Universal Morality And The Morality Of The Universe
by Raymond Ingles | View comments |
Print This Post
People willing to cooperate and behave morally with each other – willing to trust and work with one another as part of a group – have a powerful advantage over those who don't, in a very wide range of situations. This would imply a perfectly reasonable evolutionary reason for a "moral sense" to exist. A response to Phillip Ellis Jackson.
Introduction
In "What kind of car would Jesus drive to take his girlfriend to an abortion clinic?," Dr. Phillip Jackson argues for the existence of "a common set of moral values [that] is installed, recognized, and perpetuated within each individual and the human race as a whole . . . It must either involve a purely physical explanation (such as culture, society, genetics, etc.), or a metaphysical one; which is to say a morality based on the existence and purposeful actions of God." It is probably not surprising that Dr. Jackson argues for the latter case.
It's an interesting, if lengthy, read.1 I believe that much of it is wrong, but wrong in an interesting and instructive way. And what is right is interesting as well. A central theme is the example of a violent rape and murder of a five-year-old child. This, Dr. Jackson contends, is clearly wrong to all but a vanishingly small percentage of all humans throughout history,2 and I of course agree. He then explores where such a conviction could come from, but I believe his conclusions on that score are unjustified.
Eliminating Physical Explanations
Perhaps it's best to let Dr. Jackson speak for himself regarding the strategy his argument employs:
The only way a metaphysical explanation can stand is if all possible physical explanations do not fully account for an activity. Then, a metaphysical explanation at least becomes plausible.
It's worth considering, before we proceed, the difference between these two kinds of explanation, 'metaphysical' and 'physical.' What separates them? So far as I can glean the author's intent, he means 'the metaphysical' to be that which is 'supernatural' – "beyond the grasp of human understanding." A metaphysical mechanism to accomplish something (e.g. implanting a moral code in humans) would be not merely an unknown means of operation, but an unknowable one, something forever removed from human ken.
Epistemologically, this is a troublesome concept. How does one, in practice, distinguish between something 'currently unknown but comprehensible' and something 'forever unknowable?' (One might also add other categories like 'knowable in principle but impractical to discover' and 'knowable and practical but, just by bad luck, will never have the explanation stumbled upon.') From a practical perspective, the only way to tell which category something falls into is to try to understand it; if you succeed, then it was knowable. The problem is, if you fail, you can't conclude that it's unknowable. It might be, but it might also be the case that you just didn't happen to figure out something knowable, and you or someone else might have better luck on a subsequent attempt.3
Ruling out physical, 'mechanistic' – in other words, knowable – explanations has a long but less than auspicious history. Once it was widely believed that lightning was a direct expression of divine fury – so much so that Benjamin Franklin's proposal of lightning rods was considered hubristic, even heretical.4 Meteors were felt to be obviously supernatural – what besides magical forces could have held a rock suspended in the sky? – until orbital mechanics was understood. Consider this quote from a prominent physician, J. S. Haldane, close to a century ago, discussing the "mechanistic theory of heredity":
On the mechanistic theory this [cell] nucleus must carry within its substance a mechanism which by reaction with the environment not only produces the millions of complex and delicately balanced mechanisms which constitute the adult organism, but provides for their orderly arrangement into tissues and organs, and for their orderly development in a certain perfectly specific manner.
The mind recoils from such a stupendous conception; but let us follow the argument further . . . This nuclear structure or mechanism must, according to the mechanistic theory, have been formed within a very short period by the union of two others – a male and a female one. How two such mechanisms could combine to form one is entirely unintelligible, and the observed details of the process tend only to make it, if possible, more unintelligible. When we trace each nuclear mechanism backwards we find ourselves obliged to admit that it has been formed by division from a pre-existing nuclear mechanism, and this from pre-existing nuclear mechanisms through millions of cell-generations. We are thus forced to the admission that the germ-plasm is not only a structure or mechanism of inconceivable complexity, but that this structure is capable of dividing itself to an absolutely indefinite extent and yet retaining its original structure . . .
There is no need to push the analysis further. The mechanistic theory of heredity is not merely unproven, it is impossible. It involves such absurdities that no intelligent person who has thoroughly realised its meaning and implications can continue to hold it.5
Reading this passage, it's striking how clearly he recognized the functional requirements that a mechanism for inheritance would have to meet. But he could imagine no physical arrangement that could satisfy those conditions, and concluded that therefore such a mechanism was impossible. Indeed, he insisted that a spiritual explanation was the only remaining option. Laborious work by Watson and Crick (and Wilkins and Franklin6) has since discovered DNA, however, greatly illuminating that which was previously obscure.
As an aside, with this distinction between 'metaphysical' and 'mechanistic' – between 'unknowable' and 'knowable' – in mind, we can perhaps more clearly understand the divide Dr. Jackson notes:
I realize that to some scientists, allowing for God as an independent variable is like asking them to include space aliens or an undersea civilization in their hypotheses. This is no more bizarre than to those on the other side who can't understand why God must automatically be excluded because He can't be observed directly.
Science is philosophically biased towards the 'knowable' – the word itself comes from scientia, the Latin word for 'knowledge.' An explanation that makes use of an unknowable-by-definition element is, ipso facto, not a scientific explanation. "Then a miracle occurs" might be valid in theology; but in science, it's cheating.7 It's not that God is ruled out because It could not be observed, should It choose to act in an amenable manner. Rather, science cannot assume that such a being would be forever unknowable. Science certainly acknowledges unknowns – for example, exactly how the gravitational field could work at a distance was unknown in Newton's time, however well his laws worked – but it is structurally incapable of addressing the unknowable.8
Now, it may be true that there exist subjects that actually are unknowable, and therefore not amenable to scientific inquiry, but the above examples would seem to urge caution before making confident pronouncements on that score. Personally, I'm not convinced there's ever a time to declare something 'unknowable.' If one decides that something is 'unknowable,' one will stop trying to understand it. Perhaps if Dr. Haldane had decided to try a bit harder, the structure of DNA might have been elucidated earlier.
Before Benjamin Franklin's famous experiments, when someone asked, "What causes lightning?" the proper answer was not "Zeus," or "Thor," or "Seth," or "the Thunderbirds," or "God." The proper answer was, "We don't know. Perhaps one day we will." And now, of course, we know far more about lightning because of the inquries of people like Franklin.
In any case, after dismissing politics and culture as potential sources of "universal moral truth," Dr. Jackson goes on to attempt to dispel any remaining possible non-metaphysical explanation for morality by a reductio ad absurdam:
The best way is to assume that a physical mechanism to provide morality does exist (i.e. genetics), and then explore the logical implications of it.
He then goes on to show that genetics cannot "[give] morality its content." But I believe a key mistake was made at this point – by using the phrase "i.e." (id est, "that is," "in other words") instead of "e.g." (exempli gratia, "for example"). If there existed other possibilities besides genetics as sources for 'universal morality,' they remained unexamined. I argue that there exists at least one other possibility at least as plausible as the metaphysical explanation Dr. Jackson proposed.
Divinely-Imposed Morality
But before I elaborate, I'd like to examine the morality that Dr. Jackson proposes in more detail, one "explained on a metaphysical level." It's contended that "all possible physical explanations do not fully account for" universal morality. In other words, it's not possible to deduce its existence from within the universe. Only something 'outside,' on the metaphysical level – i.e. God – imposes such a morality. (It's not directly stated, but implied, that other notions that might count as 'metaphysical,' such as "logic," can't be used to discover these morals.) This is called, in philosophy, "divine command theory."
The key problem with a divinely-imposed morality, untied to any other principle, was recognized long ago in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro. To briefly summarize, Socrates is concerned with what is 'pious.' He and a noted expert on piety, Euthyphro, agree that the pious is that which is loved by the gods.9 However, Socrates presses on to the key question – is there something about the pious that causes the gods to love it, or does the love of the gods cause something to be pious? In other words, sacrificing animals to the gods is pious, and loved by the gods. But is there something about sacrificing animals that is intrinsically pious, or is it just something that, for no particular reason, the gods just happened to love? Does the piety cause the love, or does the love cause the piety?
The extension to morality should be obvious. It is, of course, generally held that God approves of moral behavior. But the question now becomes, is moral behavior approved by God because it's inherently good and deserving of approval? Or is it simply the case that whatever God just happens to approve of becomes, by that very fact, moral and good? Not to put too fine a point on things, we must ask this question: Could God have created a universe identical to this one in all respects . . . except that abortion was morally obligated?
Note carefully the structure of the question. I am not proposing a universe where, say, for some reason all children always grew up to be serial killers without exception. Or a universe where any child born would inevitably suffer unbearable agony. I am proposing a universe completely identical to ours on the physical level, and differing on the metaphysical level only in one respect.
The objection might be raised that actions like abortion or rape violate the innate moral principle of "not harming innocent life;" that God could not make a special exception for one specific case like abortion while maintaining the immorality of rape. A solid case could certainly be made for this. So, let's go to the limit, and rephrase the question. Could a God have created a universe identical to this one in all physical and metaphysical respects except that it was a moral imperative to harm innocent life?
Of course our moral intuitions rebel at the idea. But, allegedly, that's only because we weren't given an "innate moral code" that lined up with such a moral system. Had God chosen to implant in us the moral code that we should always harm innocent life, it would seem perfectly right, indeed noble, to do so. And, if nothing beyond divine whimsy makes something moral,10 attacking babies would actually be right and just.
If morality is simply a matter of what God commands, then saying that "God is good" becomes a vacuous, or at least tautological, claim. Essentially, we simply have the ultimate case of Might Makes Right. A logical corollary of this idea is that, for example, the people in France and Poland who collaborated with the Nazi occupiers did have the right principle in mind. Their mistake was picking the wrong bully to submit to. I find this proposition to be somewhat unsatisfying, certainly, though it doesn't seem to bother everyone. I'd now like to propose an alternative source of morality that doesn't rely on the direct command from a God.
Deriving "Ought" From "Is"
David Hume is generally credited with describing the so-called "is-ought problem." As in Dr. Jackson's essay, the claim is something like "it's impossible to determine 'how things ought to be' from 'how things are,'" or "morals cannot be derived from simple facts about the world."
This may at first seem plausible, but consider the game of chess. There are certain fundamental structures of chess that define it – the 'rules of the game.' We have an 8×8 board, 8 pawns per side that move in certain ways, two rooks per side that move in other ways, castling, the initial configuration of the pieces, etc. Now, when playing chess, there is no rule that you can't sacrifice your queen in the first few moves of the game. It's illegal to move your king to a threatened square, but it's perfectly acceptable by the rules to stick your queen in front of a pawn at the start of the game.
However, if you want to win the game, you shouldn't do that. There are almost no situations (at least, assuming evenly-matched opponents) where giving up your queen at the start will lead to your victory. Similarly, it's rarely a good idea to move your king out to the center of the board before the endgame. It's usually a bad move.
Note words like 'shouldn't' and 'bad.' They are value judgments. They prescribe 'oughts.' But they are not part of the 'rules' of chess. From where do they come? They arise from the combinations of two things – first, the rules and structure of chess, and second, from the player's desire to win the game. They are strategic rules. A player is free to disregard them, but they do so at their peril – it's unlikely to further their goal.
Hopefully the parallel to wider life is obvious. We have 'rules of the game' in life, too – the laws of physics, for example. We are not free to violate these strictures. (Well, technically, if we find a case where they are violated, we reformulate the laws and our theories to take into account the anomalous case. Should we find a rock that fell upward, our understanding of gravity would be wrong, not the rock!11) Many of them are so well established that it's difficult to see how they could be wrong to a significant degree. Unless you can produce a flying rock or a magic carpet, I think we can expect to have to obey the laws of gravity, for example.
As humans, we have desires and goals as well. Some are very basic and inborn and apparently universal (air, water, food, sleep, shelter, etc.) and some are so common that only extremely rare individuals seem not to need them (e.g. the company of other people), and some are deeply personal and not common at all (a desire to write a novel, say). But like chess, might there be strategic rules that arise in the real world from physical laws and conditions, combined with our desires?
Game Theory
Game theory attempts to analyze interactions among competing and cooperating agents in the context of systems of rules governing the options available to them. It's a rich and interesting field, and some of its results have bearing on the topic of morality.
The Prisoner's Dilemma
One useful model in game theory is the Prisoner's Dilemma. Basically, two players have the option of cooperating with, or betraying, each other. If both cooperate, there is a moderate payoff, e.g. 3 points. If one cooperates and one betrays, the betrayer gets a large payoff (say, 5 points) and the cooperator gets nothing. If both betray, there is a small payoff (e.g. 1 point each).
What's the optimal strategy in this case? On average, betraying pays 3 points (5 * 50% + 1 * 50%), while cooperating pays only 1.5 points (3 * 50% + 0 * 50%). Rationally, if you're playing the game it's in your best interest to betray.
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
But what if we change the situation slightly, by repeating the game over and over with the same opponent? Only a few stable solutions exist, assuming remotely sensible players. If you both betray all the time, your payoff is 1 point per game. If you both cooperate all the time, your payoff is much better, 3 points per game. What about more complex situations and strategies, such as varying opponents?
It turns out that an extremely simple strategy is also among the best. It is called "Tit For Tat." It starts out cooperating, and simply repeats the move that its opponent played the last time. Note that if the other player cooperates, TfT will be friendly, but if it is betrayed, TfT will retaliate. In the rules given above, it is very difficult to beat TfT's usual score.
If we vary the rules a bit, and allow for imperfect players – where there can be occasional 'accidents' when someone mistakenly betrays when they 'intended' to cooperate, or vice versa – things get even more interesting. It is possible for even a pair of TfTs to get caught in a loop of 'mutual recrimination,' with both betraying over and over. Their payoff per game plummets from 3 to 1. In such situations, a more 'forgiving' strategy actually does better.
The Conspiracy Of Doves
Another model is worth noting; the "Hawks and Doves" game. Hawks always fight for resources, until seriously injured. Doves run away instead of fighting, and split resources 50/50 if working with another Dove. Imagine that each 'resource' is worth 100 points. If a Hawk fights a Dove, it gets 100 points and the Dove gets nothing. If a Dove encounters another Dove, each gets 50 points. If a Hawk fights another Hawk, it either gets 100 points if it wins, or -300 points (from being injured while losing the fight).
Given these ratios, everyone should be a Dove – everyone will average a 50 point payoff. But a lone Hawk among Doves gets a hugely disproportionate payoff; the "Conspiracy of Doves" is not stable. In the above situation, the stable state of the population is 1/3 Hawk, 2/3 Dove, and the average payoff is only 33 points. (Note that this still applies if really there's only one kind of bird, but it has varying chances of acting like a Hawk or a Dove.)
But Chess Isn't The Real World
There is a key difference between games like chess and games like the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. In games like chess, there is a winner and a loser; one player has a positive outcome, the other negative. Such games are called 'zero-sum;' the benefits one player receives are equal and opposite to the penalties the loser suffers. Games like the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, on the other hand, are 'non zero-sum;' it's possible for all players to lose, or all to profit, or a mix of both.
I think we can agree that, overall, our lives in the real world are 'non zero-sum.' We have the option of cooperating with others, fighting, betraying, helping, lending and borrowing, and so forth. We can see analogs of Hawk, Dove, and Tit for Tat strategies in daily life. For example, I would suggest that the Israelis and Palestinians are stuck in a loop of mutual recrimination that results in an overall worse situation for both groups. But neither side is willing to forgive the other, and they've been at it so long they can't even imagine forgiving each other.
Other results of experimental work and game-theoretic computer simulations illustrate additional general principles. In an extremely large group, the effect of any one defection is diluted, but the longer the players expect the interaction to go on, the less attractive anti-social behavior becomes. A player's willingness to cooperate is affected by their estimates of how many other players around them are cooperating, as well.
At this point we know that fixed 'rules of the game,' combined with desires of agents constrained to follow those rules, can give rise to 'meta-rules,' useful strategies that the players can choose to follow – rules just as real as the basic rules of the game, though existing on another level. Can moral precepts be examples of such strategies? It would need to be shown that following such morals led to advantages for those who followed them. And these would have to be intra-universal advantages – not ones based on metaphysical, outside-the-universe considerations.
Morality Can Be Selfish
Fortunately, Dr. Jackson acknowledges that moral behavior can and does pay off in the real world, and gives an example, though he relegates that admission to endnote 15. This is an important datum, which serves to undermine the contention that morality can't be derived from within the universe itself.
We don't have to rely on Dr. Jackson's admission, however. A bit of reasoning and research can make a fairly solid case for the benefits of morality. One very useful item of support comes from those who most vociferously exhort others to follow their moral precepts. While they frequently cite the alleged supernatural repercussions of vice, they also tend to devote plenty of time to its more worldly consequences. Violence, greed, gluttony, sloth, and so forth don't tend to bring about optimal outcomes on a regular basis. Indeed, who doesn't argue that life would overall be better for everyone, if everyone behaved morally as a matter of course? (A real-life "Conspiracy of Doves," if you like.)
The history of moral behavior also seems to make sense within a game-theoretic framework. As noted by Stephen Pinker,12 violence in real terms has been decreasing for centuries – decreasing by huge amounts. E.g. "24 homicides per 100,000 Englishmen in the fourteenth century to 0.6 per 100,000 by the early 1960s." It's difficult to argue that religion had much influence on this; indeed, not many people argue that we're more religious now than in the 1300s. Just the opposite, in fact. It seems that technology and economics and medicine have had a far greater civilizing effect than religion. Longer, safer lifespans encourage more extensive cooperation – the longer you can expect yourself and your neighbors to be around, the more important it becomes to treat your neighbors well.
But if moral behavior has real-world benefits – if people living in moral, cooperative, stable societies have advantages over those who don't – then it would seem we no longer require a metaphysical justification for morality. Morality apparently doesn't have to flow from divine command. Given what humans are, and what kind of universe they inhabit, some types of behavior and some courses of action are wiser choices than others.
Let's now return to our previous thought experiment, a universe identical to our own except that harming innocent life was metaphysically 'moral.' If 'divine command theory' were correct, perhaps such a universe would be just as 'moral' as our own. But would it work? How well would humanity get along if, say, the current situation in Darfour were commonly accepted to be noble and just? Remember, the inhabitants of this prospective universe are just like us physically and mentally – the only difference is 'spiritual.' Parents would probably find it difficult to fulfill their duties of torturing their children, since their animal instincts would argue against it. By that universe's rules, a society that protected and cared for its children would be 'evil.' Would it prosper?
The game-theoretic conception of morality seems to handle this thought-experiment much more handily. It would contend that no, God could not create a universe that closely resembled ours but possessed radically different morals. Either the physical laws or else humanity – or most likely both – would have to be quite different to make harming innocent life 'moral.' (This general idea, BTW, is analogous in many ways to the Catholic Church's notion of "Natural Law."13)
The In-Group
Another bit of evidence is contained within Dr. Jackson's paper. Consider this passage:
The truly interesting thing about God-given morality is that even individuals and dictatorial governments who act in the most outrageous, barbaric manner – and who may even reject the notion of a universal morality – still end up drawing their guidance from these same moral principles. Anarchists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries who rejected all social norms and set off bombs that killed hundreds of innocent people, nevertheless did not believe that they should settle disputes among themselves by just getting up and shooting the other guy. It's one thing to set off a bomb that kills Mary Jane and her little daughter Alice who happened to be walking by, and another to pull the trigger on Comrade Serge because his definition of "alienation and the means of production" differs slightly from yours. You may ridicule and belittle him, and in extreme cases kick him out of the collective, but he doesn't deserve to die. Mary Jane and her daughter on the other hand, by refusing to join the revolution, have in essence allied themselves with the evil bourgeois forces that make life miserable for the ancestors of future Wal-Mart employees. According to this convoluted logic, they are part of the problem.
If one is part of the 'in-group,' if one counts as a full person, then one becomes subject to the fundamental morality under discussion here. Indeed, it's very hard to see how any group could effectively operate without such rules governing interpersonal dynamics.
But that in-group's membership has fluctuated throughout history. In the earliest past, it may have been as limited as "the male members of my tribe." It certainly didn't include women as full persons in their own right – consider how recently women acquired the right to vote in the United States, and how many countries do not have full legal equality for women today. Slaves didn't count, and people from outside one's own tribe (and then city, and then country, and then 'race') didn't make the cut either. To a large extent, the increase in general moral behavior described by Pinker and others is a record of the gradual expansion of that 'in-group' to encompass more and more people.14 But the point remains that, however the in-group is defined, so long as it is composed of humans certain basic strategies will be necessary to manage it.
The "Moral Sense"
Both Dr. Jackson and I agree that there is a moral framework that humans inevitably work within, and we would even appear to agree on much of its content. (We certainly agree that slavery and terrorism, along with the rape and murder of five-year-old children, are in violation of that morality.) There's some disagreement regarding exactly how that morality is constituted (perhaps we could call my position 'universal morality,' while his might more accurately be called 'extra-universal morality' . . .) but another thing we agree on is that genetics does not, by itself, form a justification for morality.
However, genetics does have another role to play in addition to forming part of human nature. I've hopefully established that morality, properly understood, is advantageous in the world. We have been living as groups of humans (with no significant change in what it means to be 'human') for around 200,000 years, and our near ancestors were living in groups for millennia before that. Other people have formed a critical part of our environment for our entire existence. Would it be surprising to discover that evolution had helped adapt us to living and working with others?
Another interesting model from game theory provides some evidence for this. The Traveler's Dilemma is a variation on the Prisoner's Dilemma. The setup is a bit complicated,15 but in this game, people – all kinds of people, from countries around the world – routinely and apparently instinctively behave in a way that is not strictly rational but leads to a better outcome than if everyone was playing in a ruthlessly rational manner. There may be an explanation for this besides a divinely implanted impulse to be good.
Much work has been done investigating human moral intuitions and behavior. A few illustrative examples may serve to clarify some of the findings. Let's take a pair of quick cognitive tests, freely stolen from Daniel Dennett's Darwin's Dangerous Idea:
Test Number One
You have a set of cards before you. Each card has a letter on one side, and a number on the other.
—– —– —– —–
| D | | F | | 3 | | 7 |
—– —– —– —–
Now, let's say there's a condition that you're asked to check for. The condition is, "If there's a D on one side of the card, then there is a 3 on the other side." Which of the above cards do you need to flip over to see if that condition is met? Take your time, reason it out, and then move on to the second test.
Test Number Two
You have a set of cards before you. Each card has information about patrons in a bar. On one side is what they are drinking; on another side are their ages.
—————— —————— ————— —————
| Drinking wine | | Drinking soda | | 25 years old | | 16 years old |
—————— —————— ————— —————
Now, let's say you're the bouncer at that bar. Your job is to make sure that no one under the age of 21 is drinking alcohol. Which of the above cards do you need to flip over to see if that condition is met?
The Answers
The answer for both tests is the same. You need to flip over the first card and the last card. Most people have a hard time with the first test, and most people have very little trouble with the second test. But the structure of both tests is exactly the same – logically equivalent conditions are being checked for. Why would one be so much easier than the other? A great deal of research, with many variations of tests like this, seems to point to a definite answer: the second test asks people to detect if a social contract is being violated – in other words, it asks people to spot cheating. And it turns out almost everyone has a built-in knack for such things. We all have a positive, built-in talent for spotting cheaters.
I believe I've established that moral behavior has practical consequences and practical justification, or at least have shown that such a notion is plausible. People willing to cooperate and behave morally with each other – willing to trust and work with one another as part of a group – have a powerful advantage over those who don't, in a very wide range of situations. This would imply a perfectly reasonable evolutionary reason for a "moral sense" to exist.
We have other examples of such systems in the brain. Figuring out what babies are thinking is difficult, but experiments seem to indicate that babies have instincts for understanding basic physics – at least, the kinds of physics humans typically encounter. They seem to express surprise when seeing an object float apparently unsupported, for example. We also appear to have built-in systems for understanding the minds and emotions of others and ourselves. This may be more obvious by its absence – autism seems to be a case where development of this 'mental understanding system' goes awry to greater or lesser degree. If there were useful, general strategies for interacting with other people, then inbuilt support for recognizing and applying such strategies would be a reasonable thing for evolution to produce.
Such a moral sense would also include warnings when one contemplates doing something contrary to morality – since moral actions, by this model, are sensible and useful strategies. Additionally, it would be important to realize when one is doing something that others would frown upon.16 Sometimes people violate these warnings anyway – the lure of short-term gains tempting them more than a long-term payoff. That doesn't mean that it's a wise choice.
Recent research17 has indicated that damage to the brain can actually affect how people make moral judgments. If our sense of morality is implanted by a supernatural means, then the details of that experiment are difficult to explain. Dr. Jackson, in making an unrelated point, uses the example of an automobile – even if one doesn't fully understand all of its workings, one can "make predictions about its operation and functioning." If altering the function of the brain alters moral judgment . . .
It might be advanced that, given how complex the world is, 'discovering' such principles would be too complex for evolution to manage. However, we have plenty of documented examples of evolution developing complex novel features despite its inherent lack of foresight. (My personal favorite is the essentially complete fossil record of the development of our inner ear bones from the redundant extra jawbones of therapsid dinosaurs.) Over long periods of time evolution is able to adapt to, and optimize for, even slight advantages.18 And moral behavior has more than slight advantages.
So genetics does not explain morality in this model; it does not, to use Dr. Jackson's words, "[give] morality its specific content." But it can "influence the expression of morality in an individual human being." Of course, genetics couldn't be expected to do so perfectly. Our physical intuitions break down badly when attempting to deal with objects moving close to the speed of light, or with very small particles.19 Our moral intuitions seem to work serviceably enough when dealing with groups up to about the size of a large tribe; beyond that, there can be complications. Our intuitions are certainly highly polished and useful instruments that we should do well to make use of as far as possible. But how should we extend them to the complex societies of today?
Moral Engineering
The real world – and hence, real-world morality – is very complex. No simple moral code will work everywhere. Sane individuals realize this – it's the fanatics who follow the letter of every single rule they receive that, for example, blow themselves and other people up. Difficult moral quandaries that require effort and thought and care – quandaries that may not have any optimal solution – arise constantly. When they involve large numbers of people, we can't hope to have rules that give specific guidance in every situation. But there are techniques we've developed anyway. Some principles of morality are universal, but they need to be put into practice. So we've developed legal codes.
Engineers have an even more complex job than physicists, putting together working mechanisms in the face of many uncertainties and unknowns. They frequently have to resort to 'rules of thumb,' approximations, and techniques that have historically worked, even if why they work isn't always fully understood.20 Engineers generally have to design conservatively, and build in redundancy, and add margins for error. Engineering moral (and legal) codes is similarly complicated . . . but that does not imply that it's impossible. Engineering continually improves and finds new ways of doing things, sometimes better than the old, sometimes merely applicable in certain special cases. There may never be an Ultimate Engineering that can accomplish all possible things . . . but that doesn't mean we should abandon engineering.
Still, we can take some lessons from game theory and psychology when crafting such codes. If there are conditions that help encourage cooperation (long horizons of interaction, clear and fairly-enforced punishments for violating rules, etc.) we should make sure to arrange for them as much as possible. Sometimes we may have to settle, like the Hawks and Doves, for a less-than-optimal situation in exchange for stability. But the fact that humans can plan and coordinate (and the fact that we do have built-in capacities for trust and cooperation as shown by the Traveler's Dilemma) gives us some hope that we can do better than armed truces and Mexican Standoffs.21
Legal codes and societal norms may similarly never be perfect, and certainly don't approach ideal today. But that doesn't imply progress can't be made. Though perhaps not for all the same reasons, I agree with Dr. Jackson's basically Libertarian style, where he advocates education and persuasion to work to end abortion instead of force and violence. I agree more with the practical justification he gives for this than the spiritual one, but our conclusions are essentially identical. Taking a cue from evolution (see below), diversity in the marketplace of ideas is a very good thing.
Genetic Moral Engineering
I've already pointed out the difference between genetics reflecting morality and genetics causing morality, but I'd like to take the chance to address a side issue: some apparent misconceptions on Dr. Jackson's part about using genetics to justify policy decisions. In particular, he argues that if morality were solely "the product of man's genetics as influenced by his environment," actions like exterminating those with genes predisposing people to alcoholism or pedophilia would be justified, or even required. But the conclusion does not follow from the premise.
One of the (many) reasons eugenics is wrong is that it assumes that it's possible to identify genes that are bad, and eliminate them. Genetics is more complicated than that, and traits that are 'bad' in one circumstance can be literally life-saving in others. For example, a person with two copies of the sickle-cell gene will suffer from sickle-cell anemia and die young. But a person with only one copy does not suffer such ill effects and has a significantly increased resistance to malaria. In a region where malaria is endemic, the risk of having babies die from sickle-cell anemia is offset by the improved chances of other babies surviving malaria. Cystic Fibrosis is another recessive trait where only one copy of a mutated gene apparently affords some protection from Typhoid and perhaps Tuberculosis. A further example is RH-negative blood; there is some evidence that, while RH-negative women are at increased risk of miscarriage, they have an easier time getting pregnant.
There aren't genes "for" alcoholism or pedophilia in the same way as there are genes "for" red hair. Mental development is more complex than that, and at most genes may put someone at increased risk for such things. And we don't know what positive traits such genes might help to enable – perhaps the stereotype of the artist susceptible to drug abuse has a basis in fact, and by working to eliminate alcoholism we would devastate the art world. There has been quite a bit of speculation as to Charles Dodgson's (Lewis Carroll's) possible pedophilia; if he was a pedophile, he apparently was able to direct his energies away from harming young girls, and toward entertaining them (and adults) with fantastic stories, as well as mathematics.22
The penalties for actual drunk driving or child molestation should be severe enough to act as a powerful deterrent, and someone who has acted on a propensity for this should be treated differently than one who hasn't. But there certainly isn't now, and very probably will never be, a test that can look at someone's genes and precisely predict their individual future behavior. Lacking that, pre-emptive and involuntary measures are unjustified. Punishment and/or treatment for actual behavior is the only reliable course. Objective examples of people who have been able to overcome such propensities supports this regardless of whether one believes their resistance came from a supernatural origin.
This leads into another evolutionary argument against such eugenic practices. Diversity in a population is a very good thing. It helps a population cope with all kinds of threats – disasters, disease, variations in environment, and more. If a trait really is "bad," it will be eliminated in due course without – even in spite of – our intervention.
Sacrificing The Queen, Part One
Chess masters may occasionally spot an advantage to sacrificing their queen in a game. The strategic rule that "one should not sacrifice one's queen" is a simplification. More precisely, it should be stated that "one should only sacrifice one's queen for substantial positional and/or material advantage." Such cases do arise, but they are fairly rare. Still, this does raise an important question about moral strategies — in what cases (if any) do they cease to apply?
One can imagine hypothetical cases where an action that would ordinarily be immoral might become moral. I alluded to a few debatable justifications for universal abortion above, in the "thought experiment." Indeed, even Dr. Jackson notes that abortion per se is not immoral in absolutely all circumstances (". . . having an abortion to save the life of a mother is a valid exception"). The real world is, as I have said, complex, and very strange circumstances can obtain at times. When there are two innocent lives at risk, there can be genuine debate about the correct course to follow. But I can't really imagine circumstances that would make the rape and murder of a child 'moral.'
The more fundamental the principle, the less common are the possible exceptions. "Not harming innocent life" is a fundamental principle indeed, and exceptions are correspondingly difficult to find. Tens of thousands of people, many of them women and children, died in the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it is likely that the bombings ended up saving lives by averting a devastating conventional invasion of Japan. On the other hand, others (such as Generals Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Nimitz) judged the use of the bombs unnecessary. As noted before, some moral quandaries have no easy answer.
Sacrificing The Queen, Part Two
What about a chess grandmaster who can beat any and all comers? One who can't even play an interesting match without handicapping themselves dramatically, such as giving up their queen and both rooks? They can violate strategic rules that others need to follow and still win the match. Are there equivalents in the real world of moral strategies?
How about a Stalin, someone who can take over and dominate an entire country for decades? One who can 'get away with' riding roughshod over anyone, or any group, who dares oppose them? What, if anything, constrains them? Why should they care about the kind of morality that the vast majority are concerned with?
I'd like to relay a story I first read during the 2003 invasion of Iraq:23
When one of the most secure and luxurious of his palace-and-bunker complexes was completed in 1984, at a cost of $70 million, Saddam Hussein moved in right away. But even protected by enormous layers of concrete, sand and steel, behind zigzag corridors and blast doors made to withstand a Hiroshima-size explosion, and guarded by men who knew they'd have to be ready to die for him, or be killed by him, Saddam apparently could not sleep.
"All night long he heard a sound like the cocking of a pistol," remembers Wolfgang Wendler, the German engineer who supervised the project. Wendler was summoned by angry officials to find out what was wrong. He discovered a faulty thermostat.
Saddam, of course, deserves no pity. But this is the kind of life he led – literally jumping at shadows, because there was no one he could fully trust. Stalin became so suspicious of doctors that later in life he refused their treatment and consulted with veterinarians instead.24 These dictators had plenty of purely material comforts, but in the process of acquiring them they'd given up any chance of enjoying them untroubled by fears of assassination, let alone the pleasures of sharing them with loved ones. They could literally never afford to fully relax. Perhaps there are a few individuals for whom that would be worth the trade, but I wonder if they ever regretted the situations they'd locked themselves into.
This is an example of why morality is so fundamental: there are inevitable costs for violating it, particularly on a massive and regular basis. People are a diverse bunch, and there do exist sociopaths that might not mind (or even notice) those costs, but that doesn't mean the costs aren't there. As Dr. Jackson himself notes, the fact that exceptions exist doesn't mean the general principle is invalid.
The Foundation Has Changed – What About The Conclusions?
As I've noted, while I disagree with Dr. Jackson as to the source of morality, we broadly agree on the content of morality. Harming innocent life is wrong, for example. Unnecessary restrictions on liberty are wrong as well. What about his conclusions regarding terrorism and abortion, the major focus of his treatise?
Regarding abortion, we're actually in fairly close agreement. For reasons outside the scope of this paper, I'm unwilling to restrict abortions before the end of the first month of pregnancy,25 but after that our positions appear to be identical. Abortion is not justified for the sake of convenience, or even in the case of rape or incest; but when there is a threat to the life of the mother, it's her decision whether to proceed with the pregnancy.
As to terrorism, I agree that it is also immoral. But I think Dr. Jackson engages in a bit of sleight-of-hand when he conflates terrorism and abortion as arising from identical mindsets. Justifications for abortion tend to deny humanity to the developing fetus; but as he acknowledges, Islamic terrorists don't claim their victims are not human, they claim they are not innocent. Of course they dehumanize their enemies as much as possible to help psych themselves up for violence, but this is hardly unique to terrorists. Even our own troops have done this ('gooks', 'hajis'); it's a human coping mechanism, though a dangerous one.26
Dr. Jackson's paper covers a great deal of territory, and I don't intend, or pretend, to discuss it all here. My key thesis in this discussion is that the conclusions he reaches about the origins of morality are incorrect, or at least that he has not met the standard of evidence he set for himself. I welcome constructive discussion, corrections, and criticism.
Endnotes
1. Unfortunately the overall tone of the essay puts me in mind of George Orwell's apology for his "objectively pro-fascism" remark: "To admit that an opponent might be both honest and intelligent is felt to be intolerable. It is more immediately satisfying to shout that he is a fool or a scoundrel." I cannot claim to be free from this inclination myself, but fortunately Dr. Jackson himself in his paper acknowledges that one can "condemn a harmful or immoral action" even if one's past isn't "pure as the driven snow."
2. Of course, some of the exceptions have been historically significant. E.g. 1 Samuel 15:3, Joshua 10:40.
3. "Is knowledge knowable? If not, how do we know this?" - Woody Allen
4. http://www.tektonics.org/lp/norods.html
5. J. S. Haldane, Mechanism, Life, And Personality, 1913
6. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosalind_Franklin
7. http://www.sciencecartoonsplus.com/gallery.htm or http://www.sciencecartoonsplus.com/gallery/math/math07.gif
8. It's true that there are principles in science like the "Uncertainty Principle," which states that it's impossible to know with total precision both the position and velocity of a particle. However, this is because in Quantum Mechanics, a particle literally does not have a definite position and velocity.
9. Of course, their polytheistic framework was less efficient than a monotheistic one, so it took them some discussion to reach the conclusion that the pious was, in fact, that which was loved by all the gods.
10. Perhaps one might argue that a God that created the universe would have the right to do whatever It liked with that universe. But the question would immediately arise, "On what basis does the principle that 'the creator of something owns it' rest?" Is that an unchangeable, logically necessary moral principle — or is it imposed by divine whim?
11. When Dr. Jackson, commenting on the 'natural laws,' alludes to the "question . . . of who, exactly, created those natural laws," he betrays a confusion about the nature of natural laws and legal or moral 'laws.' Legal/moral laws are prescriptions for how one should behave; natural 'laws' are descriptions of how things do, in fact, behave. Legal laws of course have creators, but natural laws are not legal laws.
12. http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/pinker07/pinker07_index.html
13. It's worth noting that framing morality in this way allows a creator God to be 'good' in a significant sense again. It even allows It to be the ultimate author of morality, in the limited sense that the morality inherent in a universe would flow from the type of universe created and the kinds of beings placed within it. Of course, it does limit the kinds of morality that such a God could impose, but it seems generally accepted that an inability to create logical contradictions is not a significant limitation on omnipotence. There's even a role for revelation to play. Such a God might be aware of ramifications of the system — of moral precepts — too difficult for limited humans to deduce, and be able to relay them.
14. Consider how dumbfounding the notion of a Colin Powell or Condoleezza Rice as Secretary of State would have been at the dawn of the 19th century.
15. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Traveler%27s_dilemma and http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa006&articleID=7750A576-E7F2-99DF-3824E0B1C2540D47&pageNumber=1&catID=2.
16. "Conscience is the inner voice that warns us somebody may be looking." - H. L. Mencken
17. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/health/21cnd-brain.html?ex=1332129600&en=aa03e4a1c7a9ffd3&ei=5088& and http://www.mindhacks.com/blog/2005/10/the_moral_brain.html and http://www.reason.com/news/show/35014.html are popularized examples.
18. Orgel's Second Rule: "Evolution is cleverer than you are."
19. The famous physicist Richard Fenyman once remarked, "You don't understand Quantum Mechanics. You just get used to it."
20. "Engineering does not require science. Science helps a lot but people built perfectly good brick walls long before they knew why cement works." - Alan Cox
21. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium
22. http://books.guardian.co.uk/departments/classics/story/0,6000,582828,00.html
23. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3068650/site/newsweek/from/RL.3/
24. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10053223&dopt=Abstract
25. Essentially, I agree with Dr. Jackson that, "If free will is a byproduct of nature, then it is a byproduct of intelligence, because it isn't the heart, or the legs, or the fingernails or the toes that formulates this expression of free will. It's the brain . . ." Before one month, the brain hasn't formed or differentiated.
26. I am not, of course, equating the moral standing of U.S. troops with Al Quaeda terrorists. But they are all human beings, and will inevitably have things in common.
sorceror171@gmail.com
http://ingles.homeunix.net/
Read more articles by Raymond Ingles
Mr. Ingles gave me an opportunity to read an earlier draft of his essay, and I believe that IC is going to publish my rejoinder tomorrow. Briefly, I contend that Mr. Ingles has not stated my original proposition correctly. He confused a discussion of religion with a discussion of God, speaks of a God-imposed morality rather that a God-instilled morality as I did, and in the end equates rational action to further an individual’s wants, needs and desires with the intrinsic moral content of human behavior.
You’ll see my full response in “The True Nature of Human Morality: A Response to the Critique ‘Universal Morality And The Morality Of The Universe’”
Comment by Phillip Ellis Jackson | July 12, 2007
Speaking of rather long articles…
Anyway, the author fails to make his case. Moral behavior is not cooperative behavior, nor is it a manifestation of a "more evolved" animal. There is no evolutionary utility for moral behavior.
Consider one of Jesus' moral precepts: " if someone wants to sue you and take your tunic, let him have your cloak as well." Or another: "Therefore I tell you, do not worry about your life, what you will eat or drink; or about your body, what you will wear. " Do these sound superior behavioral characteristics that evolution will select over other, more selfish attributes?
There is no evolutionary explanation for altruism, self-denial, or mercy. In fact, most of Jesus' teachings fly in the face of the author's theories.
The author's ignorance about matters of faith is clear. He apparently has not taken the time to understand that which he tries to debunk.
Comment by Mountain Man | July 12, 2007
It is clearly false to claim that there is no evolutionary utility for moral behavior: evolution does not work solely on the level of the individua.
In any case, Jackson's argument is characteristic of most theological attempts to declare all morality other than that in a theological framework impossible. It demands the use of metaphysical explanation, but then fails utterly to justify the extravagance by providing the claimed "explanations": from morality to free will, these troublesome, difficult to explain concepts are "solved" by poofs of magic (i.e. by not explaining them at all), leaving us just as ignorant of them as we began.
Saying that moral justification is "provided" by God is simply a non-answer. Provided how? What are the actions undertaken: call them mystical magical metaphysical actions if you please, but do at least explain what they are, to make any position "moral." If you cannot explain what those actions are, even in the vaguest theory, then what's the point of the exercise? And how is any of the scoffing at merely material morality justified by any superior alternative?
The plain fact of the matter is that we as human beings do seem to have some core values like empathy for others, desire for social bonds with others around us, and so forth. Different societies have arranged these basic elements in different ways, but there are only so many configurations that are stable: those which are not quickly fall into disarray (as would any society in which murder was sanctioned and allowed). And the possession of these basic values have made moral argument and hence moral progress possible: there is enough variation to make conclusions non-obvious to everyone, but enough commonality for debates to be coherent.
What all this says about whether a moral value is ultimately "justified" I have no idea, because I've never heard anyone coherently explain what that even means (a murderous computer might be stopped, but if it had no concern for the lives of humans, I don't see how anyone could ever argue or convince it that it was somehow "mistaken" or "unjustified" in its actions).
Comment by vicstich | July 12, 2007
Er … vicstich. Before you conclude what I say is wrong, you might want to actually see what I said. I did not use the term "metaphysical" in the way Mr. Ingles described (as I'll indicate in my response), and my original article addressed your other points in some detail. I also deal in my response with "evolutionary utility" as a foundation for morality. The fact that society has "evolved" to a point where embryonic stem cell research is possible does not make this research intrinsically moral (or immoral). Another calculation (which I also describe) is needed for that.
Phil Jackson
Comment by Phillip Ellis Jackson | July 12, 2007
Well, I'll reserve judgement until I see your full reply, Phillip, but I think there may be misunderstandings all around. I didn't say that "evolutionary utility" was the "foundation for morality" - though I did argue that evolutionary utility was the reason for the existence of our intuitive sense of morality.
I was arguing that the actual foundation for morality - morality as commonly understood and displayed - is based on logical consequences of our nature as humans and the nature of the universe we inhabit. Evolution responds to these consequences but does not actually create them. (Well, except in the limited sense that much of our nature is a consequence of evolutionary development.)
And I don't recall speaking at any point of society "evolving". Certainly I regard what I termed the "expansion of the in-group" as positive progress, and I imagine most sane people do as well. But I never wrote (or, so far as I can see, implied) that because something becomes technically possible that it's automatically moral. Actually, I argued the opposite in the case of abortion, didn't I?
Comment by Raymond Ingles | July 12, 2007
Mountain Man, I'm rather dubious that the types of self-abnegating 'morals' - that form portions of Jesus' recorded teachings - are really part of the 'universal morality' that Dr. Jackson was arguing for. Indeed, they seem to go quite against the grain of what people consider moral.
Why else is, say, 'self-defense' considered a valid justification for violence? I do not recall a large number of people - any, really - who argued that we should 'turn the other cheek' to Saddam Hussein because that was the moral thing to do. (There were people who argued for keeping up the sanction scheme for practical reasons, but I don't recall too many people arguing that Saddam's rule was morally justified.)
Very few followers of Jesus throughout history have followed the specific precepts you mention about overpaying in lawsuits or taking no care of one's own phsyical well-being. Let's face it, even if we assume arguendo that they are valid moral guidelines, they are very tough sells. But Dr. Jackson was arguing for a universal morality, the kind that everyone intuitively understands and agrees is right. He was discussing things like the rape and/or murder of children, the kind of actions that even convicted felons get outraged about.
Oddly enough, most people - even people who claim to follow Jesus' teachings - don't get outraged about organizations or churches - mounting a vigorous defense against a lawsuit, or families stocking up their pantry for the coming week. (Indeed, we tend to take children away from households where the parents don't provide for their kids…)
Comment by Raymond Ingles | July 12, 2007
By the way, everyone — though I've never met Mr. Ingles before, I've found him to be a decent guy and I've greatly enjoyed this opportunity to debate the issue with him. Rather than keep hinting at what I've said in response, and mixing my reaction to other people's comments with my reaction to Mr. Ingles' observations, I'll just wait now for my actual words to appear and then continue the debate (if necessary) after that.
Comment by Phillip Ellis Jackson | July 12, 2007
I have to say thanks for the long article. It has allowed me to see a little deeper into the mind of a determinist.
It looks to me that when DNA was found you placed its existance within the framework of a naturalistic universe. So your foundation splits from mine at this point. Just as I believe scripture is inspired and not from man. I believe and know that DNA is part of the creation. Our world views are different so the same data can be used to support both sides of an argument. This is the fundamental basis for any disagreement. To argue the data is a waste of time. You have to go back to your world view. If you start with any naturalistic view it eventually boils down to nilism. Even the polythesis view eventually boils down to nilism as well. There are many good books on this subject. With my world view I see everything around me as God's universe. A naturalist on the other hand see's the universe as god. Since man is viewed by naturalist as the dominate being in the universe then by that logic man is god. This is the basis for the new age thinking.
How does one arrive at a world view and how does one defend it. In my case I defend myself by showing that science does not support a naturalistic universe. Of course that argument is volumes not pages.
Comment by fbaginski | July 12, 2007
Fbaginski, I think you're going to have to define your terms a bit. "Determinism" in the classical sense hasn't really obtained since the advent of Quantum Mechanics, and even without QM, things like Chaos Theory would make it so impractical as to be at best a philosophical curiosity.
And I'd be very curious to hear what definitions of "naturalistic" and 'ni[hi]lism" you're using. Indeed, I rather thought I was laying out a case that naturalism doesn't automatically lead to nihilism…
Comment by Raymond Ingles | July 12, 2007
Outside those true believers from the E. O. Wilson school of socio-biology or evolutionary psychology as it’s currently called, is there any reason to link evolution to genetics to human behavior, and more specifically to morality? For a professional scientist, the answer is no based on the empirics. For the philosophical school of science-based speculation the answer is definitely yes. Who’s right, or phrasing the question differently, can we derive knowledge that strays beyond mere empirical facts and the legitimate conclusions derived from such facts and make truth claims composed of 9 parts speculation and 1 part proven fact?
This author said: “There aren’t genes ‘for’ alcoholism or pedophilia in the same way as there are genes ‘for’ red hair.” Alcoholism and pedophilia describe certain types of human behavior, but there isn’t a shred of evidence that these behaviors have any relation to genes. So, the author’s statement is somewhat true on the surface, there “aren’t genes” for these behaviors, such genes can’t be located on the chromosome, they don’t have an assigned number as do scientifically verifiable genes, they have no identified role in embryological development – in short, they are mythical constructions that don’t exist based on science alone.
But, the author’s statement seems to imply something more, although it isn’t clear what. Are we to assume there really are such genes, but these alcohol or pedophilia genes manifest gene expression in a different manner than the gene for red hair? OK, but is there any evidence for that assumption? Well, no. Does the emphasis on the word “for” in this statement have any scientific validity, does it connote any meaningful scientific conclusions – again, no. So, what does this statement actually mean – what information does it transmit? Using logical deconstruction it means absolutely nothing – it transmits no information of value.
In fact, the recent trend to speculate on the origins of human behavior using evolution and genetics to confer some form of scientific validity mimics the same psychology that confers legitimacy on conclusions derived from astrology. Does the current angle between Mars and Jupiter mean you’re in danger of losing your job? Nonsense, you say. But, can you prove the movement of the planets and stars don’t influence your destiny – and how would you go about proving such an assertion? Does the fact that astrology advice is printed in many newspapers and magazines lend a certain legitimacy to belief? Many people read these astrology columns, so are you saying they are all crazy? And if widespread belief alone doesn’t confer legitimacy, does a widespread, but similarly unproven, belief in evolutionary psychology held by scientists and relativist philosophers confer legitimacy beyond similar but unproven beliefs in astrology held by the general public?
Phil Jackson’s recent essay on Thomas Kuhn (The Politics of Science and Religion) and Kuhn’s thoughts on how scientists embrace theoretical paradigms is a good starting reference to see the fallacy in employing evolution or genetics as an explanation for human behavior. For this author, I couldn’t get beyond the double standard encountered so often in essays of this type. On the one hand, the scientific method is deemed a superior path to knowledge compared to any form of metaphysical reasoning. On the other hand, such authors blissfully ignore the discipline of the scientific method relative to truth claims when they engage in reasoning based on scientifically unproven speculation.
Comment by Pat Skurka | July 12, 2007
Mr. Ingles,
Your distinction between hard morals and easy ones is perplexing to me. Are you suggesting that because many people find it difficult to follow Jesus' teaching, that we can simply dispense with them a priori? On what basis?
The quintessential nature of morality is that it demands a standard of behavior and thinking that is different than the natural inclination of a person. Following morality is different than believing it. Accepting morality is different than acknowledging it. Morality often contravenes human nature.
That is why evolutionary explanations of moral development are so wanting. They attempt to explain morality as a desirable trait making those who possess it to be worthy of "making the cut." But we must account for all aspects of morality, including the morality that selects against a person or class of people, like altruism, self-denial, or mercy. Evolution fails to explain this.
Most people who tend to dismiss Jesus will say, "Well, he was a great moral teacher." So, sir, what do you say? Is he a great moral teacher, or just a lunatic? If he is a great moral teacher, would it be possible that some of those great teachings would run counter to previous understandings of morality? Might they be hard to accept, hard to practice, hard to understand?
Those who practice morality, however imperfectly, are a separate topic from the morality itself.
Oh, and vicstich says, "It is clearly false to claim that there is no evolutionary utility for moral behavior: evolution does not work solely on the level of the individual." If it is so clearly false, why not argue your point? Lay out your rebuttal. A summary dismissal on your part does nothing to make your case.
Comment by Mountain Man | July 12, 2007
Congratulations on a well-done essay and response to Dr Jacksons earlier work.
It was the Dr essay "WWJD…" that first brought me to this site and really got me to focus on the function of morality. The logical and argumentative errors in that essay have cried out for a response, and I am glad someone with the rhetorical prowess of Mr Ingles has risen to the challenge.
As he is no doubt learning fast, some of the denizens of this forum will (willfully, it will seem) misrepresent and mis-interpret his argument in way he will have not thought possible.
But there should be no doubt: Mr Ingles has fulfilled the requirements of Mr Jackson's argument without resorting to a super-natural cause, and therefore has rendered the rest of Jackson's essay moot!
I find it interesting that Mr Ingles chose to mention the possibility that long-term moral choices might have genetic resonances, but I fear he has opened himself up to an area where the mis-information and mis-application of both genetic and moral concepts on THIS blog will cause him no end of frustration, so I just thought I'd warn him.
I also loved his shoot-down of Mr fBaginski's "divine pronouncement's of Jesus" argument. The "there is no genetic basis for altruism" meme has been getting some play lately - and that may be true, or at least "unknown" for the time being - but there very well be social benefits for it, which would fit in with Mr Ingles thesis. e.g., the family of a warrior who dies for his country is honored by that society, and the fatherless children are cared for (well, in the US maybe, not so much).
Comment by Chasm | July 12, 2007
Mr. Ingles —
One of the reasons I agreed to a debate with you is because your approach was so different than Chasm. Although we disagree on basic issues, you’ve kept the conversation professional. I contrast this with Chasm who has a tiny bit of trouble telling the truth, which was most notable when he commented on my original article by saying that he had spent “hours working on a point-by-point rebuttal of my position ‘a few days ago’”, when in fact the essay was released less than 24 hours earlier. [Comment 16].
Unlike your position, Chasm also believes there is no evidence to prove that raping and killing a 5 year-old girl is “inherently immoral” [Comment 14], that “infanticide” is not inherently immoral because spiders do it to their young (notwithstanding the fact that my essay was about human morality, not animal instinct), [Comment 14], as well as making a number of other bonehead observations.
The reason for his somewhat odd comments is that in actual fact, Chasm has read only the first 20 pages or so of my moral relativism essay, and reacted to what was said in that. When I called him on this and pointed out what he did he was embarrassed, and disappeared from that conversation. What’s distinguished your comments from Chasm’s is that you’ve actually read my original essay and commented professionally on its substance, rather than used it as a launching board for a political screed.
You have also rejected the morally-relative rationalizations Chasm uses to justify abortion on demand in his recent comments to my July 2 article. I’m going to repost his comment verbatim below, because they stand out in such stark contrast to what you wrote. [Note — the capitalizations in Chasm’s comments are his]:
“Is it more moral to be a society that mandates abortion or one which forces childbirth? Golly gee, I’d hate to be part of a society that has to make either horrid choice, yet you seem intent on forcing us to have a discussion regarding the latter, as tho it were more noble or preferable than China’s. NONONO! you scream. It’s ALL ABOUT THAT BABY and that LIFE which is so important. And I’m here to tell you that, actually, things are different than they were back in the day of Jonah and his whale. For one, we really did go thru the so-called sexual revolution, conservative nightmare of all nightmares, and women really did tell the men that after six thousand years of this shit, they aren’t going to take it any more. For another, there are many pressing problems which actually do threaten us - on every level from individual all the way up to country and planet. The answers to these questions really do amount to doing good or evil because the repercussions will determine the quality of life for generations to come. Sorry for you to hear, I know, but who has sex with who, and whether or not they conceive, birth and raise a child is not one of them. Abortion is not a civic moral issue because the survival of the state, or even the village, is not at stake. The only people inside that little moral bubble are the mother, the fetus, and her family. And in America, anyway, privacy means that’s where it stays.”
It’s important for everyone dropping in on this conversation to know that people like Chasm do NOT represent the point of view you’ve advanced. Where you and I disagree on abortion is over a small but significant point which I will address at some length in my rejoinder. It is not the kind of almost unintelligible claptrap that passes for thought from Chasm, who blends a discussion about morality, social policy, religious teachings, and Constitutional rights into one intermingled thought with no understanding or appreciation for the role played (or NOT played) by each of these constituent elements.
In fact, none of what Chasm said above about abortion has anything substantively to do with the moral issues of abortion that I outlined in my original essay [in fact, I specifically reject religious teachings in and of themselves as a basis for morality, spoke about the difference between man made and God-given rights, specifically rejected the notion that the state should impose moral decisions (such as prohibiting abortion) rather than have these decisions come from the people themselves through a democratic process]. Chasm doesn’t know this because he hasn’t read my original essay, even though he makes repeated claims that he has.
His “support” for your point of view, therefore, is politically motivated and not intellectually based, so anyone who reads his screed should not confuse Chasm’s opinions with yours. His motivation for commenting on my work is not to advance the issue through a reasoned give-and-take of ideas, but rather is summed up in a comment he made to my July 2, 2007 essay: “I have read your essays, and they are a main reason I pop by here occasionally. Since being a condescending prick IS your strong suit, I’ll just explain that I find them entertaining but grossly wrong, I imagine for many of the same reasons Mr Ingles does. For that reason I shall be spending some time reading that discussion as it unfolds too.”
We can only look forward to the carefully thought-out commentary from Chasm that is sure to come. In the meantime, though, to anyone pro-or con looking in on this discussion, please direct your meaningful comments to what Mr. Ingles says, and not what his new ‘best friend’ Chasm offers as enlightened observation, since Mr. Ingles’ reasons for this debate are NOT the same as Chasm’s.
Comment by Phillip Ellis Jackson | July 12, 2007
MM makes the conflation I was talking about - what does altruism have to do with evolution?
At all?
Altruism is a concept, reinforced through honor (posthumously if necessary). All you have to do is watch a few war movies to learn about it. It doesn't need DNA to live on: just good stories and speech writers. That is, after all, one of the the original purposes of drama and dance - to inspire courage and glorify sacrifice to the realm by honoring heroes.
Not that altruism in service of (our) country isn't great 'n all, but truly, once and for all, tell me what in the heck genetics has to do with it?
Jesus was indeed kind of a socialist pacifist, and a really nice guy. Have to say. But I was under the impression Mr Jackson's thesis was that there were transcendent morals, not ones that were simply 'written in the Bible.'
That's why he had to go to baby killing rapists to find something we ALL agree on.
Comment by Chasm | July 12, 2007
The author raises a number of interesting points, demonstrates mastery over subtle Latin terms and perpetuates an oh-so-common false description of theistic morality.
I know that is standard to present "divinely imposed morality" under the title of "divine command theory" but it is almost disingenuous to suggest that this is really what most rational theorists really believe. (With the possible exception of Dr. So-and-so who apparently does believe something akin to what is described)
The false "is-ought" dilemma is explained below:
"It is, of course, generally held that God approves of moral behavior. But the question now becomes, is moral behavior approved by God because it's inherently good and deserving of approval? Or is it simply the case that whatever God just happens to approve of becomes, by that very fact, moral and good?"
Allow me to solve the great mystery of what theism holds to be true.
The answer is “yes”; "whatever God just happens to approve of becomes, by that very fact, moral and good."
That’s right. Certain behavior "just happens to" be good for the same reason that the universe "just happens to" exist.
The author doesn't believe that human ethics are subjective or intrinsic. He is more comfortable with the idea that they are a natural rational response to the world as it exists. The “good” has a benefit and a beneficiary as the arch-rationalist objectivists rightly proclaim
The author explains:
"Like chess, might there be strategic rules that arise in the real world from physical laws and conditions, combined with our desires?"
Of course there are! But if we honestly assume for a moment that a transcendent, omnipotent, Creator actually exists then we will view Divine Command Theory in a different way from those who coined the term deliberately to illustrate a supposed tautology. If God exists, then God first commands the "is." The ought is a corollary.
The author says:
"If morality is simply a matter of what God commands, then saying that "God is good" becomes a vacuous, or at least tautological, claim. Essentially, we simply have the ultimate case of Might Makes Right."
But if God exists then “Might Makes Real” and real makes right.
Morality therefore is a “whim” of God to the same degree as gravity and weak nuclear force.
When the quaking prophet commands behavior through religion, theists hold that God is COMMUNICATING behavior proper to rational beings that are a part of what already "is".
It is not accurate to say that theism presents the individual commands of religion as a spontaneous arbitrary emergence of moral principle, somehow independent from the "state of nature." Yet this is how "Divine command theory" is described by those who simply wish to discredit theism by falsely describing it.
It is another pseudo paradox like the old classic about a rock so heavy that God cannot lift it. “Could God ever create such a thing?” we are asked. At this point, the theist is supposed to descend into a tailspin of confusion. In reality, this parable defines omnipotence rather than disproving it.
In the same way, the divine command theory ruse can be a helpful illustration. It helps us to see that all that “value” depends upon the state of what exists and that existence depends upon the volition of the Auto-existent.
Comment by abuNathan | July 12, 2007
Mr. Skurka, I really didn't think I needed a footnote about the relationship of genes to behaviors like alcoholism or pedophilia, since I summarized the point in the essay - "at most genes may put someone at increased risk for such things." Even gross physical traits like red hair rarely involve single, specific genes. With red hair, for example, the expression is mixed up with, and affects, skin development as well. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_hair#Biochemistry_and_genetics).
And, as I said, mental development is more complicated still. The development of most any mental feature involves many genes interacting in a complex manner with the environment. But, yes, there is more than "a shred of evidence that these behaviors have… relation to genes". (http://alcoholism.about.com/cs/alerts/l/blnaa18.htm and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alcoholism#Genetic_predisposition_testing came up in a quick Google search. Twin studies are the gold standard here (and, by the way, one of the ways we can be sure astrology doesn't work) and yes, genetics do have an influence, perhaps even - occasionally - a strong one. A search term you might use would be "DRD2 TaqI polymorphism".) But, as I summarized, they don't by themselves determine alcoholism. Indeed, both Dr. Jackson and I pointed out that people do overcome such tendencies on a regular basis, so how you went from there to imputing 'genetic determinism' on my part is a bit confusing.
Finally, I'll note that when it came to alcoholism or pedophilia, I wasn't insisting that they were prime examples of genetic determinism. I was taking those examples directly from Dr. Jackson's paper and showing that even if they were strongly determined by genetics (which I didn't argue), that would not justify eugenic practices.
Comment by Raymond Ingles | July 12, 2007
abuNathan
Just as a point of fact, I do not subscribe to "Divine Command" theory. I expressly reject this point of view. I do not believe that my view on this was accurately portayed, as I point out in my rejoinder that I believe will appear Friday.
Phil
Comment by Phillip Ellis Jackson | July 12, 2007
abuNathan, I don't think you read my endnote 13. It's a logically valid way out of the "false paradox" as you put it. I was making the case, a la Laplace, that "I had no need of that hypothesis".
And note that if one frames morality that way, cases like those in my endnote 2 become somewhat harder to justify…
Comment by Raymond Ingles | July 12, 2007
“… alcoholism or pedophilia, I wasn’t insisting that they were prime examples of genetic determinism. I was taking those examples directly from Dr. Jackson’s paper and showing that even if they were strongly determined by genetics (which I didn’t argue), that would not justify eugenic practices.”
To weigh in on this point — because I don’t specifically address it again in my rejoinder — my original position is this. If we are to believe that there is some sort of “morality gene” (i.e. that genetics gives morality its content), then this would imply the following: people without that gene would be incapable of acting morally. Society could not “rehabilitate” them because they are genetically incapable of acting morally. Therefore, by this same logic, society would have an obligation to act pre-emptively against people who possess no morality gene to protect the remainder of society.
I went through a long explanation of this issue to illustrate the full implications of believing that the content of morality is due to human genetics; a position I reject. I believe that Mr. Ingles also rejects this position.
Genetics, rather, can work to suppress the expression of morality, which I describe in some detail. (But suppressing something is not the same thing as giving that something its “content”.) Mr. Ingles, I believe, supports this position to a point, but draws different conclusions about it than I do. I go into that issue in some detail in my rejoinder, which I’ll leave for that forum.
By the way, on a personal note, with the exception that I noted in an earlier comment, this give-and-take is exactly the kind of thing Mr. Ingles and I envisioned when we wrote our essays. Knowledge is advanced by honest debate, which involves an effort to honestly defend one’s position (vs. simply slandering an opponent or making silly, off-subject comments). I appreciate all the honest dialogue, as I know Mr. Ingles does.
Comment by Phillip Ellis Jackson | July 12, 2007
MountainMan, I'm not questioning those specific morals because they are "hard". I'm questioning them because they don't appear to be common, universal morals at all.
Consider - should our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq feel guilty about not "turning the other cheek" to insurgents? Do you think they have something to answer for? Should we bring them back to help them avoid a "near occasion of sin"?
Dr. Jackson was speaking of things that 'we all know' are right. I haven't gotten into a fight since high school, but I don't feel guilty about defending myself then. I don't really see 'turning the other cheek' as a moral obligation, and if I were sued, I'd mount a vigorous defense, and I do plan out my finances and health care and so forth. I don't feel guilt about any of that. Are you saying I should?
As to evolution not being able to produce tendencies to forgiveness and mercy, or foregoing short-term gains for long-term benefits - well, I actually tried to point out cases of those very things in my game theory examples. As I noted, when 'mistakes' are possible, forgiveness is a positive for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Google for "tit for two tats". And "Tit For Tat" itself accepts a payoff of 3 instead of 'greedily' going for 5, in the expectation of better gains over the long term.
Finally, as to Jesus, I think there's enough myth accreted onto the actual historical figure that it's hard to say what he actually said and thought. (I'm not saying there wasn't a Yeshua, just that we can't be terribly sure what the actual historical facts are. Another example of this is Socrates, whom we really only know through Plato's Dialogues.) The "Lord, Liar, Lunatic" trichotomy ignores other possibilities, including "Mistaken, Misquoted, or Mythical".
In terms of Jesus' overall morality, I'm minded of the quote of Samuel Johnson - "[B]oth good and original, but the part that is good is not original and the part that is original is not good." Jesus as depicted in the Bible spends a bit too much time in petty things like cursing fig trees, or major things like anticipating the torture of sinners with obvious relish, for me to really consider him "all that" as a moral teacher.
Comment by Raymond Ingles | July 13, 2007
I've just started reading Dr. Jackson's reply, and I haven't had time to digest it yet, but I think I need to clear up a misunderstanding right at the the beginning. I used the phrase "vanishingly small" simply to mean "extremely small" or "negligibly small"; I did not mean that such moral recognition had 'vanished' over time. I was agreeing with Dr. Jackson that the rare exceptions, the people who didn't feel instinctive revulsion at the notion of child rape and/or murder, were indeed aberrations.
Indeed, in my essay, I pointed out that over the course of history the circle within which people are considered fully human, and morally relevant, has greatly expanded. I apologize if my wording was unclear.
Comment by Raymond Ingles | July 13, 2007
Raymond Ingles & Phil Jackson:
Genetic determinism, genetic predisposition, - these are words without precise or definable meanings. I could just as easily say my ignition key has a genetic predisposition to make my motorcycle engine come to life. You would certainly grasp the intent of (and probably laugh at) my choice of words, but because you already understand the physical relation between ignition keys and internal combustion engines, my intended meaning could be intuitively determined. Does putting a label on an observed correlation strengthen the truth claim as to the cause? Is a correlation the same as causation and how do you prove that – whether we are talking about how the stars influence our destiny or gene number 23 on your chromosome?
In other words, animal breeders have been aware of genetic determinism or genetic predisposition for thousands of years – but without the multi-syllable descriptions however. 200 years ago in Michigan, an angry frontier woman was screaming at one of my ancestors that: “You’ll turn out to be a drunken bum just like your father was”. That pioneer woman certainly understood the intuitive concept of genetic predisposition to alcoholism, although she had no idea what a gene was. Correlation without understanding causation is hardly a new observation within human knowledge and genetic science hasn’t added much meat to that particular bone. Using the recent findings of science to construct philosophical arguments generally involves building a mountain of speculation on a tiny pebble of fact.
I realize the intent of your debate wasn’t directed at empirical proofs pointing to relationships between genes and human behavior, but consider for a moment the incredible obstacles to making the assumption there is such a relationship. Human behavior involves a temporal object (us) moving in complex patterns through time and space. Alcoholism and pedophilia are highly divergent forms of behavior (both from the norm and from each other) within that context. Genes are simple amino acid codes that through highly complex chemical interactions give rise to proteins. Linking biochemical reactions forming molecular proteins to behavior observed years or perhaps decades after the reaction actually occurs involves a considerable and intuitive leap of faith.
And, yes, it is common nowadays to make such intuitive leaps and then point to scientific findings as legitimizing the conclusions. However, my problem with Mr. Ingles arguments is that he does make such intuitive leaps the basis for his essay. No doubt he qualifies many of his assertions by saying the relations are complex, or not well understood, or merely increase the risk for a certain form of anti-social behavior. All well and good, but the beginning paragraph of this essay states: “This would imply a perfectly reasonable evolutionary reason for a moral sense to exist.”
As the basis for his thesis, “evolutionary reasons” are far more speculative and unproven than proposing genetic reasons for human behavior. If there isn’t a shred of evidence linking genes to temporal objects and their self-initiated movements through space and time, there is even less evidence that purely physical factors “created” these relationships over the course of “deep” time through some mysterious form of a trial and error process.
Comment by Pat Skurka | July 13, 2007
Raymond: Thanks for the clarification about "vanishingly small". It seemed inconsistent with the conclusions you actually reached about the morality of that matter. The intriguing thing about this debate is how you and I end endorsing virtually the same positions concerning slavery, abortion, and deliberately harming an innocent human life, though we employ different methods to get there. Regards, Phil
Comment by Phillip Ellis Jackson | July 13, 2007
Continuing on comment 8 and response to Ingles
Determinist are materialist that extend the past into the future by looking at the current state of forces and matter. Everything that will ever happen is set in motion by the current state. Quantum mechanics for some broke the chain of cause and effect. However using the argument in the article about knowledge one could say that we have not fully understood particle physics and if we did we could take chance away and be left with a destined universe.
If someone is a materialist at heart and breaks with determinism at the quantum level we must ask ourselves why? Is their faith in science to advance in knowledge limited? Are their world views at the whim of the lastest paper on particle physics? I would hope not. As for me scripture says that we cannot know all. This I accept. That does not stop me from being curious and helping mankind develope devices to make life easier.
I have examined various parts of the creation and used mathematics to model what is seen. Then observing what possible methods could be used to change the structure of organic life one may, using the same mathematics find the chances of random combinations to violate the entropy laws. Having done so I come to the conclusion that the entropy laws are not violated.
Seeing no chance for life to evolve from dust leads me to conclude that quantum mechanics or something close is the limit of the material world. In my mind the entire universe is held together by supernatural forces.
Comment by fbaginski | July 13, 2007
What we have here is a failure to communicate. Or rather, two descriptions of two different things.
Mr Ingles has proposed materialistic explanations and given us some game theory insights for understanding the motivations that drive how morality is interpreted and regulated in real life.
Dr Jackson has proposed a transcendent moral code, which he calls the Universal Moral Code:
Do no harm to innocents.
There have been claims of misunderstanding on both sides, and I, of all people, believe he can shed some light on the core issues here. For while Mr Ingles does fulfill the requirements set forth in Dr Jackson’s first essay - he shows how strategic tension among ever growing sets of people can explain how we use morality to solve the problems of living in a society and he gives us wonderful information and insights that can help us understand the motivations of people as they sift through right and wrong - he does not ultimately identify the source, if you will, of the most basic of ideals. And while Dr Jackson asks us to understand that the source of the ultimate command, “harm no innocents,” as a transcendent code must also be transcendent, this insight does not ultimately help us much to navigate the complex moral terrain that is human existence.
Both authors come to the admirable conclusion that if there is a lesson that has come from either approach, it is that humanity’s greatest goal (maybe even our ‘purpose’) should be to progressively expand the ‘circle of innocents’ to include as much life as possible.
Now, when I say “not much help” I do not mean to imply it is not important. If we are to conceptualize the UMC as transcendent, then we must acknowledge that it is the ‘benchmark’ for morality. Yet knowing this does not always help us to sort out the nitty gritty of how to apply it.
For instance, it doesn’t help our North Korean Prison guard. Dr Jackson and Mr Ingles both point out that this man may ‘rationalize’ his behavior as a coping mechanism. But in truth, his only MOTIVATION for cooperating in the torture of the innocent family members of political dissidents is really HIS OWN SURVIVAL. He knows that if he does not do his job, he and his family will be subjected to the same treatment. This is how his mind is cracked. The pressure of the State is such that he MUST agree to the moral construct that his prisoners are sub-human, or else risk being assigned to the same category. He cannot pray to anything for enlightenment, or rather, it is irrelevant to him whether he ‘knows’ he is doing ‘wrong’ at any stage of the game. The propaganda and indoctrination might help to misconstrue his ‘true’ realization of what is moral, but as a point of fact his only motivation is fear for his own survival and the survival of his family.
Not that any materialistic explanation of the function of morality such as the ones proffered by Mr Ingles can help Mr Under a Dictatorship Prison Guard either, but at least these formulations can help US understand the structure of the moral trap he is in, and judge him thusly.
If the Universal Moral Code is “Do no harm to the innocent,” and this code encompasses all that is and is not man, transcending boundaries, then I would propose there is also a Universal Imperative that is wholly of the realm of life - an imperative that is followed by all life, from the lowliest virus to the leaders of nations:
“Do what is necessary to survive”
Now, before you all go exploding “Moral relativist” on me, let me just re-iterate that this is not a statement about where morals come from, nor an endorsement of ‘anything goes’ morality, for ‘to survive‘ does not imply ‘anything one wants‘. Further, I must stress that the most important aspect of that sentence is WHO THE IMPLIED SUBJECT IS, be it a person, a family, a community or a state - at each level, it is the MOTIVATION FOR SURVIVAL that determines how the Universal Moral Code will be applied, and who, exactly, will be defined as innocent.
In other words, while the UMC is the ideal, in practical application within a society, this code is filtered through the imperative, “What is necessary (for us) to do to survive,” in order to define those parameters of ‘innocent’ and ‘not-innocent,’ ‘us’ and ‘them.’
“Do what is necessary to survive” most emphatically does not mean “anything goes” or “anything is moral depending on the situation.” It means that every person, family, tribe, city and state, in turn, must use this formulation to determine how to apply the UMC to resolve moral questions.
What must be understood is that morality is not a variable, it is a function. In most ‘dramatic’ scenarios we debate, its function is survival on some level, but in other scenarios its function could be trust, or honor or property.
The independent variables in the equation are always the stake-holders - the beings whose lives or property are at stake in the question. Morality as a function is part of the ’answer’ on the other side of the equation. In a life or death scenario, morality’s function is survival; criminal and civil laws resolve the morality of trust within society, and of property.
We can acknowledge the ultimate source of morality, of the spirit behind the answers, and even assign our own idea of this spirit in the form of a code, “Do no harm to innocent life,” but I believe that Dr Jackson is wrong to believe that this spirit, the source of this morality, should be included among the ‘independent variables.’ For one, God’s survival isn’t at stake, so trying to shoehorn His presence among those that actually are, distorts our ability to see what it is were trying to see in the first place. Secondly, as a purely mathematical exercise, since the Divine is already the ultimate source of the UMC, and thus a already a major part of one side of the equation, adding It to the other side, the variable side, just results in canceling out, leaving us mortals with the (no longer Divinely influenced) question at hand.
If we leave the Creator where He belongs, as the source of morality, then when an entire society’s very survival is threatened by another nation, then going to war is a moral cause. If a society brings the Creator over to the side of independent variables, then they are implying that God’s survival is at stake too, and now we have a crusade. Is this war still moral?
Lets take a minute to look at medical ethics. In most ‘survival’ moral scenarios, the most salient variable that must be solved for is: where is ‘the line.’ What point can we not cross and still satisfy the intent of the UMC?
In the area of medical ethics - and stem cell research is a current example - in order to find the ‘line’ we debate the variables of the potential survival of the tiny cells vs. the potential benefits to the survival of our society as a whole. Saying “God/the UMC” thinks we should go with protection of life doesn’t really shed much light on the decisions that must be made, for ‘life’ is part of the equation no matter which way we go. The stem cells and society are the independent variables, and Dr Jackson insists God be included also, but the fact is by doing so we would be trying to look at the problem with less resolution than before.
If we step back, and try and imagine the mind of God directing the scenario, applying the UMC to both the tiny cells and the whole of society, not only are we doing what everyone concedes is impossible - understand and apply the mind of God - but we can no longer determine exactly ‘who’ the subject of the Universal Imperative is either - whose survival is at stake? The stem cells or the people whose diseases might be cured? In order to click back into the resolution needed to actually discuss and sort out the problem, we have to decide whose survival is ultimately at stake and make a judgment call, but then we risk the wrath of moral absolutists who insist we are then not taking into account the UMC!
It’s a lose/lose scenario, which has us running in circles.
Which brings us to the heart of the issue with Dr Jackson’s insight: while he has formulated a detailed and passionate defense of the innocent pre-born, if that is the only moral question which it helps us decide, it’s just not a very useful tool. And the main reason his insight fails to help humanity much, his considerable debating skills notwithstanding, is precisely because the UMC IS transcendent: there are no real world, material examples where following or not following the UMC has resulted in divine glory or retribution, so while it may be an ideal baseline for morality, there is no way to apply it without resorting to a completely objective analysis which then obscures the actual issues to be resolved.
In the example of North Korea, the leader of that country has equated his own personal survival with that of the state. It is easy for us to judge him as having violated the UMC, but less so for us to judge those he has forced to do his dirty work. While they may have also technically violated the UMC, they have only done so in order to fulfill their own UI: to survive.
To take as another example as to how this works, let’s consider the tribe that sacrifices children on the alter of their Gods. As Dr Jackson points out, they are elevating the status of the child above the status of ’innocent’ in order to allow themselves to make the sacrifice - they have to do so in order to violate the UMC - but only by understanding that the tribe is utilizing the UI “Do what WE must to survive,” can we see their motivation for doing so. Because they feel that their Gods will be angry, and that they may thus suffer or be destroyed, they are not merely excused from the UMC, they are COMPELLED to violate the UMC and harm an innocent.
Moreover, convincing the tribal leader that they are unnecessarily violating the UMC will take a lot more than just pointing out, “Hey, you know those kids are innocent. You should stop that, or the God that created the UMC will be mad.” No, convincing the tribal leader to stop the sacrifices will require that we PROVE to him that he will not threaten the survival of the tribe by doing so. Appealing to his inner sense of goodness, or asking that he listen to his heart for what the UMC tells him will accomplish nothing. As soon as the missionaries leave, they will start sacrifices again. By ONLY trying to show the chief the perspective of God and the UMC, we have lost resolution on the problem. He can and will point out that his Gods demand sacrifice, and simply countering that the Creator of the UMC has priority will, again, result in circular arguments.
Reminding the chief of primacy of the UMC will only be the first step, therefore. After that he must be shown that by sparing the life of the sacrificial victim, he will NOT be jeopardizing the survival of his tribe. Only then, when convinced BEYOND DOUBT that there is no correlation between sacrifice and the prosperity of his tribe, will the chief relent.
So you see, while it is possible to assign transcendent sources to the most basic of morals, in order for this insight to be applied in the Real World of Life, it must always be combined with the question, “What must we do, to survive?” to find an answer.
I must confess at this point that I fear I may have given Dr Jackson another arrow in his quiver. For after pointing out that the Universal Moral Code is “Do no harm to innocents,” he can ask of a woman contemplating ending her pregnancy, “Must you do this, in order to survive?”
And he very well may be right.
Comment by Chasm | July 14, 2007
This article and Dr Jackson's both suffer from the same false premise: "The only way a metaphysical explanation can stand is if all possible physical explanations do not fully account for an activity. Then, a metaphysical explanation at least becomes plausible." One could just as easily argue the reverse, that "the only way a physical explanation can stand is if all possible metaphysical explanations do not fully account for an activity. Then, a physical explanation at least becomes plausible." When dealing with a part of our common experience of consciousness, I would argue that if either bias is more appropriate, it would be the bias towards the metaphysical. However, I would further argue that if one actually wanted to determine whether morality was physical or metaphysical, their ONLY hope at accomplishing that would be to meditate on it WITHOUT bias.
While a long time ago I speculated on physical bases of morality along the lines of the reasonings in this article, I have long since become intimately acquainted with its actual supernatural basis. Having held both positions, I believe that exercises such as those in Dr. Jacksons article, in which he attempts to "disprove" physical explanations are completely pointless. Until one has knowledge of metaphysical realities, one HAS NO ALTERNATIVE but to cling to physical explanations of all things, regardless of the validity or invalidity of their criticisms. The human mind is more than capable of making any such belief seem rational to itself when pressed. I believe that the kind of knowledge being discussed here can not be gained through debate or proofs, but only in isolated meditation.
Comment by erikmartin | July 14, 2007
Perhaps I'm missing the point here. Mr. Ingles has suggested that there could be an argument made for an evolutionary, purely physical basis for morality. However, this is not the same as proving that morality can only be explained in term of evolutionary theory. Nor is it the same as proving that a divine source of morality is logically contradictory or impossible.
To borrow from his game theory analogy, he has not turned over the first and last cards. He has merely turned over the "Drinking Soda" card and shown that other side of the card could be an adult. To which I reply, "so what?"
Mr. Ingles has done exactly what he accused Mr. Jackson of doing; namely, confusing i.e. with e.g.
Comment by Steve Sabin | July 14, 2007
The fundamental flaw in Mr. Ingles reasoning occurs very early in this essay. He assumes that a divine source for morality is synonymous with divinely imposed morality and then goes on to argue that there is an inherent arbitrariness in the nature of morality when it has origin in the divine. Succinctly, it is suggested that “divine whimsy” makes one thing moral and another thing immoral, while an evolutionary, physical basis for morality suffers from no such problems.
But Mr. Ingles is attempting to solve a problem where no such problem exists.
A divine source of morality does not mandate that morality be “anything the divine declares it to be.” This assumes that God’s omnipotence has no boundaries whatsoever and is instead free to be illogical and arbitrary. There are many things God cannot do. He cannot lie. He cannot contradict Himself. Nor can he – despite the childhood philosophical quandary – make a rock so big that he cannot pick it up.
Could God create a universe in which all existing mathematical and logical proofs hold true except that the natural logarithm of 1 = 1 instead of 0? No. The fabric of mathematics would unravel. Nor could He arbitrarily declare that everything in the universe work precisely the way it does now, except that the acceleration due to gravity has now been divinely decreed as 37 ft/sec^2 instead of 32. It is simply not possible to arbitrarily change one thing while divorcing it from its repercussions.
Mr. Ingles would seem to argue that because “might cannot make right,” might therefore will not make right. But consider this: what if divine might reflects what is right, because it has a perspective that we do not currently have? What if morality that we perceive to be arbitrary, is in fact as much an absolute as the need for pi to be the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter?
We recognize physical laws as statements of the way things are – not as an arbitrary compilation of rules.
Why is it assumed that a moral code, therefore, is inherently any different? What if love is right and hate is wrong simply because this is a statement of reality, not an arbitrary determination that was made with the flip of a divine coin?
That fact that many elements of morality can be argued logically and pragmatically, and justified on the basis of physical constraints, doesn’t do anything to invalidate an argument that declares morality to be divinely inspired. It is not necessary to assume that morality can be “anything God decrees it to be” in order to embrace God as the source of morality.
Comment by Steve Sabin | July 14, 2007
Chasm:
You say that the NK Prison guard’s “only MOTIVATION for cooperating in the torture of the innocent family members of political dissidents is really HIS OWN SURVIVAL.”
What you have just described is what I’ve said happens when outside forces act upon an individual to suppress the expression of the UMC. In Korea, the state indoctrinates/pressures an individual from birth to suppress the UMC, and this “outside force” indeed usually works in such an extreme case. But not always, because even in NK the state must remain vigilant to stamp out any political or moral opposition to its reign that still surfaces in spite of its efforts. So while you are correct in a br