved.
George’s essay muddles a lot of ideas, and commits the classic crime of using straw man arguments. Rather than address George’s mistakes, however, I’d like to emphasize a key point:
We have to honor the Rule of Law.
Yes, these are bad people. Yes, if we turn them loose, some of them will kill. Yes, we must protect ourselves. But if we throw away the rule of law, then we might as well give up on civilization, because without the rule of law, there is no civilization.
The rule of law means that you don’t just lock up people on a whim or a rumor. The rule of law means that you have a trial and decide — from the evidence, not their religion — whether they have committed a crime. If you can prove that they have committed a crime, then you find them guilty and punish them accordingly. If you can’t prove them guilty, then you find them “not guilty” and you let them go. It’s pretty clear how the rule of law works.
Our problem here is that at Guantanamo, the Bush Administration is claiming that the rule of law doesn’t apply. The Bush Administration claims that, because these are especially bad people, we shouldn’t follow the rule of law. This denies the very essence of the rule of law. If the law can be applied or ignored at the convenience of the government, it isn’t much of a law, is it?
The argument often proferred is that, if we follow the rule of law, the bad guys will get away. Look, if you can’t prove that they’re bad guys, how do you know they’re bad guys in the first place?
So let’s stop screwing around. Justice delayed is justice denied. Let’s put these people on trial, convict the guilty ones, and send them to jail. The ones we can’t convict, let’s turn loose. We’ve had these people in legal limbo for nearly five years now. Let’s get cracking and finish this business.
Chris Crawford misses one very important point. The United States Legislature specifically has denied the federal courts any jurisdiction over the detainees and because the legislature may do that under the powers granted in the Constitution, the Supreme Court is the one which is not following the “rule of law”. While a majority of the justices may not like that fact, they should have said, essentially, “Sorry, but we have no power to act on this matter.” See the dissenting opinions for further information.
Steven, the interpretation of the Constitution is a matter for the courts to decide. If the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution to say X, then that’s the official position. If the Congress interprets it differently, that means nothing, because the Constitution does not grant Congress the power to interpret the Constitution. Congress has to AMEND the Constitution in such cases. If Congress wishes to amend the Constitution to force the point, it can do so. In the absence of such a Constitutional amendment, the Supreme Court’s interpretation has priority. And quoting the minority opinion doesn’t prove much — after all, it is the MINORITY opinion and as such represents an officially rejected point of view.
Chris Crawford says, “Our problem here is that at Guantanamo, the Bush Administration is claiming that the rule of law doesn’t apply. The Bush Administration claims that, because these are especially bad people, we shouldn’t follow the rule of law.”
This is not true. It is only your perception of what the Bush Administration claims. It is not a question of rule of law vs. no rule of law, but WHICH law rules. The administration has steadfastly held that al-Qaeda and Taliban captives do not qualify for POW status. POW status is granted to those captives who were engaged in honorable soldiering and who were following the rules of war and therefore get the “combatants’ priveledge” of not being held responsible for the death and destruction they cause, as long as it was in accordance with the rules of war.
This article, perhaps inadvertently, implies these terrorists represent a “new” kind of war-fighting. This is also not true. As evidence, I offer Article 82 of the Lieber Code, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President Lincoln on 24 April 1863, which states,
“Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or with the occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers – such men, or squads of men, are not public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.”
Punishment for those captured while engaging in such illegal participation historically has been very severe, NO QUARTER.
While it may be argued that the Lieber Code does not apply to war today, it illustrates that such men who “operate without commission” have been around for some time.
Fast forward to today. The Law of Armed Conflict (part of Geneva) makes the same distinction because the whole idea of Geneva is to minimize the unnecessary death and destruction caused by war. If Geneva offered no dis-incentives for men to “operate without commission”, the net effect would be an increase in the number of those types of combatants and a corresponding INCREASE in the death and destruction you appear to be against.
You say that “if we throw away the rule of law, then we might as well give up on civilization, because without the rule of law, there is no civilization.” I maintain that if you have a dual standard, one for terrorists and a different one for the US, you have already jettisoned the rule of law, and consequently civilization, and the next time an American soldier commits an atrocity, you will have no room to complain.
G. Sedona, your speculations as to my position are incorrect; you would be well served to ask me my opinions before declaring them to the world. I do not insist that the Geneva Convention be applied to the people at Guantanamo (although the Supreme Court does and I acquiesce to their greater legal wisdom in this matter). My point is that SOME law, of some kind, should be used in resolving the matter. The Bush Administration claims that neither the law of war nor criminal law applies to these people, and therefore they declare themselves unconstrained by any law. This I reject. I believe that ours must be a government of laws, not of men, that we should operate under the rule of law, not by the whims of those in power.
You cite the precedent set by President Lincoln, but let me point out a crucial facts: first, Mr. Lincoln’s order applied during a time of insurrection, and the Constitution explicitly recognizes that habeus corpus may be suspended during an insurrection (although it grants that power to Congress, not to the President). We are not facing an insurrection and so Mr. Lincoln’s order is inapplicable to the people at Guantanamo.
I have no intention of giving these people a free pass. Let’s prosecute them as murderers, and if we find them guilty, sentence them to jail. And if a proper legal trial finds them not guilty, then we set them free. What possible objection could you have to a proper trial for these men?
Chris Crawford: Your whole argument seems to center around the notion that they have been arrested for committing some civilian crime when that’s not the case at all. I maintain that they come under different laws, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) because they freely joined a group that are unlawful combatants, and should be treated according to the laws of unlawful belligerency:
“Unlawful Combatants. Unlawful combatants are individuals who directly participate in hostilities without being authorized by governmental authority or under international law to do so. For example, bandits who rob and plunder and civilians who attack a downed airman are unlawful combatants. Unlawful combatants who engage in hostilities violate LOAC and become lawful targets. They may be killed or wounded and, if captured, may be tried as war criminals for their LOAC violations.” (Emphasis added) – “The Rules of War: The Law of Armed Conflict” http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/wars/a/loac.htm. They can also be tried for war crimes they commit while in captivity. If Hamdan changed any of this, please cite the parts of the opinion that do. Short of that, my take is that the administration has to change only the type of military court, and is not required to move to a civilian court in lieu of a military one, and that’s only if the administration decides to try them at all. In any event, the captives can be held under a military action to prevent them from rejoining the enemy, until the war is over. They can then be put on trial and punishment can be added to time already spent in captivity because their time as a captive is not considered punishment since it is to keep them from rejoining the enemy.
You also said, “The Bush Administration claims that neither the law of war nor criminal law applies to these people.” I maintain this is not true, and I challenge you to find an administration position paper where it makes that argument. By contrast, the administration has made the exact opposite case; read in the Air Force Law Review here http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6007/is_55/ai_n8585592 for a good explanation by Joseph P. Bialke. He explains how the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies to al-Qaeda and the Taliban and why they are unlawful combatants.
You said that I cited Lincoln as a precedent; I made no such claim. You went on to say, “Mr. Lincoln’s order applied during a time of insurrection . . . ” and went off onto a rant about what the constitution says about insurrection. If you read my post carefully, you will find where I stated, “While it may be argued that the Lieber Code does not apply to war today, it illustrates that such men who ‘operate without commission’ have been around for some time,” and you should also see that I mention Lincoln’s General Order 100 only to point out that there is nothing “new” about the tactics of the terrorists in this war, since they were addressed in Lincoln’s time, and that they are most certainly addressed in current international law, i.e., LOAC. This misperception perpetuates this notion that the detainees should get treated as those accused of a civilian crime because there is no international law of war covering them, when in fact there is.
You also said, “I believe that ours must be a government of laws, not of men, that we should operate under the rule of law, not by the whims of those in power.” As I said in my last post, it’s not a question of law vs. no law, but which law(s). If you believe in the rule of law so much, where is your outrage at terrorists who follow NO law at all? All those who engage in combat should be held to the SAME standard (LOAC), otherwise, where are the incentives for anyone to follow them? There are none, and the end result will be more terrorists, instead of regular armies, and more deaths of “innocent civilians”. Where is your rule of law when one side is held to a standard higher than the law, while the other side is invariably given a pass at their most egregious violations of the law you love so much? You never addressed that in your response.
So, you want the rule of law? Be careful what you ask for; it’s not as generous as you might think. For example, even a lawful combatant who becomes a POW cannot rejoin the fight once is set free or even if he escapes. Since he was captured, he has in essence surrendered to his enemy. Should he rejoin the fight and be captured again, he could be tried as a war criminal. Another thing, unless I’m mistaken, the capturing power has to feed its captives so they don’t lose weight. Fine. Feed them the same rations our soldiers eat on the battlefield. Unless it’s been changed, that’s what I was taught when I was in the military. Too bad – no more honey glazed duck.
It is not without precedent for the US to turn over captives to its allies. When the end was near for Germany in WW-II, many German soldiers surrendered to the American Army in lieu of the Russian Army they were fighting against. After the surrender, the US Army turned them over to the Russians because they were determined to be rightfully their prisoners. Something similar could happen in this war. Since we are allies with Afghanistan, and part of the war on terror is being fought there, some of these detainees could be considered prisoners of Afghanistan, or maybe their country of origin. According to one US-held German POW of WW-II, the BEST thing that could happen to a soldier on the battlefield is to be captured and held as a POW by the Americans. I predict that Hamdan and his fellow captives will rue the day he decided to file his lawsuit.
You ask, “What possible objection could you have to a proper trial for these men?” Again, it all depends on what you consider “proper” and under what rules. I happen to agree with Bialke’s analysis that they are unlawful combatants and not civilian criminals. The only similarity between the terrorists at GTMO and people accused of a civilian crime is that they’re both behind bars. Nothing else. Nadda.
One final point. When liberal outrage at terrorists surpasses that which they hurl at the Bush administration and our legitimate combatant soldiers, they might have more credibility than the current perception that this is just another campaign stop in their continuation of the election of 2000.
Have a nice day.
G. of Sedona, thank you for the detailed and reasoned analysis in the first half your posting; that provides some useful information.
You seem to think that I sympathize with terrorists; you even go so far as to complain that “other side is invariably given a pass at their most egregious violations of the law you love so much? You never addressed that in your response.” Please re-read my statement, “I have no intention of giving these people a free pass.”
You claim that the Administration does indeed wish to apply the rule of law to these men, and only differs on on which law is to be applied. The LOAC would have them tried as war criminals. Fine, let’s try them as war criminals. The important thing is that we should have trials for these people. Arbitrarily tossing people in jail is a violation of the rule of law. Without formally establishing a reason for holding them, their detention is arbitrary.
Your reasoning for holding people indefinitely during the duration of a war is a little slippery. You rightly point out that, while hostilities continue, it is proper to detain combatants. The problem here is that you have no legal definition of either ‘hostilities’ or ‘combatant’. No declaration of war has been made, nor has the President declared any basis for establishing when or if hostilities ever began or will ever end. Thus, the term is completely arbitrary and cannot provide any basis for holding these people. The term ‘combatant’ has a bit more history behind it; it is generally taken to mean a person who is apprehended while committing hostile acts. The problem here is that many of the detainees at Guantanamo do not meet this definition. They were instead handed over to American forces by foreign civilians. These people should never have been detained as combatants in the first place. It would have been appropriate to charge them with civilian crimes — but that has not been done and we have no jurisdiction in any case.
You seem to think that outrage against the crimes of the terrorists is an important element of application of the rule of law. I take the opposite view, that the law must be blind and unemotional. I don’t ever want to see outrage seep into our legal proceedings. I want a legal system that is cool, calm, and rational. Leave your outrage at the courthouse door.
Thank you for your clarification of your meaning in referring to Lincoln’s actions; I agree that it has no relevance to the current situation.
The important thing here is that we both agree that there should have been trials for these people. So let’s get cracking and have the trials. The Supreme Court has established that the trials planned by the military were not fair. Well and good; let us proceed from there.
chris c believes that terrorists who do not wear uniforms and kill innocent people should be granted the same status as our soldiers who do not kill innocent people, who wear uniforms and abide by the geneva conventions. The geneva conventions were specifically designed to prevent what the savage muslims are doing. Yet they ignored the conventions. So now the supreme idiots have taken it upon themselves to tread on what was once settled law for the most part. Way to go supreme idiots. We have destroyed the concept that soldiers have to be uniformed and behave in certain manners. Chis C and his ilk support this backasswards position because they support blood thirsty barbaric muslims in their obvious attempt to spread islam. What chris is too naive and uneducated to understand is that his type of weak kneed poorly trained intellectual breed would be the first to suffer because he couldn’t deen under islam. Suffering would usually entail: losing a body part, switching/whipping until dead, losing his head, maybe stoning or hanging, or plain ol’ torture. Oh but our supreme nitwits have said that is alright when conducting warfare.
Mr. Handlery nails it, as usual.
The question now is what of the problem? Terrorist walk, quack and behead like unlawful combatants, yet apparently they are not. Worse, they are entitled to the protections afforded lawful combatants.
For three centuries we have been making criminal laws with an eye toward punishing the guilty and protecting the innocent. Those are noble objectives but it’s becoming increasingly clear the focus should be to ensure our laws are judgeproofed.
Just how do you do that? A good question, considering the recent silliness of five supreme lawyers.
One thing I have noticed, though, is there are no illustrations to go along with our laws. For those judges who have trouble understanding the written language, some sketches might help.
Chris Crawford:
You said, “Arbitrarily tossing people in jail is a violation of the rule of law. Without formally establishing a reason for holding them, their detention is arbitrary.”
As I indicated in all my posts, it depends on which laws. You are still looking on their detention as “cases” like those accused of committing a civilian crime. I don’t think they were “arbitrarily tossed in jail” as you characterized. They were captured while engaging in combat. Since their detention is “a military operation to prevent them from rejoining the enemy,” it is not arbitrary any more than our holding Axis soldiers in WW-II, who, by the way, were legitimate combatants.
“The problem here is that you have no legal definition of either ‘hostilities’ or ‘combatant’.”
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Article 2)
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them . . . Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof. http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/genevacon/blart-2.htm (The Supreme Court obviously ignored that part.)
And, “LOAC applies to international armed conflicts and in the conduct of military operations and related activities in armed conflict, however such conflicts are characterized.”
As far as ‘combatant” is concerned, I provided a definition and a reference link; didn’t you read either? Here it is:
Combatants
The Geneva Conventions distinguish between lawful combatants, noncombatants, and unlawful combatants.
Lawful Combatants. A lawful combatant is an individual authorized by governmental authority or the LOAC to engage in hostilities. A lawful combatant may be a member of a regular armed force or an irregular force. In either case, the lawful combatant must be commanded by a person responsible for subordinates; have fixed distinctive emblems recognizable at a distance, such as uniforms; carry arms openly; AND conduct his or her combat operations according to the LOAC. The LOAC applies to lawful combatants who engage in the hostilities of armed conflict and provides combatant immunity for their lawful warlike acts during conflict, except for LOAC violations.
Noncombatants. These individuals are not authorized by governmental authority or the LOAC to engage in hostilities. In fact, they do not engage in hostilities. This category includes civilians accompanying the Armed Forces; combatants who are out of combat, such as POWs and the wounded, and certain military personnel who are members of the Armed Forces not authorized to engage in combatant activities, such as medical personnel and chaplains. Noncombatants may not be made the object of direct attack. They may, however, suffer injury or death incident to a direct attack on a military objective without such an attack violating the LOAC, if such attack is on a lawful target by lawful means.
Unlawful Combatants. Unlawful combatants are individuals who directly participate in hostilities without being authorized by governmental authority or under international law to do so. For example, bandits who rob and plunder, and civilians who attack a downed airman are unlawful combatants. Unlawful combatants who engage in hostilities violate LOAC and become lawful targets. They may be killed or wounded and, if captured, may be tried as war criminals for their LOAC violations.
Undetermined Status. Should doubt exist as to whether an individual is a lawful combatant, noncombatant, or an unlawful combatant, such person shall be extended the protections of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention until status is determined. The capturing nation must convene a competent tribunal to determine the detained person’s status. (Emphasis added)
I have no objection to their status being determined by a military court martial, or a court established in the country in which they were captured. I am steadfastly opposed to their access to American civil courts, which in my opinion is goal just to “get” Bush.
“The problem here is that many of the detainees at Guantanamo do not meet this definition.”
Those are no longer at GTMO; the US returned them. In fact, the US was overly generous and returned some it should have kept.
“It would have been appropriate to charge them with civilian crimes — but that has not been done and we have no jurisdiction in any case.”
In such cases, since the US would have no jurisdiction, they cannot be tried in American courts, but must be tried by the jurisdiction where they committed their offenses, just like Iraq is trying Saddam. And I’ll drink to that.
“You seem to think that outrage against the crimes of the terrorists is an important element of application of the rule of law.”
You betchum, Red Ryder. Did you ever hear the phrase, “outrages the conscience”? Some think that spanking your kid is not torture while slapping around a known terrorist is. I take the opposite view. You seem to think that just having a law is enough, whereas I believe it is insufficient. You have to have incentives for doing good and punishment for doing bad; and engaging in unlawful combat, by its very nature, presents such unusual danger to protected persons and property that it “outrages the conscience” infinitely more than slapping around a known terrorist or making him wear women’s underwear. The modern unlawful combatant is more correctly described as “terrorist”, for it is insufficient for him to act “without commission, commit hostilities against an army, raid, rob, steal, plunder, and blend into the civilian population”; he has to kill indiscriminately, and for absolutely no gain at all. Enough said.
G of Sedona, your argument is predicated upon the falsehood that all of the detainees were captured while actively engaged in combat. This is not the case; some of the detainees were captured while engaged in combat, but some of the detainees now in custody were turned over to US military forces by civilians or local militia, who claimed them to be al-Qaida. Thus, they are being held on hearsay alone, and have not been given any opportunity to contest that hearsay. In some of the few cases in which the lucky few have been given some sort of hearing, they have not been afforded the opportunity to even know who accused them — that’s classified. The international observers who are familiar with these tribunals have dismissed them as failing to meet basic standards of jurisprudence.
The whole point of civilization and law is that we take revenge and anger out of the equation and turn the conflict over to a higher authority that addresses it cooly and calmly. If you put anger into the equation, all you get is an endless cycle of revenge and counter-revenge.
If you want to be mad at terrorists, fine, go ahead. Call them poopheads. Call them nasty names. Stick pins into terrorist dolls. Shoot photos of Osama bin Ladin. Do whatever makes you feel good. But I would rather worry about what we can do to prevent terrorism.
“But I would rather worry about what we can do to prevent terrorism.”
You don’t reward it; you reward it when you treat its perpetrators as you would those engaged in honorable soldiering. You don’t negotiate with it; when you negotiate with it, you inevitably validate their concocted grievances and their fantasy ideology. You don’t try to see their point of view; when you try to see their point of view, you inevitably jettison your moral compass. They are evildoers, those to whom others exist simply as an opportunity to do evil and for no other reason. Combat with evildoers is not Clausewitzian war. Nor is it a fight against civilian crime to be turned over to those civilian police and courts unable to deal with it. You do not make treaties with evildoers or try to adjust your conduct to make them like you. You do not try to see the world from the evildoers’ point of view. You do not try to appease them, or persuade them, or reason with them. You try, on the contrary, to outwit them, to vanquish them, to kill them. You behave with them in the same manner that you would deal with a fatal epidemic – you try to wipe it out. In short, you make the price so high that no one will even think of doing it, because that’s the only thing this enemy understands. Period.
There’s one problem with your ‘final solution’ to terrorism: you have not established that ANY of the people at Guantanamo are terrorists. Let’s divide them into two groups: those captured on the battlefield, and those turned in by civilians. The first group is almost certainly NOT terrorists, because terrorists don’t fight in the open. The second group might have some terrorists in it, but we have nothing in the way of reliable evidence to that effect. They were turned in by other Afghans — that’s our evidence. That’s not evidence, that’s the grossest kind of hearsay. Perhaps we have been able to establish their guilt though ‘interrogation’. OK, I’m willing to accept that, especially if we can corroborate their confessions. But without a trial (which you’ve already agreed is a desirable thing), we have no way of knowing.
If you really want to go after terrorists, then go after terrorists! Randomly grabbing a bunch of foreigners and torturing them doesn’t accomplish anything against terrorism. If you want to destroy the target, first you must identify the target. Shooting blindly in the dark is guaranteed to hit the wrong people. And when you kill innocent people, you just create more terrorists — the precise opposite of your intended goal.
Chris Crawford: “The first group is almost certainly NOT terrorists, because terrorists don’t fight in the open.”
You have a rather narrow perception of a battlefield. What do they have to do, wear red uniforms and march in a line before you will consider them combatants? Of all groups (and I don’t necessarily agree there is more than one), this is the MOST LIKELY to be terrorists.
“The second group might have some terrorists in it, but we have nothing in the way of reliable evidence to that effect. They were turned in by other Afghans . . . ”
As I posted before, these have been released, overly generous at that. Just consider how much of a pain it is to keep them, and the more you keep, the more the pain. So I’m convinced they’ve been culled down to just combatants.
Besides, what level of proof to you want? Preponderance of evidence? Beyond a reasonable doubt? Beyond all doubt? It seems to me you want civilian trials in US courts for even the worst of them just so they can be set free; that’s what civilian courts are for, to set criminals free, because they have morphed FROM “It is better to let ten guilty men go free than to convict one innocent man” TO “It is better to let ten guilty men go free than to convict a single one of them.” A lot has been written about Bush and Cheney being “chicken hawks.” Well, find me a judge who has been in the military, extra points if he’s been in combat. If Bush succeeds in keeping them out of US civilian courts, I will have considered it a win for him.
Geneva and LOAC give more rights to legitimate combatants than illegitimate combatants, and it does it for a good reason: to discourage unlawful combatancy because they are not under any authority and hence are out of control and thus present unusual danger to “protected” persons. Your belief that some of them might have been picked up in error reinforces my position: If the terrorists had been following LOAC instead, this wouldn’t have happened. So, I agree with Geneva. By contrast, you want the exact opposite: more rights for illegitimates just so you can hold the law up as some sort of monument in front of those who are trying to destroy civilization. This will accomplish the exact opposite of what you say you want by rewarding unlawful combat. You, of course, won’t be the one to suffer if they go free and terrorize more.
BTW, I didn’t say trials are “a desirable thing”. I said I would agree with a US court martial (which Geneva allows) or turning them over for some sort of trial in the country of their capture.
I predict in the end, only a few (less than 10) will be tried for war crimes, and only one or two (maybe) will actually be convicted (but set free on appeal). The rest will be released under some amnesty agreement when the war ends. As far as I’m concerned, they can be held in GTMO until then, which Geneva also allows. It’s not my fault they decided to join a war that’s supposed to last until Islam rules the world.
First off, you ask, “What do they have to do, wear red uniforms and march in a line before you will consider them combatants? ” You aren’t reading what I wrote; I wrote, “The first group is almost certainly NOT terrorists, because terrorists don’t fight in the open.” You are confusing terrorists with combatants. A combatant fights in the open; a terrorist relies on stealth. These are two completely different fighters, and you can’t see the difference between them. If you don’t know who you’re fighting, you probably won’t win.
You claim that all of the innocents who were turned over by Afghans have been released. On what information do you base this claim? You don’t know anything about these people; there have been no inquiries into their status other than the secret determinations of some military people. You are basing everything on your belief that our military would never make a mistake about anybody. If we can always trust people in power to do the right thing, we wouldn’t need an independent judiciary. The fundamental truth throughout all history — a truth that the Founding Fathers understood, and that you deny — is that people are fallible, they make mistakes, and that you need mechanisms to double-check the decisions they make, lest they screw things up. But you naively trust soldiers to be infallible.
You declare that you have no confidence in our justice system. You seem to think that justice is simply a matter of punishing bad people. The problem is, how do you know in the first place who the bad guys are? Do you base it on their religion? Their turbans? Random guesswork? If you can’t identify your target, you can’t hit it. Real justice is about identifying the target. Your kind of justice is about shooting a machine gun in the dark.
Re: "Could Due Process Equal etc."
The comments of Chris Crawford remind me of why I consider American Liberals mentally ill and why I have stopped reading my local newspaper, never watch TV news and avoid popular magazines. Just reading Crawford's comments gives me an Excedrin headache and stirs in my soul the angst remembered from college as I then listened to Liberal professors sling their crap all over the students compelled to attend their lectures.
I would like you to read below an essay that you may not yet have seen. The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken and now the Court of Unintended Consequences has begun to stir. Oh, the whirl wind is coming. God, I wish the Liberal Lawyers, Judges and Politicians would have some humility and common sense and learn when to let well enough alone. The slope we are sliding down because of their negligence will end in a nasty escalation of warfare world wide. The essay is a reaction caused by frustration. Other military men are thinking the same way the author is thinking. Mutiny is coming or a coupe if the U.S. Government does not reign in the Liberals but at the same time expects the Military to fight always with their hands tied behind their backs and different rules from those normally governing soldiers in battle. The fighting men see that they are in harms way and the Political Generals kowtow to the Politicians, Media and the Political Generals' own careers instead of working for the lives of those fighting and winning the battle itself. The soldiers ( enlisted and junior officers ) have long memories and have seen that since WWII the sacrifices of American fighting men have been chiefly in vain. Frustration begets eventually a dark reaction.
Here is a sophistical essay written by an ex-officer that should curdle one's blood.
KILL TERRORISTS, DON’T CAPURE THEM
Written by Ralph Peters
Thursday, 13 Jul
The British military defines experience as the ability to recognize a mistake the second time you make it. By that standard, we should be very experienced in dealing with captured terrorists, since we've made the same mistake again and again.
Violent Islamist extremists must be killed on the battlefield. Only in the rarest cases should they be taken prisoner. Few have serious intelligence value. And, once captured, there's no way to dispose of them.
Killing terrorists during a conflict isn't barbaric or immoral – or even illegal. We've imposed rules upon ourselves that have no historical or judicial precedent. We haven't been stymied by others, but by ourselves.
The oft-cited, seldom-read Geneva and Hague Conventions define legal combatants as those who visibly identify themselves by wearing uniforms or distinguishing insignia (the latter provision covers honorable partisans – but no badges or armbands, no protection).
Those who wear civilian clothes to ambush soldiers or collect intelligence are assassins and spies – beyond the pale of law.
Traditionally, those who masquerade as civilians in order to kill legal combatants have been executed promptly, without trial. Severity, not sloppy leftist pandering, kept warfare within some decent bounds at least part of the time.
But we have reached a point at which the rules apply only to us, while our enemies are permitted unrestricted freedom.
The present situation encourages our enemies to behave wantonly, while crippling our attempts to deal with terror.
Consider today's norm: A terrorist in civilian clothes can explode an IED, killing and maiming American troops or innocent civilians, then demand humane treatment if captured – and the media will step in as his champion.
A disguised insurgent can shoot his rockets, throw his grenades, empty his magazines, kill and wound our troops, then, out of ammo, raise his hands and demand "three hots and a cot" while he invents tales of abuse.
Conferring unprecedented legal status upon these murderous transnational outlaws is unnecessary, unwise and ultimately suicidal. It exalts monsters. And it provides the anti-American pack with living vermin to anoint as victims, if not heroes.
Isn't it time we gave our critics what they're asking for? Let's solve the "unjust" imprisonment problem, once and for all. No more Guantanamos! Every terrorist mission should be a suicide mission. With our help.
We need to clarify the rules of conflict. But integrity and courage have fled Washington. Nobody will state bluntly that we're in a fight for our lives, that war is hell, and that we must do what it takes to win.
This isn't an argument for a murderous rampage, but its opposite. We must kill our enemies with discrimination. But we do need to kill them. A corpse is a corpse: The media's rage dissipates with the stench. But an imprisoned terrorist is a strategic liability.
Nor should we ever mistreat captured soldiers or insurgents who adhere to standing conventions. On the contrary, we should enforce policies that encourage our enemies to identify themselves according to the laws of war. Ambiguity works to their advantage, never to ours.
Our policy toward terrorists and insurgents in civilian clothing should be straightforward and public: Surrender before firing a shot or taking hostile action toward our troops, and we'll regard you as a legal prisoner. But once you've pulled a trigger, thrown a grenade or detonated a bomb, you will be killed. On the battlefield and on the spot.
Isn't that common sense? It also happens to conform to the traditional conduct of war between civilized nations. Ignorant of history, we've talked ourselves into folly.
And by the way: How have the terrorists treated the uniformed American soldiers they've captured? According to the Geneva Convention?
Sadly, even our military has been infected by political correctness. Some of my former peers will wring their hands and babble about "winning hearts and minds." But we'll never win the hearts and minds of terrorists.
And if we hope to win the minds, if not the hearts, of foreign populations, we must be willing to kill the violent, lawless fraction of a fraction of a percent of the population determined to terrorize the rest.
Ravaged societies crave and need strict order. Soft policies may appear to work in the short term, but they fail overwhelmingly in the longer term. Wherever we've tried sweetness and light in Iraq, it has only worked as long as our troops were present – after which the terrorists returned and slaughtered the beneficiaries of our good intentions.
If you wish to defend the many, you must be willing to kill the few.
For now, we're stuck with a situation in which the hardcore terrorists in Guantanamo are "innocent victims" even to our fair-weather allies. In Iraq, our troops capture bomb-makers only to learn they've been dumped back on the block.
It is not humane to spare fanatical murderers. It is not humane to play into our enemy's hands. And it is not humane to endanger our troops out of political correctness.
Instead of worrying over trumped-up atrocities in Iraq (the media give credence to any claim made by terrorists), we should stop apologizing and take a stand. That means firm rules for the battlefield, not Gumby-speak intended to please critics who'll never be satisfied by anything America does.
The ultimate act of humanity in the War on Terror is to win. To do so, we must kill our enemies wherever we encounter them. He who commits an act of terror forfeits every right he once possessed.
Lt. Col Ralph Peters (US Army-ret.)is the author of the just-published Never Quit the Fight.
Dan, your posting is long on emotion and short on logic. I am particularly surprised that you would suggest that a military coup might be in the offing. I’m sure that the huge majority of military officers would be deeply offended by your suggestion that they are anything less than absolutely professional. Since the founding of the Republic, the US Army has made it a central dictum of its training that the military stays out of politics and obeys the law. Shame on you for suggesting otherwise!
The central point made in the essay is that we should shoot terrorists on the battlefield. OK, that’s fine with me. I have just two questions:
1. How do you know which ones are terrorists?
2. How do you know where the battlefield is?
Sure, it’s easy enough if somebody comes running at you screaming epithets in Arabic and tossing grenades. But that’s not how terrorists work. The very essence of terrorism is stealth. It’s extremely rare to catch a terrorist red-handed. If all we do is execute the red-handed ones on the spot, I’m fine with that. But if that’s all we do, we’ll never make any progress. The vast majority of terrorists hide in the shadows, dress like civilians, and can’t be identified as terrorists. Thus, the solution that Mr. Peters proposes won’t accomplish anything other than to kill a handful of terrorists. We can’t touch the great majority of terrorists using his recommendations. His proposal is feckless.
Yes, terrorists often ignore the Geneva Conventions, but why join them, why sink to their level? Or do we not have the brains to fight in any other way? Are we forced now to fight like dogs, abandoning all decency because we simply haven’t got the wits to conduct ourselves properly.
Countries follow the rule of international law because it says more about who they are than who their enemies are.
Dear Chris,
Re: “Dan, your posting is long on emotion and short on logic. I am particularly surprised that you would suggest that a military coup might be in the offing. I’m sure that the huge majority of military officers would be deeply offended by your suggestion that they are anything less than absolutely professional. Since the founding of the Republic, the US Army has made it a central dictum of its training that the military stays out of politics and obeys the law. Shame on you for suggesting otherwise!”
Thanks for the accolades.
I am not advocating a coup d’etat. No modern military was more steeped in staying out of politics as was the German military but given the right conditions even that stolid institution crumbled and Hitler just missed getting killed by Claus von Stauffenberg in the July 20 Plot (1944). Ill led armies and countries fracture suddenly despite long histories of stability. Long, unsuccessful wars, especially if the political and military leaders are perceived as inept, place severe stress on military cohesiveness, morale and loyalty to those leaders.
Re: “The central point made in the essay is that we should shoot terrorists on the battlefield. OK, that’s fine with me. I have just two questions:
1. How do you know which ones are terrorists?
2. How do you know where the battlefield is?”—Chris Crawford
You have entered into the subject of Fourth Generation Warfare. The U.S. Military is steeped in 2nd Generation ( attrition warfare ) with a small amount of 3rd Generation ( maneuver warfare ) in its doctrine. Today’s problem facing the U.S.A. with its “War Against Terror” is that a 4th Generation War is unfolding; a war that can not be fought effectively using 2nd and 3rd generation tactics. It is not Guerrilla Warfare but a more challenging problem to face, one likely to fracture the U.S. Military and Country as we are apt to see little progress in ending it as our leaders ( military and civilian ) stumble around ineffectively using 2nd and 3rd generation means to combat it. If you are not familiar with the concept of 4th Generation Warfare I advise reading some of the later works of Martin van Creveld. To make the task easier for you and the lurkers I am attaching an essay by William S. Lind, an apostle of the irreplaceable military thinker John Boyd:
January 15, 2004
Understanding Fourth Generation War
by William S. Lind
Rather than commenting on the specifics of the war with Iraq, I thought it might be a good time to lay out a framework for understanding that and other conflicts. The framework is the Four Generations of Modern War.
I developed the framework of the first three generations (“generation” is shorthand for dialectically qualitative shift) in the 1980s, when I was laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to the Marine Corps. Marines kept asking, “What will the Fourth Generation be like?”, and I began to think about that. The result was the article I co-authored for the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” Our troops found copies of it in the caves at Tora Bora, the al Quaeda hideout in Afghanistan.
The Four Generations began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the treaty that ended the Thirty Years’ War. With the Treaty of Westphalia, the state established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different entities had fought wars – families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises – using many different means, not just armies and navies (two of those means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue). Now, state militaries find it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves.
The First Generation of Modern War runs roughly from 1648 to 1860. This was war of line and column tactics, where battles were formal and the battlefield was orderly. The relevance of the First Generation springs from the fact that the battlefield of order created a military culture of order. Most of the things that distinguish “military” from “civilian” – uniforms, saluting, careful gradations or rank – were products of the First Generation and are intended to reinforce the culture of order.
The problem is that, around the middle of the 19th century, the battlefield of order began to break down. Mass armies, soldiers who actually wanted to fight (an 18th century’s soldier’s main objective was to desert), rifled muskets, then breech loaders and machine guns, made the old line and column tactics first obsolete, then suicidal.
The problem ever since has been a growing contradiction between the military culture and the increasing disorderliness of the battlefield. The culture of order that was once consistent with the environment in which it operated has become more and more at odds with it.
Second Generation warfare was one answer to this contradiction. Developed by the French Army during and after World War I, it sought a solution in mass firepower, most of which was indirect artillery fire. The goal was attrition, and the doctrine was summed up by the French as, “The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.” Centrally-controlled firepower was carefully synchronized, using detailed, specific plans and orders, for the infantry, tanks, and artillery, in a “conducted battle” where the commander was in effect the conductor of an orchestra.
Second Generation warfare came as a great relief to soldiers (or at least their officers) because it preserved the culture of order. The focus was inward on rules, processes and procedures. Obedience was more important than initiative (in fact, initiative was not wanted, because it endangered synchronization), and discipline was top-down and imposed.
Second Generation warfare is relevant to us today because the United States Army and Marine Corps learned Second Generation warfare from the French during and after World War I. It remains the American war of war, as we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq: to Americans, war means “putting steel on target.” Aviation has replaced artillery as the source of most firepower, but otherwise, (and despite the Marine’s formal doctrine, which is Third Generation maneuver warfare) the American military today is as French as white wine and brie. At the Marine Corps’ desert warfare training center at 29 Palms, California, the only thing missing is the tricolor and a picture of General Gamelin in the headquarters. The same is true at the Army’s Armor School at Fort Knox, where one instructor recently began his class by saying, “I don’t know why I have to teach you all this old French crap, but I do.”
Third Generation warfare, like Second, was a product of World War I. It was developed by the German Army, and is commonly known as Blitzkrieg or maneuver warfare.
Third Generation warfare is based not on firepower and attrition but speed, surprise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tactically, in the attack a Third Generation military seeks to get into the enemy’s rear and collapse him from the rear forward: instead of “close with and destroy,” the motto is “bypass and collapse.” In the defense, it attempts to draw the enemy in, then cut him off. War ceases to be a shoving contest, where forces attempt to hold or advance a “line;” Third Generation warfare is non-linear.
Not only do tactics change in the Third Generation, so does the military culture. A Third Generation military focuses outward, on the situation, the enemy, and the result the situation requires, not inward on process and method (in war games in the 19th Century, German junior officers were routinely given problems that could only be solved by disobeying orders). Orders themselves specify the result to be achieved, but never the method (“Auftragstaktik”). Initiative is more important than obedience (mistakes are tolerated, so long as they come from too much initiative rather than too little), and it all depends on self-discipline, not imposed discipline. The Kaiserheer and the Wehrmacht could put on great parades, but in reality they had broken with the culture of order.
Characteristics such as decentralization and initiative carry over from the Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects the Fourth Generation marks the most radical change since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents such as al Quaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the FARC. Almost everywhere, the state is losing.
Fourth Generation war is also marked by a return to a world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict. We now find ourselves facing the Christian West’s oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam. After about three centuries on the strategic defensive, following the failure of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam has resumed the strategic offensive, expanding outward in every direction. In Third Generation war, invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army.
Nor is Fourth Generation warfare merely something we import, as we did on 9/11. At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation war on their soil. America, with a closed political system (regardless of which party wins, the Establishment remains in power and nothing really changes) and a poisonous ideology of “multiculturalism,” is a prime candidate for the home-grown variety of Fourth Generation war – which is by far the most dangerous kind.
Where does the war in Iraq fit in this framework?
I suggest that the war we have seen thus far is merely a powder train leading to the magazine. The magazine is Fourth Generation war by a wide variety of Islamic non-state actors, directed at America and Americans (and local governments friendly to America) everywhere. The longer America occupies Iraq, the greater the chance that the magazine will explode. If it does, God help us all.
For almost two years, a small seminar has been meeting at my house to work on the question of how to fight Fourth Generation war. It is made up mostly of Marines, lieutenant through lieutenant colonel, with one Army officer, one National Guard tanker captain and one foreign officer. We figured somebody ought to be working on the most difficult question facing the U.S. armed forces, and nobody else seems to be.
The seminar recently decided it was time to go public with a few of the ideas it has come up with, and use this column to that end. We have no magic solutions to offer, only some thoughts. We recognized from the outset that the whole task may be hopeless; state militaries may not be able to come to grips with Fourth Generation enemies no matter what they do.
But for what they are worth, here are our thoughts to date:
•
If America had some Third Generation ground forces, capable of maneuver warfare, we might be able to fight battles of encirclement. The inability to fight battles of encirclement is what led to the failure of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, where al Qaeda stood, fought us, and got away with few casualties. To fight such battles we need some true light infantry, infantry that can move farther and faster on its feet than the enemy, has a full tactical repertoire (not just bumping into the enemy and calling for fire) and can fight with its own weapons instead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate that U.S. Marine infantry today has a sustained march rate of only 10-15 kilometers per day; German World War II line, not light, infantry could sustain 40 kilometers.
•
Fourth Generation opponents will not sign up to the Geneva Conventions, but might some be open to a chivalric code governing how our war with them would be fought? It’s worth exploring.
•
How U.S. forces conduct themselves after the battle may be as important in 4GW as how they fight the battle.
•
What the Marine Corps calls “cultural intelligence” is of vital importance in 4GW, and it must go down to the lowest rank. In Iraq, the Marines seemed to grasp this much better than the U.S. Army.
•
What kind of people do we need in Special Operations Forces? The seminar thought minds were more important than muscles, but it is not clear all U.S. SOF understand this.
•
One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people.
•
Unfortunately, the American doctrine of “force protection” works against integration and generally hurts us badly. Here’s a quote from the minutes of the seminar:
There are two ways to deal with the issue of force protection. One way is the way we are currently doing it, which is to separate ourselves from the population and to intimidate them with our firepower. A more viable alternative might be to take the opposite approach and integrate with the community. That way you find out more of what is going on and the population protects you. The British approach of getting the helmets off as soon as possible may actually be saving lives.
•
What “wins” at the tactical and physical levels may lose at the operational, strategic, mental and moral levels, where 4GW is decided. Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that the British Army has taken more casualties than it has inflicted. This is something the Second Generation American military has great trouble grasping, because it defines success in terms of comparative attrition rates.
•
We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology.
•
What can the U.S. military learn from cops? Our reserve and National Guard units include lots of cops; are we taking advantage of what they know?
One key to success in 4GW may be “losing to win.” Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generation forces. In a world where the state is in decline, if you destroy a state, it is very difficult to recreate it. Here’s another quote from the minutes of the seminar:
“The discussion concluded that while war against another state may be necessary one should seek to preserve that state even as one defeats it. Grant the opposing armies the ‘honors of war,’ tell them what a fine job they did, make their defeat ‘civilized’ so they can survive the war institutionally intact and then work for your side. This would be similar to 18th century notions of civilized war and contribute greatly to propping up a fragile state. Humiliating the defeated enemy troops, especially in front of their own population, is always a serious mistake but one that Americans are prone to make. This is because the ‘football mentality’ we have developed since World War II works against us.”
In many ways, the 21st century will offer a war between the forces of 4GW and Brave New World. The 4GW forces understand this, while the international elites that seek BNW do not. Another quote from the minutes:
“Osama bin Ladin, though reportedly very wealthy, lives in a cave. Yes, it is for security but it is also leadership by example. It may make it harder to separate (physically or psychologically) the 4GW leaders from their troops. It also makes it harder to discredit those leaders with their followers… This contrasts dramatically with the BNW elites who are physically and psychologically separated (by a huge gap) from their followers (even the generals in most conventional armies are to a great extent separated fro their men)… The BNW elites are in many respects occupying the moral low ground but don’t know it.”
•
In the Axis occupation of the Balkans during World War II, the Italians in many ways were more effective than the Germans. The key to their success is that they did not want to fight. On Cyprus, the U.N. commander rated the Argentine battalion as more effective than the British or the Austrians because the Argentines did not want to fight. What lessons can U.S. forces draw from this?
•
How would the Mafia do an occupation?
•
When we have a coalition, what if we let each country do what is does best, e.g., the Russians handle operational art, the U.S. firepower and logistics, maybe the Italians the occupation?
•
How could the Defense Department’s concept of “Transformation” be redefined so as to come to grips with 4GW? If you read the current “Transformation Planning Guidance” put out by DOD, you find nothing in it on 4GW, indeed nothing that relates at all to either of the two wars we are now fighting. It is all oriented toward fighting other state armed forces that fight us symmetrically.
The seminar intends to continue working on this question of redefining “Transformation” (die Verwandlung?) so as to make it relevant to 4GW. However, for our December meeting, we have posed the following problem: It is Spring, 2004. The U.S. Marines are to relieve the Army in the occupation of Fallujah, perhaps Iraq’s hottest hot spot (and one where the 82nd Airborne’s tactics have been pouring gasoline on the fire). You are the commander of the Marine force taking over Fallujah. What do you do?
I’ll let you know what we come up with.
Will Saddam’s capture mark a turning point in the war in Iraq? Don’t count on it. Few resistance fighters have been fighting for Saddam personally. Saddam’s capture may lead to a fractioning of the Baath Party, which would move us further toward a Fourth Generation situation where no one can recreate the state. It may also tell the Shiites that they no longer need America to protect them from Saddam, giving them more options in their struggle for free elections.
If the U.S. Army used the capture of Saddam to announce the end of tactics that enrage ordinary Iraqis and drive them toward active resistance, it might buy us a bit of de-escalation. But I don’t think we’ll that be smart. When it comes to Fourth Generation war, it seems nobody in the American military gets it.
Recently, a faculty member at the National Defense University wrote to Marine Corps General Mattis, commander of I MAR DIV, to ask his views on the importance of reading military history. Mattis responded with an eloquent defense of taking time to read history, one that should go up on the wall at all of our military schools. “Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation,” Mattis said. “It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead.”
Still, even such a capable and well-read commander as General Mattis seems to miss the point about Fourth Generation warfare. He said in his missive, “Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun. For all the ‘4th Generation of War’ intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc., I must respectfully say…’Not really…”
Well, that isn’t quite what we Fourth Generation intellectuals are saying. On the contrary, we have pointed out over and over that the 4th Generation is not novel but a return, specifically a return to the way war worked before the rise of the state. Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war. They will wage war for many different reasons, not just “the extension of politics by other means.” And they will use many different tools to fight war, not restricting themselves to what we recognize as military forces. When I am asked to recommend a good book describing what a Fourth Generation world will be like, I usually suggest Barbara Tuchman’s A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century.
Nor are we saying that Fourth Generation tactics are new. On the contrary, many of the tactics Fourth Generation opponents use are standard guerilla tactics. Others, including much of what we call “terrorism,” are classic Arab light cavalry warfare carried out with modern technology at the operational and strategic, not just tactical, levels.
As I have said before in this column, most of what we are facing in Iraq today is not yet Fourth Generation warfare, but a War of National Liberation, fought by people whose goal is to restore a Baathist state. But as that goal fades and those forces splinter, Fourth Generation war will come more and more to the fore. What will characterize it is not vast changes in how the enemy fights, but rather in who fights and what they fight for. The change in who fights makes it difficult for us to tell friend from foe. A good example is the advent of female suicide bombers; do U.S. troops now start frisking every Moslem woman they encounter? The change in what our enemies fight for makes impossible the political compromises that are necessary to ending any war. We find that when it comes to making peace, we have no one to talk to and nothing to talk about. And the end of a war like that in Iraq becomes inevitable: the local state we attacked vanishes, leaving behind either a stateless region (Somalia) or a façade of a state (Afghanistan) within which more non-state elements rise and fight.
General Mattis is correct that none of this is new. It is only new to state armed forces that were designed to fight other state armed forces. The fact that no state military has recently succeeded in defeating a non-state enemy reminds us that Clio has a sense of humor: history also teaches us that not all problems have solutions.
Dan, thanks for that posting. I have read a little about 4GW, but this discussion, especially in relation to Iraq, is particularly useful. I find myself in hearty agreement with just about everything he writes. Of particular concern is his statement: “…no state military has recently succeeded in defeating a non-state enemy…” That’s what I find so troubling about our situation in Iraq — it looks like a no-win situation.
The most salient feature of the article is the recognition that you can’t just wade in blasting, that identifying the enemy is particularly difficult, and that establishing a rappor with the civilian population is crucial to success. These notions certainly seem antithetical to the approach you suggest — unless I have misread you.
Dear Chris,
re: “These notions certainly seem antithetical to the approach you suggest — unless I have misread you.”
I have never made any policy suggestions that I recall. My posts are are on a cautionary level with no actual or implied advice on tactics to undertake. My basic fear is that the reaction launched by the U.S. Government ( executive, judicial, legislative, military ) in the “War on Terror” has been so incredibly inept, uncoordinated and at cross purposes that, as the physicist, Peter Woit, recently commented about “string theory:” IT IS NOT EVEN WRONG.
PLEASE read again this excerpt from the Lind essay:
“At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation war on their soil. America, with a closed political system (regardless of which party wins, the Establishment remains in power and nothing really changes) and a poisonous ideology of ‘multiculturalism,’ is a prime candidate for the home-grown variety of Fourth Generation war – which is by far the most dangerous kind.”
Dan
Apparently I have misread your meaning; I apologize. That paragraph you quote was one of the few that I disagreed with. In particular, the comment about the “poisonous ideology of multiculturalism” is way, way wrong. America’s strength as a culture has always been its ability to integrate the best of many cultures: English, Scottish, German, and Irish in the nineteenth century, Eastern European in the early twentieth century, and now Asian and Hispanic. His suggestion that this will somehow lead to fourth generation war inside this country seems absurd to me. Perhaps what he has in mind are the various militias and violent extremists at both ends of the political spectrum — but these are not cultural in foundation, they are political.
The multiculturalism movement today and the one to which the author Lind refers has nothing to do with integration. In fact, it is just the opposite.
There was a time when people came to America to integrate, learn the language and “melt” into the American culture.
While some still do, the multiculuralism movement led by leftist activists today is all about respecting the rights of other cultures not to integrate — respecting one’s right not to learn or speak English and otherwise having the freedom to live as a foreigner among us yet benefit from citizenship.
The Irish, Germans, Scottish came here to be Americans. I know, as I am one of them.
Multiculturalism today dictates that integration is not required. In fact, expecting integration, adoption of American ways and learning the language is likely to draw an accusation of racism or insensitivty.
Nick, I can’t speak for other people and how they use the word ‘multiculturalism’, but I certainly do not use the word in manner you describe.
re: "In particular, the comment about the 'poisonous ideology of multiculturalism' is way, way wrong. America’s strength as a culture has always been its ability to integrate the best of many cultures: English, Scottish, German, and Irish in the nineteenth century, Eastern European in the early twentieth century, and now Asian and Hispanic."–Chris Crawford
Assimilation is a better term than integration. Assimilation of whites from different countries and cultures is not easy but given the roughly same mean IQ not impossible. North Asians also have roughly the same IQ and can assimilate to some extent with the whites but Mexicans and other denizens from South of the Border with their mean IQ 85 to 90 tops are doomed to be another unassimilated group that trouble the USA as are the blacks with their 80 to 85 mean IQ, a group that has not assimilated in the USA, except on TV sitcoms and commercials, since the end of the Civil War.
Please read this url:
Cognitive Decline: The Irreducible Legacy of Open Borders
Summary: Cognitive decline, the result of third world immigration, differential fecundity and gene flow, will mark the end of Western ascendancy. Described herein is the path to collapse and the improbable circumstances surrounding its discovery. Volume 7, Number 1, January 2005
As to multiculturalism itself. It is not a plan to assimilate the races and ethnic groups entering the USA as well as those unassimilated minorities that vex our nation. On the contrary it is just another ploy of the Left where they take a term that sounds good, invert the actual meaning ( such as Progressivism, Liberalism ) and sucker well meaning, good hearted but naive people like you dear Chris that come to accept their plan uncritically because the language sounds reasonable. Multiculturalism is designed to prevent assimilation, to Balkanize the whites in a sea of antagonistic minorities and along with increasing immigration of more and more brown and black low IQ, uneducated third world "workers" and "their cousins and their aunts" until the whites become dispossed of their own country. Please read this essay on the subject from the internet site Upstream:
Cheers,
Dan
Multiculturalism: The Subdividing of Truth
Julie Ann Kessler
Senior – Ashland College
Campus
Fall 1991
No debate within higher education is more divisive than the one being waged between self-proclaimed "multiculturalists" and those who could be called traditionalists in the study of Western culture.
Multiculturalists argue that the writing, art, and historical achievements of blacks, women, Hispanics, and other "oppressed" minorities have been down-played or excluded altogether from the history books. Paula Rothenberg, whose Racism and Sexism: An Integrated Study ( available currently for one cent plus shipping from Amazon.com –Dan ) was described by Newsweek as the "primer" for multiculturalists, has said, "The traditional curriculum teaches all of us to see the world through the eyes of privileged, white, European males and to adopt their interests and perspectives as our own."
While all multiculturalists seek to revamp education, the degree to which they are willing to go varies. A more radical camp, which can be identified as "particularists", does not allow that the experiences of one ethnic group can have any relevance to members of another. Other multiculturalists, who might be called "pluralists", hold to an all-inclusive American history, with an accent on shared experiences. Pluralists take exception to the "sanitized" education of yesteryear and call for an examination of history that includes differing cultural perspectives.
Pluralists in essence say, "American culture belongs to all of us," as opposed to "American culture belongs to us whites." The particularists, on the other hand have turned this old, exclusive view on end: "American culture does belong to whites; so celebrate your ancestral homeland instead of your present home. Ethnic and racial differences must be accentuated and hatreds fanned."
The ideological impetus behind the particularist approach was probably most vividly captured in the 1988 controversy at Stanford University over changes in a required course on Western culture. As Dinesh D'Souza so aptly pointed out in a recent article in Policy Review, Stanford students who were clearly content with certain aspects of Western culture, such as their Lakers T-shirts and Reeboks, apparently missed the irony in their chant, "Hey, hey, ho, ho, Western culture's got to go!"
They chanted. And they protested. And not surprisingly, they got their way. Western culture is out and a new requirement called Cultures, Ideas and Values (CIV) is in. In these CIV courses, each professor assigns texts of Western and non-Western origin. Books are chosen not for their value as works of great literature or for their thoughtful expositions on the truth and nature of things. Rather, these works _ or the authors thereof _ are expected to act as "representatives" for entire groups of people.
Students at Stanford read the book I, Rigoberta Menchu to come to grips with racism, sexism, imperialism, and capitalist exploitation. The work details the development of political consciousness of a Guatamalan female, a peasant of Indian ancestry who becomes a feminist and Marxist and renounces marriage and motherhood. Students are meant to read the book in order to understand the perspective of female Marxist Guatamalan peasants of Indian ancestry, not to examine whether the book is valid or contributes to a student's education.
Particularists deny that there is a commonality or a universality in the human experience. Rigoberta speaks only to her fellow multiple-victims of oppression. Victims of racism-sexism-imperialism-capitalist exploitation can identify and thereby gain "self-esteem". Education is quickly broken down into fragmented areas of study _ divided along racial, ethnic or cultural lines. A person's ideas and capacities, in this view, are set within boundaries that have determined his destiny from the moment of his conception. To the particularists there can be no human mind at work that is capable of transcending the accidents of birth.
A belief in a shared experience of a common American culture, is no more than Eurocentric arrogance, says Temple University's Molefi Kete Asante. He believes that blacks "must move away from an [sic] Eurocentric framework" in order to be able to "create freely." Particularism rests on the assertion that there is no common heritage, only a conglomeration of non-assimilating group traditions.
However, some multiculturalists see a common ground on which to stand. The "pluralistic" approach to multiculturalism has been advocated by a former historian of education at Columbia University, Diane Ravitch.
In the pluralistic approach to education, history is studied taking into account different cultural perspectives. This is done not for the purpose of advancing an ideological agenda, but to come to grips with what they consider objective reality. As Ravitch puts it, "The essential difference between pluralism and particularism is that the former actively combats ethnocentrism and the latter purposefully teaches it…. The pluralists seek a richer common culture; the particularists insist that no common culture is possible or desirable."
The pluralists would revise history to correct what they consider inaccuracies and expand the traditional canon by adding texts written by minorities. The old history and canon, while they served a useful unifying purpose, are flawed and too narrow say the pluralists. This approach is derided by particularists as simply adding window dressings to a fundamentally flawed system. Peter Erickson, a proponent of particularism and author of Patriarchal Structures in Shakespeare's Drama, holds that "each minority tradition is a distinct cultural entity that cannot be dissolved into an overarching common tradition through the catalytic action of adding one or two minority authors to the established canon."
Pluralists maintain that particularists are extremists, and have politicized a valid issue. Sniping between the two sides reached new heights in August when Leonard Jeffries, Chairman of the African-American studies department at CUNY's City College, at a rally in Harlem called Diane Ravitch "the ultimate, supreme, sophisticated, debonair racist" and a "Texas Jew."
Even within the pluralistic view of education, there is, it seems, something that is, at minimum, sowing the seeds of pluralism's destruction. As Ravitch readily admits, pluralism easily can be, and has been, transformed into particularism. In its concern to include everyone in a new common American history, to be nice to everybody and not leave anyone out, pluralism may well give rise to cultural divisiveness where none might otherwise exist.
The justly-acclaimed movie, Stand and Deliver has had such an effect. The film tells the story of a mathematics teacher in Los Angeles who inspired consistently poor math students to learn calculus so they might pass the Advanced Placement for mathematics examination. In one scene, the teacher, frustrated by the attitude of his class, tells the students (who happen to be mostly Hispanic) that it was their Mayan ancestors who invented the concept of zero. This tactic has been misunderstood by "multiculturalists" of both the particularist and pluralist persuasions. Although the statement was a rhetorical device used by the teacher to gain attention, it has been interpreted as a call for a return to Mayan mathematical systems for Hispanic children. The teacher meant that there was no reason why these students could not learn calculus. Their race could not serve as their scapegoat or as a mask for their unwillingness to try. He meant to say, "Don't think you can make me feel sorry for you because you are Hispanic. Don't think that I'll treat you differently because of this."
As Ravitch points out, such a statement from a teacher would, and in fact did, inspire Hispanic and non-Hispanic students alike. It was more a statement of his character and expectations as a teacher than it was a call to racial pride.
Well-intentioned people have, according to Ravitch, begun to wonder if it might not be a good idea to teach Hispanic children mathematics through Aztec and Mayan systems, even to the point of reverting back to the old Mayan calendar! George Ghevarnghese Joseph, of the United Kingdom's Manchester University, has demanded that schools teach "ethnomathematics," with all counting systems given equal priority, however primitive.
While pluralists readily acknowledge that it is our common humanity that binds us and not our culture, they also are willing to acknowledge the validity of programs that place much weight on culture. So ethnic or cultural studies are fine, "so long as they are taught critically and not as doctrinal faiths," says Ravitch.
Traditionalists do not gainsay the advantages of learning about non-Western customs and traditions; but it seems to them that once the need for dividing departments of learning along racial, ethnic, and other lines is admitted, there can be no stopping the degeneration into particularism.
By advocating such programs, pluralists are seemingly disavowing the one thing they claim separates them from the particularists, namely, universality.
Traditionalists argue that too much is being made of race, ethnicity, and gender by both factions within multiculturalism. They argue that more attention is being given to those things that divide us than to those things that unite and even elevate us. While the pluralists may be well-intentioned, they are playing into the hands of the more radical particularists.
When Socrates decided that he wanted to know what justice was, he set out and began asking everyone he met what they thought it meant. The answers he received went along these lines, "In Sparta justice is…," "In Athens justice is…." These answers left him unsatisfied. He did not want to know what justice in Sparta or Athens was; he wanted to know what justice was _ period. Far from ignoring other cultures on his journey to learn the meaning of justice, he observed them and attempted to transcend them. Traditionalists argue that this search for universal truth is the intellectual basis and crowning glory of Western culture Without this grounding they believe, multiculturalism is doomed.
The urls are not being accepted. I will try again.
Cognitive Decline: The Irreducible Legacy of Open Borders
Cognitive decline, the result of third world immigration, differential fecundity and gene flow, will mark the end of Western ascendancy. Described herein is the path to collapse and the improbable circumstances surrounding its discovery. La Griff du Lion, Volume 7, Number 1, January 2005, http://www.lagriffedulion.f2s.com/imm.htm
Upstream-
http://www.mugu.com/cgi-bin/Upstream/kessler-truth
Racism and Sexism: An Integrated Study (Paperback)
by Paula S. Rothenberg
Go to Amazon.com and search books for “Racism and Sexism: An Integrated Study” without the quotes.
Dan