Giving in to aggression might evade a fight initially, but it will not avoid the risk of ultimate slaughter.
A stunning piece appeared in the Spiegel (7/23), a German weekly. It shocked this writer, so it might impress the reader, too. Inevitably, the account carries one from the report’s specifics to implications that are more significant than the original details.
The two-page piece responds to a lawsuit brought against the UN and Dutch soldiers under its command. The plaintiff alleges their responsibility for the Srebrenica massacres.
On June 12 1995, Bosnian Serbs acting for Belgrade captured the Muslim town Srebrenica and massacred seven thousand male captives. “Blue Helmets” protected the town and a safe-zone close to it, sheltering the claimants.
Now Numira Subasic, having lost 22 family members, wants justice for herself and other abused women. That government has already investigated the case and the conclusions cost a Minister his job.
The Dutch UN soldiers were disinterested and incompetent, intimidated as well as mainly concerned with their own survival. Indeed, the UN Protection Force's Dutch troops were unprepared or, put facetiously, they did not anticipate encountering violence.
These attitudes taken from a PC-inspired book of myths inspired the inappropriate decisions made under the pressure of 15 hostages held by the Serbs. One mistake was to avoid “provoking” the easily aggravated by appearing to be too martial. In addition, to signal good will, presumably in the interest of keeping “channels open” for a “dialogue,” the positions before Srebrenica were surrendered. Once the Serbs reached the camp on July 12 and asked to inspect it, the Dutch, presumably to “create confidence,” piled up their arms and admitted the Serbs. Thereafter, lacking the means to resist, they ignored the ensuing marauding. Survivors claim that some Dutch did not even surrender under duress but that they accompanied the Serbs voluntarily. (A famous photo shows the Dutch and the Serbs toasting each other.)
According to survivors, the tolerant Dutch entrusted to protect the refugees feared the Serbs and so became accessories to their crime. Therefore, they did nothing when soldiers led women out of their compound to rape them. A survivor claims that a “Dutch Bat” trooper listened to his walkman while, close to him, a woman was raped. One witness alleges that a ten-year-old was placed in his mother’s lap and then decapitated. In another case, a protector was present when the mother of a crying child was ordered to make it stop. The woman failed. Therefore, the trooper cut the throat of the infant. This writer knows a Moslem rape victim whose child cried when it happened. Thereupon the Serbs urinated on the small girl.
Previously, on July 8, UN troops came under attack. The Dutch Chief of Staff — allegedly on orders from home – refused air support. Protecting the hostages might have been the motive for self-induced paralysis.
Unless the lawsuit is settled discreetly to protect the guilty, its aftermath could become a significant precedent. It will pertain to (1) the responsibility of troops protecting civilians, and (2) define the accountability of international organizations for the failure of national contingents acting under their aegis.
Now, let us turn to the generalizations that transcend the significance of the foregoing. (Keep in mind that in the above the venue and the nationalities are only of marginal significance.)
What follows might not suit some. This writer’s “hard-line” view is shaped by experiences that in all probability the reader did not have for two reasons. They are the fortunate timing and shrewdly chosen location of birth. What follows derives from surviving two systems that killed for a guilt created by defective descent.
The case of the DutchBat’s failure reveals how some articles of faith, thought to be so self-evident that all other cultures are assumed to heed them, are not only wrong but also harmful. Trying to appease an aggressor led here to measures that signaled weakness and cowardice, thereby encouraging a party that was violent by preference. Being “nice” and assuming that others, if handled with kind “understanding” will also be “nice,” only helped the butchers. The Dutch failed to understand that in other cultures violence, such as murder and rape, might play a different role than in their own. (The range is between “effective way to assert claims” and “unthinkable act to be rejected. “) Projecting their own values the Dutch ignored reality because it contradicted their prejudices. This applied political correctness criminalized the Dutch and made them into accessories to murder. Alas, we are not alike and our cultures are not equal — unless one accepts ethically repugnant comportment as being within the pale.
The capitulation of the decent Dutch reduced them to nasty auxiliaries in mass murder. The process raises general questions about PC assumptions and their use in a world their advocates ignore. Besides that, the knee-jerk reaction at Srebrenica points at an even more important issue. Industrial civilization and its open society are besieged. Fending off the attackers is still relatively easy and, therefore, currently it is correspondingly simple to deny the existing threat. In time, when forced to do what many now are determined to avoid, the delayed action will become more costly. The sweat saved now might require rivers of tears later on.
There is – now or later – a job to be done. Regarding that, the performance at Srebrenica is a signal causing concern. What the case demonstrates is a widespread weakness within the Atlantic Alliance. You may call it a symptom of “Eurosclerosis.” In some of the entities that make up Europe, groups with programs built upon the illusionary assumptions that condemned Srebrenica are in power. In others, such as in the USA, they are set to take over.
The described crisis management of the United Nations Protection Force has created only a few thousand local victims. Conveniently, these involved, using Thirties language, a people “far away about which we know nothing.” Meanwhile, beyond their back yard, the Serbian midgets could not threaten civilization. However, other challengers, driven by the same mind-set but representing the elephant class, are rising. If these are confronted with the criminal tolerance shown in Srebrenica, the cost of the errors of those who wallow in their puddles of confusion will be towering.
An unwelcome conclusion for America and Europe emerges. Giving in to aggression might evade a fight initially. However, it will not avoid the risk of ultimate slaughter. Europe’s vulnerability derives from its state of mind, which imperils it and its US ally. The preferred approach of the “progressive humanitarians” of both continents will not even restrain a pre-teen gang. The case presented – the danger, the response and the outcome – suggests that a revision of the approach to global politics is called for. It should conform to the rules the bad guys set and abandon the illusions of an ideal world. Iran, Iraq, Korea, but also Russia and China have a message. It counsels that, a reality-corrected change in the assumptions that determine the assessment of antagonists and the means used to respond to them is imperative.
handlery@sunrise.ch
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