Give freelunch a break. Sure, he confuses methodological naturalism with ontological naturalism a time or 17, but, hey, who wouldn’t? After all, there are a bewildering variety of metaphysical theories based upon a rejection of substance dualism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics#Mind_and_matter

René Descartes proposed substance dualism, a theory in which mind and body are essentially quite different, with the mind having some of the attributes traditionally assigned to the soul, in the seventeenth century.

For freelunch, physical processes knowable by science create the mind. Ergo, he embraces “Materialism Monism” aka “Materialism” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism). But, he has a problem. From the first link:

For the last one hundred years, the dominant metaphysics has without a doubt been materialistic monism. Science has demonstrated many ways in which mind and brain interact, but the exact nature of the relationship is still open to debate. Type identity theory, token identity theory, functionalism, reductive physicalism, nonreductive physicalism, eliminative materialism, anomalous monism, property dualism, epiphenomenalism and emergence are just some of the candidates for a scientifically-informed account of the mind. (It should be noted that while many of these positions are dualisms, none of them are substance dualism.)

Look at that list. I don’t know about you, but I found it impossible to understand what each and every one of these metaphysical schools of thought propose, and, even worse, what their strengths and weaknesses are vis-à-vis all the other metaphysical schools of thought based on materialistic monism.

It’s no wonder freelunch is confused. 99.999999% of humanity would be confused.

Of course, we can fault him when he obliquely interjects elements of ontological naturalism into the debate, but, again, we shouldn’t criticize him too harshly. After all, there’s nothing to debate re methodological naturalism. Once you understand its most primitive tenet (ie, everything is contingent, the ultimate nihilism), what’s there to argue about?

So, he orthogonally interjects elements of ontological naturalism to try to fake us out that his POV isn’t ruthlessly and suffusedly nihilistic. In that sense, he demonstrates a great deal of human compassion even though his intellectual contribution to the discussion is nil.

Restating – "I'm not arguing about metaphysics – that is why I am making a universal metaphysical claim"

Dog chasing tail, saying he isn't.

“Methodological naturalism is contingent on the information available.”

Now about ontological naturalism? If you’re basing your arguments solely on methodological naturalism, then, by definition, there is no absolute morality.

“That is also why I cannot accept the unsupported assertion that there is such a thing as absolute morality. Nothing supports such a claim.”

Again, methodological naturalism by definition rejects an absolute anything.

“There is nothing about this (methodological) naturalism that contradicts itself.”

Of course, it doesn’t. By definition, it doesn’t. Logically, it’s impossible to even form a contradiction in methodological naturalism where literally everything is contingent. Logically, contradictions can be constructed only if one assumes that there is an absolute to reference the contradictions against.

“No one can tell me what this absolute morality looks like, where it came from, why it wasn’t recognized, why it doesn’t seem to be held true in all places at all times.”

You have your belief system, and we have ours. In your belief system, all is contingent. In ours, an absolute is possible.

Let’s talk a little bit about absolute morality, and use the 10 commandments as a basis. The first 3 commandments in the Catholic interpretation speak about God, and the last 7 speak about the human sphere.

Now, I’ll grant you that we can induct analogs to the last 7 commandments using the way evolution operates as a basis. After all, the last 7 commandments are pretty much common sense, and, if one doesn’t try to get too fine, they are pretty much universal.

However, it is impossible by definition to induct analogs to the first 3 commandments. Hence, these commandments are beyond the power of methodological naturalism to add or detract.

We moral absolutists have a major problem, though. We can’t really understand how the perfect can be contained within the imperfect. Our only hope is that, as our consciousness, intelligence, and knowledge evolve, we will eventually understand that the contingencies are chimeras, and that the absolute is all there is.

One last point. In one of your posts, you said, “Society is the source of morality.” Here’s the deal. For “society”, substitute “group”. If so, morality ensues from the group. Thus, group rights trump individual rights. This implies that the individual liberties spoken of in the Declaration of Independence are null and void, and that the basis of the American Revolution is null and void if one believes in methodological naturalism.

Are all methodological naturalists Marxists, then? I think so.

I spoke up about this because Professor Roebuck's original posting and some of my critics appear to have conflated methodology and metaphysics. I am defending the methodology against the erroneous claims that have been made. I am not making any effort to defend anyone's metaphysics. That does not seem to be useful. That is also why I cannot accept the unsupported assertion that there is such a thing as absolute morality. Nothing supports such a claim. No one can tell me what this absolute morality looks like, where it came from, why it wasn't recognized, why it doesn't seem to be held true in all places at all times. With so many unanswered questions about such a simple, absolutist statement, what possible reason would anyone have for accepting the claim that an absolute morality exists?

In your view, society invents its morals as it needs to? I suppose then that morals are subject to a variety of mutable factors.

But wait, isn't it wrong to impose morality on someone? Except of course that the statement itself – it is wrong to impose morality – is a moral precept, one that we seem to be free to impose on others.

Does society decide new morals via the force of law? That can't be, since we can't legislate morality. Of course, "can't" is a moral imperative, and the absence of morality in law is still a moral position being legislated.

Or maybe, do a bunch of us just kinda assent to a new moral position, until society is brought up to speed? For example, if gays decide it is immoral to disagree with them (which, of course, is now happening), they can behave according to their new morality. At some point when society has been softened up, they can lobby the government for hate crime laws, etc. They use the force of government to impose a new morality based on the agenda of their interest group. Is that what you mean?

Or how about that we just let the wisest amongst us determine what is moral? An elite group of ethicists could tell us hapless proletariats what is moral.

But what I don't understand is why I should accept society's morals at all. I think my morals are better. I chose them, I made them up, and after all, there is no absolute morality. You say I should because society works better, but that is a moral judgment that I don't have to accept. And, the word "should" is just another moral imperative.

Maybe you can think of a reason I should accept society's morals, whatever they happen to be, but you'll have to do so without forcing moral absolutes on me.

Yup, let's see how you do.

*** This is a joke, right? When "society" decided to enslave people, then slavery became "moral". When Germany decided to kill Jews, killing Jews became "moral". It's moral to own a private business in the US, but immoral to own a private business in Cuba — both actions being equally "moral".

Morality does not come from human consensus or societal influences. If so, the UN would be the fountainhead of all that is moral.

"LiveFree, Where does 'naturalism contradict itself’?'"

There are 2 sources here: (1) Alan's entire essay; and (2) What follows.

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for Naturalism, the central tenet of Naturalism:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/

“Causal closure” or “Causal Completeness”: All physical effects can be accounted for by basic physical causes (where ‘physical’ can be understood as referring to some list of fundamental forces).

Using this definition, mind, for example, is the effect of electrochemical activity in the organic brain.

Science being inductive, it basically posits that existence (ie, phenomena) precedes essence (ie, scientific theories). Thus, science mandates that:

(1) A priori knowledge is impossible; &
(2) All other intellectual disciplines, particularly mathematics & metaphysics, must be inductive.

Mathematics has succumbed to the naturalists. A mathematical system is deemed ‘true’ if it is internally consistent. Theorems proved within a mathematical system (ie, the conclusions) affirm the ‘truth’ of the axioms (ie, the principles). Again, existence precedes essence.

http://www.mrc.uidaho.edu/~rwells/Critical%20Philosophy%20and%20Mind/Chapter%2023.pdf

The battle to save the foundations is over. The defenders of absolute certainty have long conceded defeat and left the field. Truth now in mathematics, as it has long been in the physical sciences, is contextual. Systems are not certain, they are “relatively consistent” – a term that means ‘consistent within a framework.’

Metaphysics must succumb, too, but that’s another story.

Since new data could invalidate current ‘truths’, naturalism must posit that all ‘truths’ are contingent. How, then, can naturalists contend that naturalism is the only way to acquire knowledge if all ‘truths’ are contingent?

Of course, Alan said it better.

His logical conclusion is inescapable: Naturalism denies itself. To naturalists, the only real truths are phenomena. Concepts are provisional. All concepts are, including the concept that naturalism is the only way to acquire knowledge.

So if a store (part of society) decided to charge moral relativeists twice what they charge everyone else, that's ok?