The NIE and Iranian Internal Politics

The December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on the Iranian nuclear program has strengthened radical elements within the Iranian regime and helped Ahmadinejad to consolidate his power.

Since its release in December 2007, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Iranian nuclear program has become the subject of political debate and fierce discussions. Much has been told about its negative impact on US and international efforts to pressure the Iranian regime.

Absent from the debate is the NIE's influence on the power structure in Iran and the outcome of a fundamental transformation which started a few years ago when Ahmadinejad took the reign of command in 2005.

Many observers in Iran believe that the formulation and the timing of the NIE was intentionally designed to achieve concrete political goals mainly related to US internal politics. The consequences of the estimate, however, extend far beyond US politics and directly affects the situation in Iran.  Briefly, the estimate has strengthened the ultra-radicals in Tehran, and the NIE authors bear the grave responsibility of endangering US national security in addition to prolonging the suffering of the Iranian people. 

Strangely, the NIE's misconception regarding the Iranian power structure and its radicalization is a reminder of the “Task Force” report by the Council on Foreign Relations, released in July 2004. This report was the work of the Iran expert elite in Washington.

At that time, the reformers had been ousted from the Parliament and there was a shift in the Iranian power structure towards a more radical faction. While a simple review of the Iranian press would easily inform the observer of this fundamental change, the CFR task force discovered that:

Iran is experiencing a gradual process of internal change that will slowly but surely produce a government more responsive toward its citizens’ wishes and more responsible in its approach to the international community.
– p.13.

Such judgment emanated from CFR's discovery that ". . . the pragmatists appear to be ascendant in Tehran." (p. 19)

Recent shifts in Iran’s domestic political fortunes may facilitate enhanced flexibility and coherence in its foreign policy . . . The pragmatists who appear to be ascendant in Tehran have described dialogue with the United States as a course that is “neither wine, nor prayer” — in other words, neither prohibited nor obligatory.

Resulting from such judgment was the loosening of US and international pressure on Iran and the strengthening of Iran's position in the region, which in turn helped the eviction of Mohammad Khatami and the unification of power under one single faction.

Four years later, the NIE was released at a moment when the dominant faction was faced with a drastic economic crisis and challenged by international pressure. Civil society was reorganizing and many elements of society were demanding a halt to the Iranian enrichment program. The Nobel Peace Laureate was among hundreds of independent activists who braved the imposed censorship on the nuclear issue and challenged the Supreme Leader's foreign policy.

The NIE's release and the subsequent weakening of international pressure were a victory for the Ahmadinejad faction and he in turn consolidated his position. This new development helped the regime silence its critics and eliminated the quasi-totality of rival candidates from the parliamentary election.

While the actual situation in Iran and the monopolization of power by the radical faction is mainly a reflection of internal crisis and the regime's difficulty in curbing popular unrest, the impact of international attitude should not be underestimated.

Two good examples of the Iranian regime's vulnerability could be seen in 1996 and 2002, when in both situations external pressure was able to restrain the Iranian regime. In 1996, Europe confronted Iran over its terrorist activities following court hearings on the Mykonos affair, and the US threatened Iran after its terrorist proxies attacked the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia. The combined international pressure accentuated the popular unrest and the regime was forced to bring in a more conciliatory president.

Then, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the discovery of Iran's nuclear program, the Clerical rulers were faced with unified pressure from the US and Europe. This pressure led to its cooperation on Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran also appears to have halted some parts of its enrichment program in 2003.

There are many in the US who hope for a more moderate Iranian president in 2009. For them, such an outcome will aid the US in lowering the cost of resolving its confrontation with Iran. Apparently, the political will behind the NIE has also been in the same direction. No doubt, the consequences of the report have been the successful in strengthening radical elements within the Iranian regime, and increased the possibility of a dreadful and unwanted war between the two countries.