Accepting Reality Is No Vice, and Being Oblivious Is No Virtue
by Ivan Eland | View comments |
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The obliviousness of the American people, politicians, and press is especially acute when it comes to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
America is an amazing place — one of the wealthiest and freest nations on earth. Yet because Europe has so many more cultures and languages in one contained area, Americans, compared to their European brethren, seem like country bumpkins in their knowledge and understanding of what is happening in the world. Unfortunately, this tin ear for global affairs sometimes afflicts U.S. leaders and media, too.
The obliviousness of the American people, politicians, and press is especially acute when it comes to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, the media, always concerned that they might be branded as “liberal” or “unpatriotic,” portray dramatic improvements in Iraq because of the U.S. troop surge orchestrated by the heroic Gen. David Petraeus. In fact, this portrayal has been so rosy — and so accepted hook, line, and sinker by the American people — that the Republicans will attempt to use progress in Iraq against the Democrats in the 2008 election! In Afghanistan, the press coverage has been more accurate concerning the worrisome resurgence of the Taliban, but the media and the Democrats seem to think that the United States could still win if more troops — U.S. or NATO — are inserted, or if the U.S. were to get its meek allies to put more of their existing forces into battle against enemy fighters. If the American public is deluded over the surge in Iraq, it is simply ignorant of what is going on in Afghanistan.
At the risk of being a “nattering nabob of negativity,” I would argue that the United States is still losing — and ultimately will be defeated — in both of these brushfire guerrilla wars. Others are pointing in the same direction. In an important new book, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq, William R. Polk, who has experienced insurgencies in the field, concludes from history that in the mid- to long-term — absent genocide by counterinsurgency forces — insurgents almost always prevail.
Even after spending $650 billion, more than 4,000 U.S. and allied lives, and tens or maybe hundreds of thousands of Afghan and Iraqi lives on these two wars, many U.S. politicians and most of the media and American public still prefer to avoid the stark reality that it has all been in vain — that is, that the United States is likely to lose both of these never-ending wars.
In Iraq, the violence has declined from peak levels, but actually started dropping even before the U.S. troop surge, primarily because severe ethnic cleansing had separated the warring Sunnis and Shi’a into homogenous ghettos, and because the United States had begun to pay off the Sunni guerrillas to police their local areas and fight the excessively bloodthirsty (and therefore incompetent) al Qaeda in Iraq. More important, evidence exists that the militias in Iraq, like all good guerrilla forces, have patience and are merely waiting until the United States leaves. Even with the surge, violence — although reduced — is still high, and no national reconciliation among the mutually suspicious groups has been achieved.
And it’s likely that none will be. Decades of wars, including the U.S. invasion and occupation, and grinding international economic sanctions have further widened the deep social fissures in what was already one of the most fractious countries in the Middle East. Had the obtuse Bush administration bothered to consult Arabist scholars before launching its ill-fated invasion and occupation, it would have learned that the faction-ridden Iraq, an artificial country dreamed up by the British after World War I, was the least likely of practically any nation in the Middle East to accept a liberal, federated democracy. The level of incomes and social cooperation are too low for a liberal democracy to be sustained. Even if the Iraqi government manages to pass all of the benchmark laws that the Bush administration wants (unlikely, since the president’s council just vetoed a law to hold local elections), the underlying social fragmentation will render such laws mere paper exercises, because no one will honor them. The U.S. troop surge is merely a finger in the dike, temporarily holding back these titanic social forces from clashing in full-blown civil war.
Afghanistan, like Iraq, is naturally a decentralized tribal land. Continued U.S. and allied occupation is merely fueling a resurgence of the Taliban there and radical Islamic elements in Pakistan, a country with nuclear weapons. Coercive U.S. and Afghan government anti-drug efforts are further exacerbating the Taliban’s rise, as poppy growers pay the Taliban for protection. Really, President Hamid Karzai’s role is only mayor of Kabul; warlords control the rest of the country. The media, the American public, and even the Democrats think Afghanistan is a “must win” in the war on terror. Yet Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, the leaders of al Qaeda, are probably in Pakistan — not Afghanistan. To have the best chance to capture or kill these terrorist kingpins, perhaps, for once, the U.S. government should concentrate its efforts and vast resources where they are likely to be.
To achieve such focus on the perpetrators of 9/11, the next president of the United States could actually take advantage of the American people’s apathy toward foreign affairs, cut U.S. losses, and withdraw U.S. forces immediately from both Afghanistan and Iraq — two quagmires that are creating new radical Islamic terrorists in reaction to the occupation of Muslim lands by non-Muslims.
ieland@independent.org
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Mr. Eland begins his appeal to our reason by telling us we are “country bumpkins” lacking in knowledge and understanding of the world and what is happening outside our shores. He tells us the ‘nattering nabobs’ of Europe have a far better grasp than we do, and should be listened to. Perhaps, he is unaware Europe is no more monolithic in its thinking on the war and relations than we are, and their grasp of matters depends considerably on us as a source of information. The idea Europe is somehow superior in its thinking because more fractured and factional is a red-herring intended to sow doubt. It may stimulate perception marginally, but also adds significantly to biases clouding perception. Similarly, his allegation we have a ‘tin-ear’ ignores we also have arguably the most ‘sensitive ears’ on the planet. No country has done as much for and listened as earnestly to its neighbors than has America. All of the really big initiatives to make the world a better, safer place and secure every nation a voice in its affairs began here. He would do well to remember that before apologizing to tin-eared Johnny-Come-Lately’s.
His assertion the media is consumed with dread it may be branded as “liberal” or “unpatriotic” is even more laughable, and that that is somehow skewing Iraq casualty reports too “rosy”. Eland prefaces this argument by first casting aspersions of bias on governmental reports, thereby controlling the terms of debate. Accepting the government’s accounting may have some bias (any attempt at counting casualties and deciding which category to place each is bound to have some bias and depends on nuances of counting), immediately gives Eland the advantage. He neglects to tell us, however, which alternate source(s) he references and what bias it has (and it will). That makes his argument misleading. Assuming he is referencing one of several sources biased against the U.S. government and the war (e.g., Lancet Survey, WHO, ORB, media surveys, &c – most of which are European and therefore allegedly superior), then we know we are talking differences of opinion concerning what are really casualty estimates. There is no reason to suppose these alternate estimates are superior to our own and, in some cases, are clearly determined to count every death (including many who would have died anyway) as casualties. No where does he mention the level of suffering (http://iraqiholocaust.blogspot.com/) and death in Iraq is less (even before the surge) than it was under Saddam. The violent death rate under Saddam (the part we know of) was two to three times higher (http://www.gbn.com/ArticleDisplayServlet.srv?aid=2400&msp=1242) than it has been during the occupation; and the rate attributable to U.S. forces is a tiny fraction of that. Nor does he mention the monthly average of violent deaths are 1/3 what they were for many months prior to the surge. It is true that casualties dipped down just prior to the surge as he says. If you look at any one of several graphs of these casualties (http://icasualties.org/oif/US_chart.aspx), however, you will see it only dipped in relation to sudden two sudden spikes occurring in November 2006 and January 2007. The surge began at the beginning of April 2007 and the overall trend was still upward prior to and for several months into the surge (remember the media criticizing General Petraeus the surge wasn’t working before it had a chance to). Casualties are now at the lowest level they have been since we invaded Iraq in 2003. Keep in mind, our tally includes a number of coalition casualties (both military and civilian) outside of Iraq proper which the rate under Saddam does not.
Eland’s assertion this initial drop has to do with the Sunni and Shia drawing apart belies the overall picture casualties were still increasing. While there may be some truth in it, it cannot have played a very big part. The spikes we see are more likely the anomalies and represent surges by the insurgents. This matches the reportage we had, at that time from many sources (including European), of factional and Iranian efforts to disrupt the transition to self-governance.
(cont.)
Comment by Bob Stapler | March 16, 2008
(cont.)
While it is true Al Qaeda and others may be binding their time for us to leave, that also works against them. The longer we stay and the more Iraq’s current system has time to take root, the harder it becomes for insurgency to later supplant. Eland is also wrong that historically insurgencies prevail and Polk limits his analysis to insurgency post-WWI. The history of European colonization includes many cases of native insurgencies failing to dislodge foreigners. Alexander the Great succeeded not only in conquest, but also in seeding Greek culture throughout his empire. So too did Rome, the Han dynasty in China, Japan in Korea, Bhuddism on the coat tails of Indian conquests and commercial dominance, Islam in its golden age, &c. What has changed is that we no long invade to conquer but to liberate. A liberator does not succeed unless his message is ultimately embraced. If all we sought was conquest, Iraq would now be pacsified. Liberation is harder and takes longer than conquest. Whether or not we succeed in Iraq, therefore, depends on how much our cultural message takes root. There are a number of obstacles to this, but the reception has not been as dismal as Eland paints it.
Finally, while it is certainly true this war is costing us a great deal and people are shifting toward greater apathy, those are not the only considerations. What happens to the Iraqi people if we leave now? Having invaded, with or without sufficient cause, we have an obligation to see this through. Iraq is strategically placed near the heart of the Muslim world and near the epicenter of radical-Islam. Logistic and political considerations make other countries in the region less viable and still more costly as bases for thwarting terrorism. It is not only our security or even our oil supply that is at stake. A pull-out will certainly unleash terrorism both in Iraq and elsewhere, and make our relations with oil producing (and non-producing) countries dependent on us for their security weaker at a time when competition for both oil and demand for security are growing. When calculating the savings of pulling out, we should also add up the costs of doing that.
Comment by Bob Stapler | March 16, 2008