Transatlantic Turbulences

 by George de Poor Handlery  

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A weak Europe creates a vacuum that needlessly overextends US power, and being able to count on America when the need arises weakens Europe.

Broken bones, while physically limiting, have the benefit of giving one time to exercise the mind. The reduction of activities to essentials is duplicated by the intellect. Issues crystallize; the words needed to express them shrink as clarity and brevity correlate. My hospital-thinking focused on an aspect of the scary disintegration of the transatlantic alliance. It has served America, the world and Europe well. For the latter that voluntarily lacks the ability to defend itself, the resulting dependence on US brawn should prove the utility of the relationship.

A weak Europe — it has a larger population than the US and a comparable GNP – creates a vacuum that needlessly overextends US power. However, this physical aspect of self-induced frailty is not the crux of the problem. The cause lies deeper than armies and armaments. Europe is content to rely on America if a worst-case scenario materializes. Not entirely rationally, prior to the (expectable) emergency, the Continent likes to weaken its cursed ultimate protector.

Being able to count on America when the need arises weakens Europe. At the same time Europe constrains America with contrarian instincts and through undermining agreed-upon measures by circumvented sanctions. The motive is to secure juicy contracts and to earn the good will of the ultimate strategic foe. The main damage, however, is caused on a psychological level.

Most Americans are eager to bend over backwards to be liked. They also tend to be deferential to foreigners, especially Europeans. An outgrowth is part of the likely experience of the visitor. He will be asked “where are you from?” and even if the person has no exact idea where that country might be, the response is something like “gosh, that is a beautiful place.” In case the venue is away from the “Ami’s” home, count on a ritualistic "drop by if you are in Texas." The desire to be popular, makes Americans, who like to like everybody, think that they are appreciated abroad. Therefore, the shock is great when messages are sent that if this is done (Iraq) or the other thing is refused (Kyoto Protocol), then love will be withdrawn.

To “Ivan go home” the USSR reacted by sending tanks. Fear and guaranteed futility made such signs rare. “Ami go home” is as widespread as dandelions are in lawns. In its past and current forms it makes Americans not angry but causes them to wonder what they are doing wrong. This amalgamates with the characteristic personal impatience of Americans, who like quick solutions and are easily persuaded by inadequate returns to “try something else.” (A dividend is the flexibility of the American economic system.) Through the same mechanism, the public support of a given foreign policy is of short duration. All it takes for enemies is to play for time and to organize international protest.

To be effective, the first item requires that America be persuaded to use her means ineffectively. This means nudging her to use sub-optimal instruments and then not to punch where the impact would be greatest. To achieve this, a non-win-oriented strategy must be imposed. Frequently American interest groups will contribute — as is the case of self-imposed restraints in Iraq or the possible future operations against Iran. Such boxing gloves worn in a wrestling match tend to express themselves in humanitarian or legalistic considerations. Example: efficiency subordinated to avoiding the hurting of civilians that are shrewdly used as shields by insurgents.

Warring effectively against the US must be embedded in a covering protest movement. Conveniently this “world-wide outrage” will be swathed in actions that originate in the States. This can happen because foreign policy’s local consequences are easily underestimated in a country of continental size. America is fertile soil for short-sighted elements that hope to convert a military defeat for their country abroad into a political victory for their party at home. Corresponding actions legitimize protesters abroad by supporting their claim, “we demand what Americans, from senators to crooners, also want.” Concurrently, dissonance in the States will benefit from the protest unfolding abroad. After all, are these demos not a sign that “the whole world is outraged?” So with every lateral pass of the ball between those running it, the protest gains in intensity while the players near the end zone. The trick is simple but, given the American infatuation with popularity, likely to be effective. It is easy to confuse a public that is, being insular, pre-disposed to have little solid knowledge of — and interest for — whatever is beyond its borders.

Much of Europe’s opposition to US policy is opportunistic. As such it lives off a bewilderment created by the myopia of those who wish to be undisturbed by the effort of others intended to secure their good life. It is of significance that, to the average person here, crises are registered only when Washington, by virtue it its global responsibilities, acts against a stealthy threat. This creates the impression that the trouble is caused by the USA although she merely resists an unfolding calamity. We are likely to become aware of fires when the red trucks with shrieking sirens pass us. Therefore it is easy to surmise that “no siren, no fire.“

However, the hardcore that orchestrates the conversion of initial disinterest into discomfort and that — once the going gets tough – into outrage, represent a different case. The movers might lack strategic far-sightedness but they possess great tactical skills to apply shrewdly the leverage they create. These makers and shakers act as the motors of the “global reaction” that the media picks up. They tend to underestimate the challengers of the advanced world to the same extent that in the past they misjudged Communism and undervalue the Jihadists today. At this juncture a portion of “distorted history” enters the picture. Its practitioners underrate National Socialism that they valiantly oppose now because it is dead. Concurrently, the more recent Gulag is not even considered because the folks in this crowd had, by failing to oppose Communism, supported it indirectly. So ignorance and studied relativism can make Bush Hitler’s equal and distort Abu Ghraib to match Auschwitz.

The foregoing depicted the preference to oppose the US as something issuing from a misjudgment of civilization’s enemies and of distorted past experience. The resulting arbitrary perceptions combine with visceral hostility and suspicion of the United States. This gut sentiment has the nature of a prejudice because the negative reaction is independent of the issue at hand. This form of automatic rejection ranges between a pseudo-neutral “it is an American problem” to a more engaged attitude that finds its reasons to be “against” whatever because the Americans want it. (A pendant of this is that, increasingly, in non-political areas, the adjective “American” is used to plead the demerits of something.)

A convoluted illogic is spreading. Europe is ultimately in need of added buoyancy as it navigates the choppy waters of world politics. Support is welcome – unless the rescuer is the USA. Unfortunately, as in the past, only the US has a reason and the ability to shield Europe from the potential threat of China, resurging Russian imperialism and the clear and present — but not admitted – threat of Islamists. Relying on the US as the only friendly great power on Europe’s side has an immediate price: it angers the forces that represent the threat. That, in turn, increases the dependence of the US. Meanwhile, “leaving it to the Americans” weakens the US and strengthens the modern world’s foes. As a consequence, Europe’s significance diminishes and exposes her weakness. The end result is a classical vicious circle.

There is no denying that the European Left (but not it alone) has a good motive to dislike America. Her success story embodies everything the Left opposes. To this element, putting light between itself and an America that is seen as a greater evil than any imaginable force, represents an ethical imperative. Resisting the US also seems politically astute as it holds out the possibility of finding a compromise with whomever threatens politically and economically advanced societies. Election results demonstrate the influence of those that try to be on the sidelines of the field on which successful societies clash with freedom’s enemies.

A clearing of thinking is unlikely to occur until events make two insights emerge. For one thing, freedom includes the right to dislike America. At the same time, there is something that this freedom does not include. It is an American obligation to cover the bill for the consequences of the first one of these freedoms. The major threat to Europe is that this second realization might spread in the States to the extent that it becomes a determinant of foreign policy. Compared to that, “US interventionism”, such as preventing Iran from going nuclear — an action that is feared more here than is Iran’s success – represents by far the lesser hazard to both sides of the Atlantic.

Foreign Affairs, National Defense

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