Feeding the Beasts: Why Allowing Mohammad Khatami To Practice¨Taqiyeh¨ in the US Is a Mistake

By Daniel Raisbeck & Ivan Kooiman, on October 2nd, 2006

A careful analysis of the "moderate" Mohammad Khatami reveals his outright rejection of the Western concept of the liberty of the individual against the all-poweful State.

The invitation extended to Mohammad Khatami, the former Iranian President, to lecture at prominent American platforms such as Washington's National Cathedral and Harvard University was undoubtedly the result of his reputation as a moderate intellectual, a man possessing both the temperance and the diplomatic ability necessary to enable dialogue between the Islamic Republic and the West. A reputation, however, does not always reveal a man's true character. A Spanish proverb perhaps describes the situation best: "make fame," it says, "and then sleep soundly." This is particularly the case when repute is based on words and claims rather than on actions. In surveying Khatami's acts as President, in fact, one finds that he has rested on the laurels of his renown as a reformer for far too long, and that he has never been a measured statesman as much as adept at veiling Iran´s radicalism behind charming rhetoric and apparent moderation.

Elected in 1997 by a landslide, a victorious Khatami embodied the climax of swelling discontent among Iranians due to backward policy, political oppression and a dire lack of civil and economic liberties. Prior to his election, a joint report from CNN and Reuters referred to Khatami as "the freedom candidate," albeit in an election in which "opposition parties are banned."¹ "Khatami supporters," the report stated, "use a word Western ears don't expect to hear in Iran — freedom. 'Individual freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of thought, freedom of belief.'"² CNN and Reuters added that, "Khatami appeals across a broad spectrum to those yearning for social and economic justice."³ It was thus widely anticipated that Khatami's presidency would lead to reforms creating greater liberty and democracy.

His campaign promises, however, never materialized, even though he repeated his pledge to reform the system while seeking reelection in 2001. The official version publicized by the Western media is that his failure to carry out moderate changes to the Islamic Republic resulted from his inability to curb the power of Iran's radical conservatives. As the Washington Post reported on September 6th, "many of (Khatami´s) proposed reforms – from press freedoms to limiting the 12-member Council of Guardians' veto powers — were blocked by hard-liners now in ascendance."⁴ Similarly, Foreign Policy wrote in June of 2005 that, "Khatami failed to push back the heavy hand of the clerics in daily life and enact much-needed economic reform."⁵ It is perhaps more accurate, however, to affirm that the President´s inability to reform Iran did not result from political incompetence or lack of power. Rather, reformist policies, although highly touted, were never seriously pursued, and thus the status quo ante prevailed unchallenged.

In his book titled Post-revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power, author David Meshanri affirms that, "during Khatami’s first three years as president," despite there being signs of "unprecedented criticism and free expression," "political repression also reached new heights."⁶ Ahmad Siddiqi, meanwhile, reports that during the period in question, "many individuals . . . were brought to trial in special courts, often 'for political offenses not even defined by law.'"⁷ Kalimullah Tawahudi, for instance, a prestigious Iranian Kurdish writer who disappeared in 1996, was sentenced the next year "to 24 months in jail" for "propagating non-Islamic lies."⁸ In truth, Tawahudi was guilty of researching "the forced relocation of Kurdish tribes" from Iranian Kurdistan to the Khorasan province in eastern Iran in the 1500´s, and then authoring four volumes on the subject.⁹ The fifth volume was ¨seized¨ prior to completion by Mashad´s "municipal authorities," and the city´s Shiite Clergy justified Tawahudi´s punishment by calling him the "Salman Rushdie of Khorasan."¹⁰ Other "prominent intellectuals known for their criticism of the Iranian government," meanwhile, "disappeared and were later found dead" in 1998.¹¹

During that same year, Darioush and Parvaneh Forouhar, leaders of the Nation's Party of Iran, the most organized and influential opposition group in the country at the time, were stabbed to death by the Iranian intelligence service.¹² In July 1999, student uprisings ignited by the closure of roughly three quarters of the reformist media were mercilessly quelled. At least two students lost their lives as a result of the repression, and many are still imprisoned as we write. In fact, the 1999 backlash against protesting students recently claimed its latest victim as Akbar Mohammadi, a student who remained behind bars seven years after the demonstration, perished this last July from a hunger strike in protest over the unjust nature of his extended incarceration.¹³

Such repeated abuses against intellectuals, opposition parties and reform-seeking politicians display Khatami's continuous failure to impose even the mildest reforms. He thus dealt a detrimental blow to Iranian moderates, for the ultra-conservatives were further enabled to subdue proponents of greater freedom and other "enemies" of the regime at their whim. On March 12, 2000, for instance, Said Hajjarian, Khatami’s close adviser and the presumed architect of the 1997 reformist, landslide victory, was shot in the face from point-blank range.¹⁴ The fate of Hajjarian, who miraculously survived the assassination attempt despite becoming handicapped for life, proved that not even those belonging to the President's inner circle were safe from state-sponsored violence in Iran. Khatami himself, however, did little to alter this scenario, thus contributing to the plight of those who had cast their votes in his favor.

Upon being re-elected by a reform-seeking electorate in 2001, Khatami further harmed the moderate cause by selecting a cabinet free of reformist ministers. In addition, his second term was characterized by an increased censorship of free speech, books and independent media.¹⁵ Thus, Khatami's second term, which was brought about by renewed promises to enhance liberty, proved to be a blessing in many respects for the hard-line conservatives: it resulted in a radical cabinet led by a feeble president whose administration could only disillusion those segments of the population eager for change and moderation.

The radicals, however, were not satisfied with their control over the presidency and its cabinet; in order to hinder moderates from attaining Parliamentary seats in the 2004 election, the ultra-conservatives in the Guardian Council used their authority "to vet candidates standing for election to national office," and "to reject without right of appeal those it deems to be unqualified or of unsuitable character"¹⁶ in banning 3,600 potential reformists from running for office. Supposedly, these candidates "lacked the criteria to stand for election."¹⁷ Although the Council eventually "restored 1,160 low-profile candidates to the list in response to criticism hurled at the ban," 124 moderate MP's nevertheless resigned in protest in February, 2004.¹⁸ Thereafter, the conservatives proceeded to win the election handily. Thus the legislative branch of the Iranian state became steadily transformed into an institution utterly dominated by the Mullahs.

It is important to emphasize, however, that such restrictions upon moderates seeking parliamentary seats were never necessary, for Iran's very constitution is designed so that religious conservatives ultimately possess the final say on any legislative issue. In the first place, any law passed in Iran is subject to the veto of the Guardian Council, an "upper house of Parliament" within Iran's constitution composed of twelve members, half of them Islamic clerics chosen by the Supreme Leader, half of them lawyers selected by the head of the judicial branch, who is in turn appointed by the Supreme Leader.¹⁹ "The body has the right to vet all legislation passed by the Majlis," or Members of Parliament, "and veto any laws that it judges do not comply with Islamic law or Iran’s constitution."²⁰ Thus, the presence of moderates and opposition members in Parliament amounted to a mere illusion of democratic debate within Iran. The hard-line conservatives, however, were no longer willing to tolerate even this smokescreen of modern liberalism, and hence the Iranian state became steered in a course of ever growing inclemency toward those of a moderate viewpoint, and this under the presidency of a supposed reformer.

Notable examples of political repression during Khatami's second term include the February, 2003 conviction of Abbas Abdi, Hossein-Ali Ghazian and Behrooz Geranpayeh to 8 years of imprisonment “for propagating against the system.”²¹ These men suffered such dire consequences for publishing polls revealing that three-quarters of Iranians favored negotiating with the United States, and that 64.5% of them supported resuming political relations with America.²² Also, Zahra Kazemi, a Canadian-Iranian journalist, was incarcerated in June, 2003, "for taking pictures outside a prison during a student protest in Tehran."²³ Within three weeks of her detention she had been tortured, raped and finally murdered.²⁴

As the Iranian state apparatus continued to enact its repressive policies, it became painstakingly clear to close observers that President Khatami's stated intent to reform amounted to nothing more than cleverly chosen propaganda. As Michael Ledeen put it, Khatami simply became "the empty vessel into which the Iranian people poured their dreams of freedom when they elected him."²⁵ For instance, Michael Rubin writes that from 2000 to 2002, 'the Iranian government closed more than 50 (news)papers, banned private internet service providers, seized thousands of satellite dishes and staged the largest trial of dissidents since the Islamic Revolution."²⁶ Also, despite Khatami´s declarations against the death penalty, public executions still managed to nearly double during his years in office. Cases in which the death penalty was applied increased from 75 to 139 between 2000 and 2001, according to Iran´s official figures, yet actual numbers are in all likelihood considerably higher according to Amnesty International. In turn, Rubin shrewdly pointed out in 2002 that, despite Khatami's promises to increase tolerance, "the only things that have increased in Iran" under his presidency "are floggings, executions and inflation,"²⁷ for the fiscal crisis became as acute as the violation of the most basic civil liberties.

The executions carried out by the Iranian state, it should be pointed out, are as a general rule both atrocious and motivated by sheer and utter radicalism. Ruhollah Rowhani, for instance, charged of "apostasy" for converting a Shi'a Muslim woman to the Baha'i faith, was sentenced to death in 1999.²⁸ Atefeh Rajabi, meanwhile, a 16-year-old girl, was hanged for committing "acts incompatible with chastity."²⁹ Haji Rezaie, the Supreme Court judge who presided over her trial, tied the cord around her neck himself and stated that he was pleased to do so.³⁰ "Society," he reportedly stated, "must be kept safe from acts against public morality."³¹ Subsequently, he ordered her corpse to be left hanging from the crane for several hours in order for it to serve as a "good example."³²

Rajabi, however, might be considered fortunate to succumb at the gallows when one compares her fate to that of Hajieh Esmailvand, a young Iranian woman convicted of adultery and sentenced to death by stoning.³³ Esmailvand, like countless other women stoned in Iran, was buried waist-deep in the ground, thus being unable to defend herself from the projectiles hurled at her by men, many of them civilians, who stood around her in a circle and made sure they did not infringe upon Article 104 of the Law of Hodoud, which states that, in the name of Allah, the stones cast at an adulteress "should not be large enough to kill the woman by one or two strikes, nor should they be so small that they could not be defined as stones."³⁴

One would suspect that stoning would be among the first items to be addressed by a supposed reformer. Khatami, however, never uttered a word against the practice. Quite the contrary, his government spokesman and Guidance Minister, Ata ´ollah Mohajeri, reportedly told the pro-government daily Ressalat in an April, 1998 interview that the debate should not focus on whether stoning, a traditional Quranic practice, should take place at all, but rather on whether it should be done "in full, public view," or rather among a limited number of faithfuls in a restricted area, so as to prevent an outcry from the international community.

Khatami´s criticism of the conservative establishment for its oppression of the reformist movement thus seems insincere, if not sinister. If he enjoyed any success as President, therefore, it was in no way related to reform, but rather to the skilful manner in which he was able to maintain his reputation as a moderate while blending chameleon-like with radicals such as the Supreme Leader and the members of the Guardian Council. One is thus forced to wonder how much of a true reformer Khatami was from the outset. Fortunately, Khatami himself provides insights into his true character through his own writings.

Rubin affirms that, "while still a Parliamentarian," Khatami "published an essay in an official daily" concerning the sine qua nons of "participation in government."³⁵ "Knowledge of God's commandment," Khatami wrote, "must be the foundation of individual and collective life. Acquiring such comprehension requires several years of studies and much effort."³⁶ For Rubin, such statements prove that "democracy is fine (from Khatami´s viewpoint) so long as power is limited to the mullahs and ayatollahs."³⁷

Historian Joseph Loconte, meanwhile, asserts that Khatami´s book, published soon after he became President in 1997 and entitled Islam, Liberty and Development, interposes the image of "an Enlightenment Don" with that of "an al-Qaeda operative."³⁸ Loconte writes that Khatami's calls for Islamic society to accept "the accomplishments of the West" and to abandon "dogmatic attachment to archaic ideas" are obscured by repeated, anti-Western diatribes.³⁹ For Khatami, Loconte writes, the West "has only one objective: to compel people everywhere 'to surrender to its wishes' and to seize the world's resources 'to serve the imperialist power.'"⁴⁰ In fact, Khatami describes Iran's struggle against Western values as "central to (its) survival."⁴⁰ Any compromise, he warns, would lead to "nothing but debasement and trampling on our pride."⁴¹

Loconte adds that, "a careful reading of Khatami's book reveals his rejection of the core political-religious creed of Western democracy: the inalienable, God-given rights of the individual against the coercive power of the state."⁴² Khatami writes that a system founded upon "Islamic utopian ideology is bound to restrict some individual liberties," yet he states that a system based on abstinence and high morality" is ultimately superior to one based on political freedom. Khatami further claims that young Muslims ought "to be guided toward a better path than democratic hedonism," even if they might be "tempted to resent such a system."⁴³ Khatami's own writings, therefore, foretold one of his government´s central policies: the coercion of the youth so as to establish a "higher moral order." In light of such literature, his claims of moderation should have been scrutinized in the West from the first day of his presidency, particularly as the hard-liners employed his reputation as a means to advance their own repressive agenda.

The most effective way in which the ultra-conservatives played the card of Khatami´s image to their advantage, however, was in the standoff with the West over Iran's nuclear program. Ever since August 14, 2002, the date on which Iran´s enrichment of uranium was exposed, Khatami used his reputation as an intellectual and reformer to ensure the success of the Mullahs' foot-dragging policy. Sensing that the international community was alarmed but unwilling to act decisively, he repeated rhetoric about "a dialogue between civilizations" in order to create hope in France, Germany and Britain regarding the effectiveness of a purely diplomatic approach to the crisis.

Diplomacy, however, has hitherto only granted time to the Iranians as they race toward their inclusion within the club of nuclear nations. As the EU3 continues to act upon the assumption that Iran will surrender its nuclear ambitions as long as it is treated cordially, Hossein Mussavian, Khatami's nuclear expert, candidly presented the Iranian perspective on European diplomacy: "In August 2003," he stated in an interview, "we needed another year to complete the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility project (UCF) so it could be operational. Thanks to the negotiations with Europe we gained another year . . . (and we then) completed the UCF in Esfahan."⁴⁴ It is reported that by now this plant has produced enough enriched uranium to produce 10 to 20 nuclear bombs.

Clearly, then, Khatami proved to be a far more effective pawn through which the Iranian radicals could deceive the international community than the confrontational, forthright Ahmadinejad; although the two men share the view that Iran must acquire nuclear power regardless of the consequences, Khatami's tact and his ability to manipulate his image as a moderate advanced the Iranian cause in a manner so discrete it makes the current President's sincerity seem ill-advised. This is plainly revealed when one compares Ahmadinejad's threat to "wipe Israel off the face off the Earth" to Khatami's "guarantee that (Iran) will not produce nuclear weapons, because we're against them and do not believe they are a source of power."⁴⁵ In this sense, Khatami seems to have employed to perfection the Shi´ia notion of Taqiyeh, or "'the disguising of the truth' in order to protect the faith against its religious and secular enemies."⁴⁶ Such machinations, in fact, have permitted the Iranians to progress steadily toward a state of nuclear capability while the West is slowly cajoled into submission.

Allowing Khatami to preach about the evils of "Western imperialism" in America is thus a grave mistake, and those who celebrate his visit as a sign that collaboration with Iran is advancing are merely nourishing a growing beast whose appetite for power appears to be insatiable. Certainly, the West should never surrender diplomacy as the primary tool by which to protect its interests and ensure the safety of the civilized world; yet once our enemies take advantage of our proper intentions in order to advance their barbaric agenda, we must not become guilty of the sins of what Winston Churchill defined as an appeaser: "someone who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last." Rather, let us recognize Khatami and the vicious regime he represents as the enemies they are, so that we might avoid receiving a bite from which it will be difficult to recover.

Endnotes

1. CNN.com, May 19, 1997, High Turnout in Iran´s Presidential Election: Reformer, Hard-Liners in Close Race.

2. Ibidem

3. Ibidem

4. Washingtonpost.com, September 5, 2006, War Backfiring on U.S, Khatami Says.

5. Foreignpolicy.com, June, 2005, The Cheat Sheet: The Iranian Election.

6. Meshanri, David. Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society and Power. London, EN: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001. P. 142.

7. Siddiqi, Ahmad. Khatami and the Search for Reform in Iran as appears in the Stanford Journal of International Relations, 2006.

8. FDI´s Newswire, Issue # 50, June 30, 1997 as appears in iran.org.

9. Ibidem.

10. Ibidem.

11. Supra n. 7.

12. see Timmerman, Kenneth R. Just Say No to Khatami, as appears on Frontpagemag.com, August 24, 2006.

13. See web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ESLMDE130052000?open&of=ESL-392 – 16k -

14. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 2 no. 3, March, 2000, Iran´s Shadow Government Uses Violence to Intimidate Moderates.

15. See Rubin, Michael. More Floggings and Inflation: The Fruits of Reform in Iran as appears in The Daily Telegraph (London) on April 9, 2002.
16. Economist.com, September 12, 2006. Country Briefings: Iran

17. Foxnews.com, February 2, 2004. One-Third of Iran´s Parliament Resigns.

18. Ibidem.

19. Supra, n. 16.

20. Ibidem.

21. See Human Rights Watch Letter to British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw as appears on hrw.org, February 3, 2003.

22. Ibidem.

23. CBC News online, November 16, 2005. Indepth: Zahra Kazemi, Iran´s Changing Story.

24. Ibidem.

25. Ledeen, Michael. Visa not Denied: An NRO Symposium, nro.org, August 30, 2006.

26. Supra n. 15.

27.Supra, n. 15.

28. US Department of State Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: Iran, September 9, 1999.