A Response to Dr. Kerwick’s “Neo-conservatism v. Classical Conservatism” – Part 1

 by Joseph BH McMillan  

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Jack Kerwick denigrates neo-conservatism as a form of Enlightenment liberal rationalism; but Kerwick's embrace of Classical Conservatism, heavily dependent on tradition, offers little improvement.

Whenever I see the word "versus," or its abbreviation "v.," my primitive instinct conjures up a vision of blood on the floor.

Foreman v. Ali – the "rumble in the jungle;" Roe v. Wade; or even my own modest contribution, Freedom v. A Tyranny of Rights.

So when I read the title to Dr. Jack Kerwick’s article, I must say I did expect to enjoy a measure of "brutality" in its conclusion.

The title attaches "Neo" to a lowercase conservatism with a hyphen, whereas it attaches "Classical" to an uppercase Conservatism without a hyphen.

"Game on!" I thought. Who wins?

Now let me admit that there are some subtle jabs thrown into the mix in the article, and its follow up ("Rationalism and 'the Founding' of America"), but nothing that would get the enthusiast jumping out of his seat, and punching in the air. The jabs don’t draw blood, never mind produce a knock-out.

Yet people want a knock-out if possible, or a least a technical knock-out. A win on points will satisfy their appetite for blood only if there is sufficient blood. But I fear Dr Kerwick provides none of these.

At the risk of being unkind, I fear that the article provides a sort of summary of the assumptions underlying each "brand" of conservatism, or Conservatism, without a commentary of the "fight" itself. That's a little like describing the boxing styles of Ali v. Foreman while the match is in process. I don’t want to know their boxing styles, I want to know who is winning.

So, in the absence of a commentary of the actual fight, let me see if I can provide one. In his conclusion, Dr Kerwick says this:

neo-conservatism really isn’t an expression of conservatism at all. It is a form of Enlightenment liberal rationalism, the sort of liberal rationalism in reaction against which conservatism originally emerged and developed as a distinctive tradition of thought.

Now that's a lot of labels to digest: "neo-conservatism;" "expression;" "Enlightenment liberal rationalism;" "reaction;" "a distinctive tradition of thought."

So let me throw the first jab. Dr. Kerwick claims that, "conservatism originally emerged and developed as a distinctive tradition of thought" in "reaction against" . . . "liberal rationalism." Yet, earlier in the article, he asserts that reason, in the Classical Conservative sense, "is the product of centuries of tradition."

That implies that reason is the product of a "tradition" not itself based on "reason." We could then call it "irrational tradition." So what instituted the "tradition" in the first place?

Ironically, as Dr. Kerwick asserts, "a distinctive tradition of thought" as reaction against "reason." But that is a contradiction in terms – a tradition of thought not based on thought, or reason, cannot be a tradition of thought – it can only be a tradition masquerading as thought.

And “tradition” is usually a concept deployed to maintain a status quo, and those seeking to maintain a status quo are inevitably those who benefit from it.

The Founding Fathers are the quintessential example of such inherent contradictions. "Tradition" countenanced slavery, but reason simply could not embrace it. Hence we find Jefferson, otherwise claiming that slaves would have to be deported if liberated, saying this:

For in a warm climate, no man will labor for himself who can make another labor for him. This is so true, that of the proprietors of slaves a very small proportion indeed are ever seen to labor. And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with his wrath? Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice cannot sleep for ever . . . The Almighty has no attribute which can take side with us in such a contest.

Given Jefferson’s aversion to "priest craft," his only appeal could have been to his own reason, or thought, directly challenging the force of tradition he saw all round him, a tradition he, like all those in favor of a status quo, benefited from, perhaps even in a carnal measure.

We could well argue that liberty, or as I prefer to call it, freedom, is endowed by God. But that is not a prerequisite for its exercise. No man of any worth will long submit to the authority and whim of another, even under pain of death. As the Scots declared in 1320, "It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honours that we are fighting, but for freedom — for that alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself."

So if, as Dr. Kerwick asserts, this ideology of Classical Conservative "irrational tradition" can be traced back to, and originated, in Edmund Burke, we find also in this man a determination to advance his own self-interest even in the face of his convictions. He claimed his A Vindication of Natural Society: A View of the Miseries and Evils Arising to Mankind was a satire when it was discovered that he was the author – otherwise his Parliamentary prospects may have been damaged.

He claimed that there were those naturally endowed to govern – thus his opposition to the Revolution in France. He seemed to believe that some people, like him of course, were naturally endowed by their fine upbringing, and time honored tradition, to have some natural authority over others.

I know that that is a very basic summary that probably does not do justice to some of Burke's more informed observations, but it does give a flavor of the paucity of "thought" on which this reasoning of irrational tradition proceeded.

Of course, Darwin and the likes of Herbert Spencer gave biological sustenance to the irrational tradition model of ethics, or morality. As Dr. Kerwick says, for Classical Conservatives, "morality is local, tradition-constituted. Whatever principles there may be, they are the offspring of a historically specific, shared way of life, and not its parent."

Albert Schweitzer wonderfully summed up this thinking. He said this:

By proclaiming developed herd-mentality to be ethics, Darwin and Spencer show that they have not gone to the root of the problem of the relation between instinct and reflection in ethics. If nature wishes to have a perfect herd, she does not appeal to ethics, but gives the individuals, as in the ant- or bee-kingdom, instincts by the force of which they are wholly merged in the society.

But it seems that the Classical Conservative model adds a sort of Animal Farm dimension to the equation – some of the herd are more equal than others, like Burke. Even worse, some of the species don’t even rightly belong in the herd – they are there to serve the herd, or at least the more equal of the herd.

Schweitzer, again, sums up well this attempt to derive morality from tradition: "The fruits of ethics are hung upon the bush of social impulse, but the bush itself did not bear them." So who does bear the fruit? Those, of course, who see themselves, as a consequence of their superior intellects and upbringing, even race, to be naturally endowed with the authority to declare such things.

So much for Classical Conservatism, what of Neo-conservatism, and Rationalism?

Frankly, I see little difference between these forms of conservatism. As Dr. Kerwick points out, they employ different formal assumptions to claim some authority for their position, but the end result is the same – why we should believe as they do.

Reason itself can do nothing. Reason is something that is applied to something else. When reason is applied to assumptions, it is as flawed as the assumptions it makes.

Reason can only be applied to indisputable premises if it is to proceed with any confidence. Let me try and explain the difference.

The basic premises of mathematics dictate that 2 plus 3 is 5. We could call this the law of mathematics. The premise is sound, so the conclusion, or sum, is sound.

Reasoning from assumptions would go like this: assuming that abortion should be illegal, and the abortion rate is x%, then, y number of people are committing a criminal offense by aborting their children.

So what we see in both models of conservatism is assumptions. The Classical assumption is one of "irrational tradition;" the other of "reason" applied in a vacuum. Both in fact are nothing more than applying reason to justify feelings. So far as Classical Conservatism is concerned, Dr. Kerwick acknowledges that underlying assumption. He says this: "Knowledge consists . . . in unarticulated feelings."

Of course, knowledge itself does not consist in anything of the kind. The assumption consists in someone believing that his "unarticulated feelings" somehow endow him with knowledge.

Those who subscribe to the alternative model (or models) do precisely the same. They simply have an "unarticulated feeling" that reason leads to knowledge. But unless the premises upon which reason operates are indisputable, reason leads nowhere. It is simply an exercise in self-delusion, and vanity.

So when it comes down to it, both are simply "banging on the table" [Alf Ross on Justice] that their "feelings" are the more profound, and more reflective of reality.

I won’t bother addressing the Liberal tradition – I have said enough about the nonsense underlying that ideology in other articles, and my books.

So where does that leave us?

I shall address that in Part 2.

Political Theory, Humanities, Language, Academia, Histo

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