Seeing through a Glass Darkly: Interpreting Intelligence on Iran and other “Rogue Nations”

 by Brian Melton  

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The only time we will ever have a “smoking gun” is after it has been fired, and the crime has been committed.

Recently Admiral Mike Mullen responded to questions regarding new evidence that Iran is equipping and enabling anti-western terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite announcing that yet another substantial stash of Iranian-made weapons has been found in Iraq, Mullen added (most likely in response to either an actual question or an anticipated one), "I have no smoking gun that could prove the highest (Iranian) leadership is involved in this." Unfortunately, the western world’s naiveté regarding what constitutes a “smoking gun” actively discourages our leaders from responding to a threat until it’s too late.   

If we presume, for the sake of argument, that a country like Iran (or North Korea or Syria) or a group like Al Qaeda is indeed actively attempting to develop or steal weapons of mass destruction or undermine our efforts in Iraq, there are only two logical times for the United States to take some kind of forceful preventative diplomatic or military action: Before a group succeeds or afterward.  While the particular measures must be determined by the specific situation, in general, the sooner the United States acts the better chance it has to minimize any potential loss of life or other damage. I think all would agree that acting in some way to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear arsenal is clearly preferable to figuring out what to do once they announce they have one, or worse, have already employed it. Unfortunately, the media, talking heads, academia, etc. believe that our intelligence services must provide this so-called “smoking gun” before any serious intercession would be justified. As Admiral Mullen observed above, no matter what evidence we find, we never seem to find that all-important piece. 

The reason we never can locate it is that, on the whole, we have a very silly set of unrealistically high expectations for what our spy services can deliver, most of it bred by watching too much television and too many movies. We somehow get the idea into our heads that it’s possible to construct a complete and total image of any given country’s secrets, motivations, and future actions. We think agents like 007 can penetrate every level of an opponent’s operation, learn any secrets they like, and then report back home with some absolutely damning evidence that is not open for interpretation or deconstruction. 

The fact of the matter is that the world of intelligence gathering and analysis is so complex and the evidence available to us so vast and yet so incomplete that there will likely never be a “perfectly clear” picture of what any country is doing or planning at any given time. If an enemy is paying attention at all, there are an infinite number of ways to thwart the best efforts of the best equipped spies and most expensive satellites.  Even if we or one of our allies manages to obtain an important piece of information, there is no guarantee that it will be recognized as such. The small tidbits of “intelligence” we see the media seize upon periodically represent only a tiny fraction culled from the mass of chaff and worthless information pouring into places like the CIA, FBI, and NSA on a daily basis.  This, of course, doesn’t even begin to take into account the fact that most countries also intentionally leak misleading information to enemy operatives. In the midst of all this, how can we expect to instantly identify and act on the “good” while always ignoring the “bad”?  Unfortunately, the only way to know for sure is to wait for the benefit of hindsight, and at that point it may be far too late (as it was with Pearl Harbor). The only time we will ever have a “smoking gun” is after it has been fired, and the crime has been committed.

In many ways, this is a similar situation to what some lawyers now refer to as the “CSI Effect.” Juries suffering from this mental aberration somehow expect prosecutors to be able to reconstruct a case like they do on TV. As one lawyer put it, “They want ‘my case’ to be worthy of an Emmy. They don’t want to be let down and if they are, they won’t convict.” As this and other prosecutors note, CSI is a work of creative fiction. The evidence used in real cases is almost never as clean or as clear as it is on TV, and it’s unrealistic to expect it to be. The result here is that prosecutors lose cases where the perpetrator is clearly guilty, all because some fans cling to impractical assumptions they picked up loafing on the couch.

When applied to foreign affairs, this kind of gullibility can have serious consequences. Many western leaders feel trapped by public opinion and wait for a “smoking gun” to appear before acting. As we’ve seen, this is something that, as defined by popular misconceptions, will never materialize.  As a result, we lose virtually any chance of dealing with a potential threat before it becomes a full-blown international crisis that could literally threaten millions of lives.

Of course, I’m not suggesting that the United States should attack other nations on flimsy or non-existent evidence, only that we have to have a realistic view of what constitutes “sufficient” grounds to “accuse” (as the media insists on putting it) a nation of skullduggery and, if necessary, intervene somehow. I only hope that when our present and future presidents find themselves in this quandary, they will have the intestinal fortitude to make the right decision and act forcefully, in spite of public pressure and political risk. Those are the kinds of decisions that no president wants to make, but that will define a real legacy from the perspective of history.

Foreign Affairs, National Defense

Read more articles by Brian Melton