Trying to subdue “savagery” with “civilized ideology” is, as Clausewitz long ago demonstrated, absurd.
War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.
— Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 87, Princeton University Press, 1989.
. . . victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield, but in the destruction of the enemy’s physical and psychic forces, which is usually not attained until the enemy is pursued after a victorious battle . . ..
– On War, p. 71.
If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and in their relationships to one another.. . . To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity.
– On War, p. 76.
. . . since the essence of war is fighting, and since the battle is the fight of the main force, the battle must always be considered as the true center of gravity of the war.
— On War, p. 248.
As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity . . . [t]he first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.
— On War, p. 89.
Can Clausewitz teach us anything about fighting Islam?
Clausewitz studied, analyzed, and wrote about war in the abstract to deconstruct war into its component parts, not to lay out a prescriptive set of “rules” or “laws” governing the conduct of warfare. Clausewitz saw war as a complex human endeavor that could not be reduced to a series of unbending commandments; rather he used his personal experience in seven campaigns fighting France, supplemented by years of study of Napoleonic warfare to identify the enduring elements of war and to understand how they function. In this regard Clausewitz differed from his military strategist contemporaries, Antoine-Henri Jomini and Heinrich Dietrich von Bulow, who believed that war could be reduced to invariable scientific principles that were to be followed in cookbook fashion. Over the years Jomini’s and von Bulow’s boilerplate approach has been found wanting. As a consequence, Clausewitz’s On War is the enduring work that military specialists usually turn to when they seek a theoretical framework from which they can analyze, test, and evaluate the intellectual aspects of warfare situations.
In past essays I have referred to the wisdom of Clausewitz in analyzing the combat in Iraq (here, here, here, here, and here). I believe it is necessary to revisit Clausewitz again in the search for answers as to why the US strategy in Iraq is not succeeding as the Bush administration and the Pentagon had anticipated four long years ago.
What is war and how is it won?
Clausewitz answers the “what is war?” question in a very straightforward explanation: "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means." As to the question, How is it won?, the old Prussian general again has an uncomplicated answer: “. . . victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield, but in the destruction of the enemy’s physical and psychic forces, which is usually not attained until the enemy is pursued after a victorious battle . . ..”
I have on good occasion taken the liberty to personalize Clausewitz’s description of war by reducing it to a simple equation, which is my interpretation of this master strategist’s words:
WAR = MOTIVATION (psychic forces) + CAPABILITY (physical forces).
What this means is that it is absolutely essential to remove one or both of the components of war from the equation in order to defeat an enemy. Usually destruction of the enemy’s capability will destroy or severely lessen his motivation to continue the war, but capability destruction will at a minimum remove the immediate threat posed by the enemy. The greater the capability destruction, the greater the negative psychic impact on motivation as was proven by the utter devastation caused by Sherman’s march through Georgia, and the World War II conquests of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The US Civil War and World War II were “completed wars” because, after victorious battle, Clausewitz’s condition was followed regarding the pursuit of the enemy into his very lair and destroying him there.
War against Islam examined in a Clausewitzian sense
Since war is a continuation of policy, the place to begin examining the Iraq conflict is with the policies of the US and the Islamic jihadists. In the “National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” the following statement of policy appears:
Our mission in Iraq is clear. We're hunting down the terrorists. We're helping Iraqis build a free nation that is an ally in the war on terror. We're advancing freedom in the broader Middle East. We are removing a source of violence and instability, and laying the foundation of peace for our children and grandchildren.
— President George W. Bush, June 28, 2003
The National Security Strategy continues:
VICTORY IN IRAQ DEFINED
As the central front in the global war on terror, success in Iraq is an essential element in the long war against the ideology that breeds international terrorism. Unlike past wars, however, victory in Iraq will not come in the form of an enemy's surrender, or be signaled by a single particular event — there will be no Battleship Missouri, no Appomattox.
It is troubling that “hunting down terrorists” is the primary US “mission” in Iraq as enunciated by the President. While there are many actions implicit in the operation characterized as “hunting down terrorists,” it is a disappointingly inadequate basis on which to conduct war.
The President does not explicitly set out the objective of destroying the capability of the Shari’a-faithful and their Jihad warriors, together with the Baathists to make war; rather, the US military is charged with hunting down “terrorists” – whatever that means. Moreover, the President doesn’t really mean what he says here. If you include in the definition of “terrorists” those insurgents and militias walking the streets and slaughtering innocents and murdering one’s neighbor simply to take revenge for the last sectarian murder, hunting down “terrorists” would mean at the very least hunting down the leadership structure. Yet, because of our “other policy” (i.e., democracy building), a policy that is precisely not war, we have refrained from hunting down and eliminating the most important leader of the Shi’a militias, Muqtada al-Sadr, from the theater of battle. And even more to the point, we have not hunted down the terrorists in Iran, Syria, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, who bring weapons, manpower, and instruction into Iraq to “terrorize” those Iraqis who are truly grateful for their liberation, and of course to kill US military personnel with supercharged IEDs and surface-to-air missiles.
In regard to removing the motivation of these Jihad warriors, the President ignores the one historically proven method of destroying an enemy’s motivation: destroy his combat capability. Instead, the President proposes somehow tapping into universal law of humankind and replacing the jihadist motivation by “advancing freedom in the broader Middle East.” In other words, the US objective is to convince the Shari’a-faithful to switch their allegiance from a religious faith they have held for over 1,300 years to a political ideology imposed from the outside by a hated alien culture representing a hated religion. Clearly this US policy, which we are continuing by war, is vague, open-ended, and dubious. Is it any wonder that the war is not progressing as favorably as anticipated when it was undertaken?
Contrast the US policy with that which the Shari’a-faithful and their Jihad leaders have enunciated – first by Osama bin Laden and then by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Osama’s Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans, 23 Feb 98, reads in part:
. . . in compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims:
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies — civilians and military — is an individual duty for every Muslim who can fulfill its terms in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the Holy Mosque (in Mecca) and the al-Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem) from the grip of the infidels and the grip of their Arab puppets, and in order to force the armies of the infidel out of dar al-Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is all in accordance with the words of Allah, wherein this deity commands, "and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God."
There’s no ambiguity in the Sunni jihad policy being continued by war against “Americans and their allies — civilians and military.”
We find no solace or even respite in Shia policy as expressed by Ahmadinejad. As has been widely reported, he has vowed to “. . . wipe Israel off the face of the earth” and all to the chants of “death to America!”
Again, there’s no ambiguity in Shi’ite policy. So it may be safely assumed that neither Sunni nor Shia jihadists are having intramural debates, as are occurring in America, about what is the war policy of their leadership. Returning to Clausewitz, the extreme difference in US and Islamic policies is explained by this observation:
If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and in their relationships to one another . . . To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity.
The differences in the policy statements indicate that we are engaged in a war between “civilized nations” in the West and “savages” in Islam. The West, and especially the US, is attempting to wage a “less cruel and destructive” war as if we were fighting a Western enemy that shared our values, not the least of which would be the sanctity of human life. But obviously such is not the case. Consequently, we should heed Clausewitz’s warning: “To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity.” American moderation (absurdity) is readily apparent in characterizing the US mission in Iraq as “hunting down terrorists” and in attempting to “build democracy.”
The contrast can be highlighted in this comparison: We naively expect Muslim Arabs with a 1,300+ year tradition, political ideology, and theology diametrically opposed to Western-style representative government to undergo a “conversion” to a Western belief system, while the Jihadists know with Koranic certainty that we are infidels and will remain so until defeated in war. We pursue our policy through a Limited War Doctrine which tries to pinpoint the “terrorist” enemy in an urban warfare environment while preserving the very infrastructure that provides shelter and logistics to the enemy. In contrast, both Sunni and Shia jihadis are pursuing the simple policy of killing Americans and our allies. Trying to subdue “savagery” with “civilized ideology” is, as Clausewitz long ago demonstrated, absurd.
Fighting an insurgency or asymmetrical war where conventional force battles do not occur in the context of a war as Clausewitz had envisioned in On War, suggests a reinterpretation is in order of Clausewitz’s judgment that “. . . since the essence of war is fighting, and since the battle is the fight of the main force, the battle must always be considered as the true center of gravity of the war.” I would submit, however, the Clausewitzian premise that the essence of war is fighting remains quite valid, as insurgency is still a form of war.
In other words, the enemy’s combat capability is still the center of gravity, albeit this capability is now diffuse and distributed. What this means is that the combat capability factor manifests itself on the insurgency battlefield not in large organizational formations, but rather in small guerrilla units. Of course this means that insurgents are in hiding much of the time. They do not have the luxury of building and establishing war materiel factories and producing armaments. Instead, they must remain elusive and on the move. While makeshift bomb factories are easy to set up and abandon as the need arises, the raw materials and engineering for sophisticated mines, anti-armor weapons, anti-personnel weapons, and ammunition must come from some outside source.
This outside source is the insurgency regeneration logistical facilities typically located across borders in a “safe haven.” It is there in the “safe havens” where the combat capability must be destroyed instead of on the battlefield. And, it goes without saying that these re-supply sources are in “safe havens” because those of us fighting the “counterinsurgency” have defined our battle plans and rules of engagement as such so that our enemy and their allies in the “safe havens” know we have a priori designated the border as the geographical limit in our Limited War Doctrine.
And, as we see in Afghanistan and in Iraq, insurgent forces never mass in sufficient numbers for a conventional army to deliver a decisive blow to insurgent combat capability. Consequently, only insurgency regeneration logistical facilities offer decisive targets for conventional forces. In the Iraq conflict the insurgency regeneration logistical facilities are located in Iran and Syria. But as long as we concentrate all our efforts on the insurgents inside of Iraq instead of on the resupply centers in Iran and Syria, we are merely playing “whack a mole.”
All of the above analysis brings me to my final point regarding a Clausewitzian element of war: the “trinity” of (i) the people, (ii) the commander and his army, and (iii) the government, all of which constitute the constellation of war-making entities on each side. In regard to this trinity, by Clausewitz’s reckoning, “the political aims are the business of the government alone.” Since I believe I have presented a cogent and persuasive argument that the political aims as set out by our government are inadequate to cope with the threat posed by the war of the Shari’a-faithful and their Jihad warriors against America and the West, the inescapable conclusion is that the lack of progress in the Iraq conflict rests squarely with the Bush administration’s formulation of a Limited War Doctrine limited to “hunting down [some] terrorists [sometimes].”
The obvious next question is: “Is it too late to rectify the strategic mistakes?” The answer to this question is rather straightforward from a military point of view. But of course since the policy that is so disastrously defective is not necessarily driven by military interests but rather the “policy” interests of our civilian government, the straightforward answer becomes rather convoluted.
Militarily, it is quite obviously not too late if we but drop the absurdity of “moderation” by dispensing with the idea that the Shari’a-faithful will change their allegiance from Islam to the ideology of democracy. This policy change would require a full scale redirection of our military efforts toward destroying the combat capability of Jihad warriors by eliminating the insurgency regeneration logistical facilities in Iran and Syria and by seeking out and destroying all of the insurgency leadership irrespective of the “political” ramifications for a specious coalition government.
The rub here, however, is not in the military policy. The problem resides in the politico-military leadership of America (and this includes the top military leadership in the Pentagon, since many to most senior officers are willing limited war collaborators with the political administration they serve, given the US governmental principle of civilian supremacy). Look across the political spectrum – from the Leftist cut-and-runners to the supposedly hawkish candidates from the Republican Party. None match President Bush’s commitment to this war. But this President is not prepared to abandon Limited War and democracy-building. Similarly, none of the “more hawkish” Republican presidential candidates now lining up, be they Rudy Giuliani, John McCain, Mitt Romney, or even Newt Gingrich, would dare suggest that President Bush’s Limited War or democracy-building policy is wrong. At best, they will say that we need to find new “strategies” to effect these policies.
So we see that the answer to the “obvious next question” is not at all obvious once we leave the military arena. The question we must ask ourselves is what drives otherwise good and patriotic men to abandon the obvious in their embrace of the obtuse.
dyerushalmi@saneworks.us
http://www.saneworks.us/
Read more articles by Tom Snodgrass
The weak limited war concept came to us from the greatest supply sergeant ever born…Dwight Eisenhower. It did not work when Ike tried it but it did become the new religion now served by our "caring" society that is multicultural, and spineless.
You very sucinctly indicated the reasons for failure in Vietnam and now Iraq with stop off in Bosnia on the way. But will the great unwashed American population ever consent to waging war as war instead of as a exercise in "peacekeeping"? I think not, until they understand that their very existence is on the line, but even then I am pessimistic that they would wish to surrender and take the Koran as their bood and Sharia law as their new law. We can't even handle an easy problem like illegal alien deportation and protection of our own borders by deporting the criminals and locking the border down so how will we ever deal with a real war?
I left the Air Force after almost 8 years due to our Vietnam policies that guaranteed that we could not win and the reason for going to war is to win. Personally I think the illegal alien issue is a bigger threat to our country than the Islamic jihadists.
Comment by Mickey G | March 23, 2007
“The weak limited war concept came to us from the greatest supply sergeant ever born…Dwight Eisenhower.”
Apparently, it was Truman:
“This disparity of total vs. limited war objectives first became apparent as the Korean War dragged on and President Truman’s administration could find no way to conclude the conflict. When President Eisenhower assumed the presidency from Truman in 1953, he quickly recognized the logical solution to the strategic conundrum was shifting U.S. war-fighting from limited to total war means, and he thereby ended the Korean War by communicating to the communists his intention of escalating with nuclear weapons if the communists persisted in their total war objectives. Civilian limited war advocates should have seen the glaring fallacy of their theory at this point, but they didn’t. For his part, Eisenhower did not believe that limited war could remain limited.” http://www.intellectualconservative.com/2007/01/31/counterinsurgency-and-the-us-military
Comment by sedonaman | March 23, 2007
I agree that it is foolish to try to spread/impose democracy, but these essays are troubling. So Col Snodgrass doesn't like limited war. He likes total war. Got it. But what exactly does that mean in the real world? I think this is left intentionally vague because to be specific would alarm people. I am entirely serious about this. Someone needs to be specific. Exactly what do you mean? What are you implying? What do you have in mind? How do we "win" the war in Iraq? Should we invade (or attack) Iran? Syria? Saudi Arabia? How do we destroy the enemy’s war making capability? How do we destroy their motivation? (The current meddling is increasing their motivation.)
Comment by Dan Phillips | March 23, 2007
Dan:
You are being a bit sly, are you not? To begin, Colonel Snodrass has published here and at the SANE Works for US web journal extensively on his military critique of those who believe in parsing war and building democracies at the same time (typically the crowd you identify as neocons).
What Clausewitz teaches us, what history shows us, and what the Colonel demonstrates to us is that ends in failure.
Now, from there you may certainly ask how you win the war?
Or, which is really the yet slyer part implicit in your question: must we fight this war at all?
As to the second question, the answer would be yes if you take what Islam has said and done to and about the West for 1400 years. The only time Islam has been "passive" is when it has been dominated by the West in war.
But we have listened to your argument and those of the anti-war conservatives such as Pat Buchanan. This view suggests that if we but abandon our grotesquely biased support of Israel and abandon our pretense to control the Muslim world by leaving it and minding our own business, they will leave well enough alone and we can all live in relative peace and harmony.
As you know, those of us at SANE have long advocated that Israel ought to be left to defend itself. I would have no problem with the US ending all financial support tomorrow and washing its hands of the "Peace Process". Tell the parties, you're all grown ups, solve it yourselves. The Palestinians are free to call in their Arab brethren who cry crocodile tears for them and Israel is free to secure its own realm; just leave the US out of it. I'd vote for that in a second.
But the problem with this approach to the world and to Islam is that it denies history and what Islam and its Shari'a itself teaches and demands of its Muslim faithful.
You and I might both agree that war is an ugly and despicable affair but I will chose war and destruction of my enemy any day over a nuclearized 9-11 flying from Pakistan after the Taliban overthrow Musharraf.
But, if you get past your wispy dreams that Islam really only hates America because of her support of those ugly little Zionists, then you might in fact arrive at the question you asked.
But again, you already know the answer. You suggest the Colonel has not been explicit, but he has. He has explained that here in part but in detail elsewhere at IC and at SANE. But, for the other readers who might have understood your feint as sincere, let's give it a go.
First, you identify the enemy and you understand his MOTIVATION. In the case of Islam and those of the Muslim faithful who take Islamic law seriously, there is more than enough to explain to us the motivations behind Jihad: a world wide Islamic Caliphate based upon Shari’a.
Second, you destroy the enemy’s CAPABILITY by decapitating his command-and-control by taking out as much of his leadership structure as possible, by destroying his physical infrastructure for training and long term planning, and finally you cut off his supply lines.
In Iraq's case does that mean Iranian and Syrian supply lines and routes should come under heavy aerial bombardment? Absolutely. Might there be need for special ops and even infantry in cross border actions? Probably.
There, now you have your answer, and probably more than you bargained for.
All the best,
David Yerushalmi
Society of Americans for National Existence (SANE)
Comment by David Yerushalmi | March 23, 2007
Of course specifics would alarm people, the brunt, logical, and obvious conclusion to matters pertaining to conflict is often a bit messy and the average john doe would rather pretend there is a less bloody way to patch things up. Reality bites like truth hurts.
If the 'supply lines' into iraq originate in syria or iran, erase the self-imposed border and scratch out the origins. No need to invade full scale, simply look for their stuff (i do not doubt we know where theyre keeping it), and bomb the ever-living bejeezus out of it.
I'm not the most educated in military history, but i vaguely remember a teacher explaining that in the vietnam war, aircraft patrolling the skies near the cambodian border couldnt venture over it, even if they could see the enemy. That's a really stupid way to conduct a war. If you have a threat, neutralize it, otherwise it will come back and bite you in the hind end.
Meddling will increase their motivation, constant and consistant 'meddling' (here, by meddling, i mean an open season on them, with government hands off) will exert enough pressure to make the alternative more appealing to more iraqi insurgents. Of course the Iranians and Syrians will be irrate if we bomb their supplies, and for a while, it may very well increase their motivation. Destroying the insurgent's supplies, though, will make it a bit more difficult for them to wage their war and, although their motivation to continue will be as high as ever, im pretty sure that constant destruction of supply lines and personnel will effectively halt, or at very least severely diminish their warfare conduction capabilities, and they will have to go farther and wider to find the means to fight. Stretched supply lines are the most vulnerable, and there will reach a point where the struggle to get weapons becomes more than the average insurgent is will to put up with; then, their motivation without means just means a mob of angry people.
Comment by Jekken | March 23, 2007
Wars are inevitably lost by politicians. When competent military leaders are given their head to win they do so.
But politics trumps all! George S. Patton could and did win battles but this usually put him at odds with politicians. In the end, in my judgment, it destroyed him when he was no longer needed.
The problem is politicians are playing their own game; often this conflicts with the military reality. Politicians' objectives are mainly driven by non-military factors. Behind the war strategy lurks the special and vested interests, not to mention the venal interests of those who do not have to put themselves in harms way.
These dual purposes are often at conflict with each other. Since the political purpose trumps the military it is the men and women in harms way that pay the price. Unfortunately this matters little to the real key players who only see their self-interest as the guiding light.
The justification for the Iraq war may or may not be valid. But the strategy and tactics developed in and mandated by Washington were not. The blame for this goes to Rumsfeld and of course Bush as CIC. The crime, as I see it, is that after the Iraq invasion our military forces saw that Intel had it all wrong and yet the Washington cabal refused to let our military adjust tactics and operations to the actual situation. In other words Washington mandated we continued to fight using plans that were totally flawed. One can only guess how many of our military lives were lost solely due to this stupidity and arrogance.
In my judgment our politicians have placed us in a quagmire. There are of course viable answers to the situation but the question is: are our politicians or the American public willing to accept them? This I don't know!
Comment by NHGrouch | March 23, 2007
As the eminent historian John Keegan has written, Clausewitz theory that all war is "merely the continuation of policy by other means," and his introduction of the concept of 'total war' were revolutionary and prescriptive but not necessarily historically accurate. Indeed it was only after the publication of On War that these concepts became reality. The result was the catostrophic Napoleanic wars, and the two World Wars of the 20th century. His (especially when coupled with the philosophy of Marx) was a disastrous and self-fulfilling legacy which resulted in a distortion of Western Values and the militarization of Europe to an extent never before seen. Clausewitzian theory certainly has its place, but it should be kept in context and not blown out of all proportion to reality.
A global conflagration resulting in tens of millions dead is not required to win the war on Islamic extremists. I, for one, most certainly agree that Islam is a barbaric and expansionist ideology which must be confronted and checked; however, are all Muslims strict Koran-thumping fundamentalists? No. And can the existence of moderate, tolerant governments (i.e. Iraq, Afghanistan) in the heart of Mohammadistan actually foster moderation in the larger Muslim community, even to the extent of a reduction in terrorism? In the long run, yes. The existence of moderate and tolerant governments in the region may eventually result in an increase in conversion to Christianity (though certainly not without violent reactionary resistance.)
I support our war on Islamic fundamentalists. I even support the expansion of that war, where necessary such as in Iran and Syria. But I feel the constant invocation of Clausewitz and the declaration of war on all Muslims is precipitous and unnecessary; it may even reinforce the Colonel's own formula by artificially swelling the ranks of our enemy with folks we may otherwise turn into allies (the moderate or secular Muslims such as the Hamid Karzai's of the world.)
Comment by Jeff Osonitsch | March 24, 2007
David,
I really was not intending to be sly. Theoretical debate about total versus limited war is fine. But in the real world the difference translates into a whole lot of dead people. I happen to think dead people are a bad thing (our side and theirs).
You are also putting words in my mouth. You have never seen me writing anything negative about Zionists. You have only seen me writing about the need for neutrality.
I have also never been sly in suggesting that we shouldn't be fighting this war.
As for supply lines, am I suppose to believe the intel from this government that intentionally manipulated evidence about Iraq? How do I know that the supply lines allegations are not spun and exaggerated as the WMD intel was to justify an attack on Iran or Syria? This administration has zero credibility. Plus the supply lines would not be an issue if we withdrew from Iraq as we should.
The line of thought that we are doing poorly in Iraq because we are fighting a PC war is increasingly in evidence. Isn't it possible that the reasons things are going poorly is because the whole thing was ill-conceived and unwise from the begging? David and the paleos share some agreement there. That democratization was a foolish enterprise. But we say withdraw/disengage and SANE says be more ruthless. I don't think it needs elaborating that ours is the more conservative policy.
Now I believe we need to have a serious debate on whether Islam is inherently Jihadist. I don't know the answer. Serge Trifkovic and others would say yes. Dinesh D'Souza among others would say no. But either way, that issue screams out, as I am sure you are aware, for immigration reform that intelligently discriminates. (Oh the horror. How illiberal of me.) Immigration restriction in the US and the West would go much farther in reducing the threat than will any war.
But there are > 1 billion Muslims in the world. Jeff is right. You can't make all of them the enemy. If they are over there, and we are over here, then conflict will decrease. That is virtually self-evident. The West is militarily vastly superior. An Ottoman style assault is out of the question. That is why the terrorist must resort to terrorism. We are doing what John Quincy Adams warned us against. Going forth "seeking monsters to destroy."
Comment by Dan Phillips | March 24, 2007
Jeff,
Clausewitz's "On War" was written as a result of the Napoleanic Wars, it didn't cause them. In regard to Clausewitz's influence on WWI, actually it was Antoine Henri Jomini (a Clausewitz contemporary) who was the primary reference for WWI generals and who was discredited by the adoption of his prescriptive codification of Napolean's tactics that proved disasterous after the invention of the machinegun.
Regarding the number of dead in this war with Islam, in order for the West to get the jihadis to stop attacking, the West will have to "dominate" Islam militarily. (Historically that is the only way previous jihads have been quelled.) How many dead it will take to make them believe that they are dominated is a question that no one can answer at present. One reason is that we have not yet begun to kill Muslims in the numbers that it will eventually take. I believe that is the way the old Prussian strategist would have seen the jihad war that is being waged on us, and it is definitely the way I see suppressing jihad based on history.
Regarding your assertion that not all Muslims are enemies, the world view of Islam is that the world is divided into two parts, one Islamic and the other to be conquered and made Islamic. That is the fundamental purpose of the "religion." Whether or not every Muslim is ready to pick up the scimitar of jihad to subdue the West, there is no denying that it is the foundation of their faith. I believe that most Muslims are "fence-sitters" who will jump in on the side of the jihadis if they see the "mandate of heaven" behind jihadi victories. This is the reason why we must make them believe they are "dominated" ASAP. We are not going to convince Muslims to side with us by making nice with them. We can only convince Muslims to side with us because they have no choice. Osama perfectly understood this concept when he said that people will choose "the strong horse." It is such a simple concept that is in keeping with human nature that I am baffled why Americans don't understand it and instead look for the answer to stopping jihad in "friendship" and good will." How many Muslim dead it will take to convince Muslims that they should call off jihad (which reappears historically like Halley's comet) and rein in their jihadis is up to them. I suspect we're going to have to make it very painful for the Muslim umma before the air goes out of the jihad balloon.
Comment by wfalcon | March 24, 2007
Small historical point. Eisenhower never approved of limited war and expanded our
nuclear forces to ensure that our opponents knew that an attack on us would incur their
(if not our) destruction. Eisenhower repeatedly urged LBJ to abaondon the idea of limited war
in Vietnam. He told him to use nuclear weapons if need be on the Chinese. Ike also
felt that "nuclear diplomacy," while risky, would be cheaper than maintaining the large
conventional forces that Truman oversaw.
The concept of limited war grew in part out JFK's idea of "flexible response," which
was an alternative to Eisenhower's "all or nothing" style of diplomacy. (which entailed
potentially using the nuclear threat as part of the diplomatic process) ONe way of
conceiving this was through the lens of Schelling's "Game theory", which Colonel
Snodgrass has written on earlier. Many of Kennedy's and later Johnson's cabinet
members were familiar with Schelling's work.
WNA
Comment by Nathan Alexander | March 24, 2007
First to Jeff's remarks. Precisely because Keegan is a historian and not a serious student of military strategy you have discovered a wedge between them. Clausewitz drew from history but his focus was in understanding how wars were won. If you read the Colonel's essay on War and Democracy (published here at IC and at SANE [http://www.saneworks.us/War-and-Democracy-article-397-3.htm]), you will understand that wars have been fought to be won and they have been fought to be lost since wars have been fought. Clausewitz was "revolutionary" only because he took the art and science of war seriously.
Further, to blame Clausewitz for the wars that followed him as if there had not been catastrophic wars before his time is silly. Again, Clausewitz neither advocates war nor documents its past. He understands its mechanisms.
As to the War Against Islam and the Shari’a faithful. The Colonel and those of us writing at SANE have made the war aim clear and we have said so here in essays and comment threads but to no avail to those who post the straw man of a war against the world as a defense of an opposite approach.
First, the war against Islam is a war the West did not begin. Mohammed and his successors began this war. They built a legalistic political ideology within the trappings of a religion, all of which is based upon Shari'a — "the Islamic way". The Islamic way of life is guided by fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence. Over the 1400 years since its inception, there developed five historical, traditional and AUTHORITATIVE schools or "madhāhib" (sing. = madh'hab), four of which are associated with the Sunni tradition and one with Shia. While there have been many splinters including a group from within the Wahhabi sect which rejects all such interpretations, these five schools capture 98% of all of the Muslim world.
All authoritative schools teach the same thing relative to the World Caliphate, Jihad, and the infidels. They place different emphases and arrive at the legal conclusions from different sources, but the conclusions are almost all identical. There is no doubt that during its history, certain Caliphs of the Islamic empire were less strict in following Shari’a and ultimately they paid the prices in revolts and internecine battles over the very question of fidelity to Islamic law. The Muslim leaders of the modern 20th century Arab states are almost all viewed by devout Muslims as denying the truth of Islam. That is why they must use totalitarianism to maintain control and order.
Thus, the war is not against Muslims. The war is against Shari’a faithful Muslims. Moreover, I am not in the least worried that such a clear declaration and approach to winning this war will “inflame” the Muslim world. So what? If we have in place the proper immigration policies and are prosecuting this war, it will be a war fought on their turf not ours. I could care less if 100,000 Muslims jump up and down in the street burning American flags in Mecca.
In particular, to fight this war that we did not begin, simply means that we destroy Shari’a based regimes, organizations, or operations and those states which give them cover. I have explained what “destroy” means in the context of such a war above.
And that quite obviously doesn’t mean the US or the West must kill or fight every Muslim. Of the 1.3+ billion, we know that one-third to one-half, depending upon location, reject Shari’a and want to live a different kind of life. They are not part of the war anymore than the Germans or Japanese who lived in the US as faithful citizens were part of the war (despite our quite prudent response to the possibility of clandestine support from within). Of those non-faithful “good” Muslims living in Arab lands that are and will be at the heart of the war, they are in the same sad but inevitable position of peace loving Germans and Japanese in Berlin or Hiroshima, respectively. We’ve agreed war is ugly; but any man who believes he can live in this world without war before some eschatological event brings everlasting peace on earth should remain home with the women and children.
Now to Dan’s remarks not answered in the remarks preceding.
Dan, you continue to remark about how inhumane war is and how you “think dead people are a bad thing (our side and theirs).” But do you not see how irrelevant these remarks are? No man kills without just cause unless he is a murderer. But that is precisely the distinction. If you don’t understand this most rudimentary notion (the commandment engraved on the tablets brought down by Moses was Lo Tirtzach = Thou shall not murder; it says nothing of killing for the obvious reason).
(I note by way of observation that when we left off on our last comment thread on this same subject, I asked you which of America’s wars you would deem “just”. You didn’t respond.)
Let’s just forget the Zionists. They’re simply irrelevant. For those among the “conservatives” who obsess over them, I’d say what I said above. Let the “Zionists” fend for themselves. They’ve certainly made a mess of Israel and maybe if they had to go it alone they’d learn how to be a People living as a nation-state and not a State consisting of people.
I will not be drawn into a “discussion” over the justness of this war and certainly not when the predicate is “Bush lied, people died.” Whatever “interpretation” the Bush administration gave to the intel to justify the war, the fact is that everyone since the Clinton administration was convinced Saddam had WMD. The debate pre-war was whether the threat of him using it was great enough to end diplomatic efforts and to launch a war. No serious analyst who actually read all of the pre-war intel from all of the world’s intel services that has been made available could say that the threat was not real and high. The “Bush lied” choir is simply grasping at pure fabrication. They hang their hats on one small aspect (the Niger story) and the fact that WMD was not discovered in great amounts after the launch of the war. But even assuming that the special agents on the ground in Iraq, like Mr. Gaubatz who say they had plenty of evidence of WMD moved out of the country and kept hidden, are wrong and that there really never was wmd, so what? Intel is hardly ever foolproof. You get the best information you can get and you make the best assessment you can, which in turn is just that, an educated guess, and you act on it. And if you choose not to in a case of a threatened WMD attack, you’d better be prepared to live with the consequences.
Given what we knew of Saddam, and given the evidence we had, Bush made his choice and Congress agreed. And Congress agreed not because “Bush lied” but because it knew that even Bill Clinton agreed that given what he knew from his last days in office Saddam was a threat. The Brits agreed. The French and Russians agreed. They just didn’t agree to go to war over the threat. (We know why the French and Russians didn’t want to.)
But irrespective of the correctness of that decision, to abandon this fight now would simply turn Iraq over to Iran and the Shia. You can’t even begin to come close to justifying that policy.
That means we have but two choices. Fight this war the way we have and lose; fight this war to win. Period.
One final remark in response to one of yours. You say that “That [we – the “paleos” and David/SANE agree that] democratization was a foolish enterprise. But we say withdraw/disengage and SANE says be more ruthless. I don’t think it needs elaborating that ours is the more conservative policy.”
What does this mean in context? Why is “withdrawing” or “disengaging” in the face of a real existential threat more “conservative”? A man who stands in the street to fight an attacker is far more conservative than a man who runs from his attacker in the street to take cover in his home only to lead his pursuing attacker to his wife and children. A conservative man is a prudent man, not cowardly and self-destructive. You are now in the street in Iraq and that is where the worst of Islam is currently focused. If you run home now to your wife and children, you have acted manifestly imprudently especially in light of the attacker’s expressed vowed to convert you, subjugate you, or murder you.
All the best,
David
Comment by David Yerushalmi | March 24, 2007
Islam = Nazism. If the world would treat islam and muslims like nazis, shun them at first then go from there, we and the world would all be far better off.
Comment by Dean | March 24, 2007
I wrote this here a while back; until the average muslim is made to suffer, he or she will do no more to stop the so called terrorists next door than they do in Iraq and Afghanistan, Israel and Lebanon right now. Because the average arab/persian muslim is not capable of dealing with platitudes and wishes of good will.
Also, giving the vote to savages is simply a vote for savagery. The typical arab/persian muslim will vote and enjoy that vote as they vote in office whomever their imam tells them under penalty of death or whatever muslim leader points the most guns at them and threatens them with holy penalty under that horror called the koran.
Comment by Dean | March 25, 2007
I stand corrected: On War was published, in part, as a result of Clausewitz experiences in the Napoleanic wars, it was not influential in causing them.
His perpective, however, was clearly clouded by his experience in what truly was an example of war as 'policy by other means.' Napolean's attempt to export the French Revolution fit Clausewitz description of war quite nicely. Nevertheless, many wars prior to that were neither 'extensions of policy', nor total in their execution: going back to the Greeks most wars were limited in scope, often ritualistic in nature, and fought for many reasons besides politics: economics, religion, glory, booty, even boredom. Those examples of 'total war' preceding Clausewitz were the exception — such as the Mongols decimation of Arabia and the Roman destruction of Carthage — not the rule.
And many 'limited wars' have been quite successful in meeting their stated objectives: The American Revolution, The Spanish-American War, Panama, Grenada, the Falklands, and many others; limited war failed in places such as Vietnam and Korea. The trick is to wage the right type of war against the right enemy.
Having said all that (and at the risk of sounding like a monday-morning-quarterback) I certainly agree we did not fight this war agressively enough and are now reaping the results of this failure with a costlier occupation than would otherwise have been necessary.
Comment by Jeff Osonitsch | March 25, 2007
Jeff: you simply don't understand the distinction between "Limited War Doctrine" and its opposite. The war need not be a world war or even a "full-scale" war to be a full war effort and therefore not a limited war doctrine. A war fought to destroy the enemy's capability and to achieve surrender is by definition not a limited war.
Go back and read the colonel's very detailed historical and theoretical analysis of the Limited War Doctrine first formalized by the Kennedy administration.
You will need to be careful not to confuse this very deliberately crafted (but bad) war strategy with war efforts in the past that failed because one side or the other was incapable (for whatever reason) from fully prosecuting its war effort. Incapability, whether politically or militarily, is not the same as an a priori doctrine.
Moreover, your listing of wars clearly suggests you have confused a small war with a war fought per the limited war doctrine. Take Grenada for example. We simply snuffed out any capability and occupied the island until a new friendly government was installed. That was hardly a "limited war". A small war yes; but if it only requires one bullet to remove your enemy's capability, using one bullet effectively and conquering your enemy is war as Clausewitz envisioned. None of the other examples are even approximately relevant.
All the best,
David Yerushalmi
Comment by David Yerushalmi | March 25, 2007
David: I have been assuming that the opposite of 'limited war' was 'total war.'
I agree 100% with you both that this war was fought too timidly and without the strategic neccesity of totally destroying Iraqi resistence or addressing Iranian and Syrian involvement. My problem is the incessant invocation of Clausewitz (as if his ideas are unimpeachable Gospel truth) which could lead to unnecessary excesses.
The examples I cited in my last post are relevent insofar as they demonstrate the difference between the 'limited' and 'total war' concepts. They demonstrate also the fact that limited wars are sometimes successful and that total wars are sometimes too destructive to contemplate.
For example, had the US engaged in more than a 'limited war' with the British in the late 18th century, they would have had to invade England, destroy her industrial capacity, kill the King, and raze Parliament. In Panama, the US left the nations infrastructure largely intact, yet met all of the wars goals. These limited wars met their strategic goals. On the other hand was the Mongol destruction of the Middle East necessary to acheive its goal of supremecy in the region? And using one bullet to kill an enemy head of state is not war at all, but an assassination.
Clausewitz, while important, is not in infallible; his ideas are not the final word on warfare. John Keegan dedicated his book 'A History of Warfare' to debunking much of Clausewitz' theories, in part because of their pernicious effects on modern war and society. We must fight every war in which we engage to win as quickly and totally as possible without wanton destruction or unnecessary killing of innocents. But, just as Darwin's theories unintentionally led to eugenics and, it could be argued Hitler's final solution, so can Clausewitz theories be misapplied to quite desructive ends.
Comment by Jeff Osonitsch | March 26, 2007
As I wrote before, the application of Clausewitzian principles, in part, led to the unprecedented militarization of Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries and cost some 100 million lives in the two World Wars that followed. This, in turn, paradoxically perhaps, led to the backlash we have seen in the latter half of the 20th century which has resulted in the de-militarization of Europe to the point where they are no longer capable of aiding, in any meaningful way, the US in its defense of the West against the forces of jihad.
Lets keep the theories of Clausewitz in perspective.
Comment by Jeff Osonitsch | March 26, 2007
Jeff: I am sorry. You just don't understand Clausewitz or the Limited War Doctrine.
DY
Comment by David Yerushalmi | March 26, 2007
David: I am sorry also. You just don't understand Keegan (and are overly reliant on Clausewitz) or the Just War Doctrine.
Comment by Jeff Osonitsch | March 26, 2007
Let's agree to ignore the argumentum ad verecundiam. Just explain to us what the Just War doctrine and whatever it is you think Keegan actually said about the subject that refutes the point made by the Colonel and defended by me in this comment thread.
Given this modus operandi argumentum, permit me to repeat our position succinctly: your enemy will not be able to continue the war if you successfully destroy his motivation to carry on the fight or his capability to do so. And, as we've pointed out here, nothing in this doctrine suggests that a nation destroy the world or expend more than is necessary to achieve those war aims.
But what is suggested by this doctrine, if you are going to engage in the manly and serious business of war making, you had better undertake it seriously and be certain that you are effectively prosecuting the war effort. To do anything less, is to waste the precious men, material, and good will necessary to preserve national existence at some later date.
The floor is yours. The Just War doctrine and Keegan I presume . . .
All the best,
David Yerushalmi
Comment by David Yerushalmi | March 27, 2007
I agree, as I've said repeatedly, that we must do all that is necessary to defeat this enemy whether in Iraq, Syria, Iran, or elsewhere. Once the decision is made to go to war it must be executed to win. In this we agree. The problem I have with your theory is twofold:
1) Your advocating for a general 'war against Islam' or as you've written elsewhere against 'Sharia faithful Muslims.' I am no apologist for Islam, nor am I under any illusions as to its true nature (just read my articles or posts). But the US can no more declare war selectively on sharia faithful Muslims (as opposed to Islamic terrorists and their state sponsors) without rallying the entire Muslim world in opposition to us than a foreign power can declare war on, for example, only American Catholics who receive communion every Sunday. All Americans would rally in opposition to such a declaration. This concept is needlessly provocative. We can and will win this war without starting WWIII. We needn't push moderate or secular Muslims into the enemy camp.
2) Overreliance on Clausewitz. While I am by no means an expert on the Prussian theorist, having read Keegan's work I simply urge caution when invoking his theories (which are not nearly universally true) because they may lead to excesses. Keegan argues that Clausewitz' theories - implemented in late 19th century Europe - led inevitably to the carnage of the two World Wars. He further points out the error of his 'war as policy' theory by citing hundreds of examples of wars with seemingly no political motivation. He also states that Clausewitz analysis on war was more 'ideology than science.'
As a Christian I simply urge that where the theories of Clausewitz conflict with those of Augustine we would be better served following the Church father than the Prussian Bureaucrat.
Comment by Jeff Osonitsch | March 28, 2007
David, I just realized I left out the part of the Just War Doctrine which may conflict with Clausewitz and 'war against Islam.' It is the admonition that 'the evils to be inflicted must not outweigh the evils to be eliminated.'
I would add to that this test: why start a global war which may result in millions dead when our strategic goals may be acheived through the use of arms in a select few theatres (Iraq, Iran, Syria) at the cost of only a few thousand lives? I understand that you do not openly advocate starting WWIII but I want to point out that I think this is exactly what will result from this theory - whether it is intended or not.
I liken this unintended consequence to the perversion of Darwins theory into eugenics or Clausewitz theory (which was intended only to strengthen his Prussian homeland) turning all of Europe into an armed camp.
Comment by Jeff Osonitsch | March 28, 2007
Jeff, thank you for this.
Your argument can be boiled down to two parts:
[1] Pick your enemy/war aims carefully and minimally.
[2] Avoid collateral-"unjust damage" (here "collateral" is half of the adjective not synonymous with its second half "unjust").
Before proceeding, and to dispense with Keegan, his argument is of no merit here. He is simply wrong on Clausewitz; Clausewitz would never say that wars could not be fought for stupid and even personal motivations or even by mistake. Clausewitz studied war, properly speaking. But let's not be side-tracked on our respective understandings and critique of a given author.
To your argument:
[1] Pick your enemy/war aims carefully and minimally.
There can be no argument here except as I said, you'd better be certain you have not underestimated what is necessary. Since it is your nation and people at risk, especially in a WMD world, you most certainly would err on the side of too much power except as you suggest where too much might exacerbate the threat.
So, let's examine this argument of yours: by identifying the enemy accurately (those Sharia faithful Muslims), we risk inflaming the Muslim world against us.
First, either we agree or disagree about what the Sharia or fiqh says of Jihad and what it demands of the "faithful". If we don't agree on this, the discussion is over because it would be unproductive. There is simply too much documented evidence about what Islamic law says and demands of the faithful.
Now, individuals who claim to be faithful adherents and those who claim to be sympathetic to the Sharia in their non-observance (and this would be most Muslims), must make a choice in the same way Europeans and Japanese were forced to in WWII. Recall that there were Frenchmen, Italians, Poles and the like who were forced to make a decision to align with the Axis Powers or to reject them and even to go underground in opposition. The same choice exists here. Not every Muslim need be a reformer but every Muslim needs to choose. You either support Jihad or you reject it. And, you cannot reject Jihad and be a Sharia faithful. It is a contradiction of everything Islam, Mohammed, and Allah stands for.
Moreover, precisely because we are not clear about the enemy — ONLY Sharia (i.e., traditional, historical, and authoritative) faithful are the enemy – we cannot possibly win the war. How do you force Muslims to choose if you don’t draw the line between US and THEM. But once clear about the enemy, Muslims must choose. Your “Catholic” argument makes no sense. If these types of Catholics advocated Jihad, you’d be a fool not to so identify them and war against them. And, if other peace loving Catholics took offense and joined their Jihad, they’d become the enemy as well.
Either Muslims reject the traditional Islamic law (either by rejection simply or by reform) or they do not. It is precisely the ambiguity of PC or of fear of “inflaming” the masses that creates the loss of clarity in our own war aims and in reform minded Muslims’ ability to stand up and fight the faithful.
And, what happens if we do inflame them? If we are at war, they are not permitted to enter the US. We fight them on their turf. And, we abandon this nonsense of building democracies while fighting a war which accomplishes nothing but puts in place the conditions for a successful insurgency. If Iraq were under Marshall law, and the re-supplies were cut off, the insurgency would have been dead some time ago. And, if Iranians want to jump up and down in the street protesting our air raids which destroyed their ability to re-supply the insurgency, why would I care? The moment they were to extend their hand in terrorism, we’d shoot it down or cut it off. That is war.
[2] Just War: Avoid collateral-"unjust damage".
This is easily dispensed with. A nation fighting an existential war (that means a war for its existence), cannot exact too much collateral damage as long as it is not intentionally collateral. Thus, we nuked Japan to end the war and killed many many civilians. But this was not collateral damage. We intended every death. It was what our commander-in-chief determined was necessary. He could have been right or wrong about his conclusion but that is not relevant to our discussion. In war, and in retrospect, second-guessing becomes a past-time of academics and revisionists. It doesn’t interest me. When you are in a fight and throwing punches and keeping the hordes away from your children, you make the best decisions you can under the circumstances. If after the fight you discover that you hit a bystander, that damage is the responsibility of your enemy who started or provoked the war. The only time it would be “unjust” is if you knew he was a bystander, you knew it would not further the war aim, and you hit him anyway.
In other words, our national existence and existence simply is superior to any collateral damage which flows from a just war and which is not simply wanton damage.
All the best,
David Yerushalmi
Comment by David Yerushalmi | March 28, 2007
David,
Thank you for the thoughtful response. I must tell you that I have never before debated war and peace or law and order issues where I was selling the 'softer' or more 'dovish' approach against someone more 'hawkish.' It is quite unusual and interesting. I commend you and Col. Snodgrass for your efforts and look forward to your next articles.
Jeff
Comment by Jeff Osonitsch | March 28, 2007