The reconciliation occurring in Iraq is largely cosmetic and forced by U.S. pressure.
The media, egged on by John McCain and his campaign, are going to twist the arm of Barack Obama until he cries “uncle” and admits the U.S. troop “surge” has worked in Iraq. So far, Obama has not cracked under the pressure and, for reasons of political expediency, admitted this dubious proposition.
The smart political course of action for Obama — but not the correct one — would be to admit the surge has worked to reduce violence but to observe that that’s little solace after a needless invasion and five-year (and counting) occupation that has cost more than 4,000 lives and about $600 billion. So far, Obama has stuck to the correct, and maybe even charitable, conclusion that the surge is only one of many factors that has reduced the carnage in Iraq.
Using logic, if the U.S. troop surge had been the cause of the diminished violence, then why did the mayhem go up in 2005 when the United States undertook a troop surge of similar magnitude? Moreover, because little true political reconciliation has occurred in Iraq since the surge began, if the additional troops were the cause of the new tranquility, that calm should be evaporating now that U.S. forces are being reduced to pre-surge levels. Yet so far, no spike in violence is occurring. Thus, the logical conclusion is that other factors are likely to have been more important in improving conditions than the addition of more troops.
For example, many experts believe that the prior violent cleansing of ethno-sectarian populations has separated the battling Shi’i and Sunni groups and thus reduced the internecine warfare. Also, the U.S. military finally implemented a true counterinsurgency strategy in which it eschewed killing lots of guerrillas (and civilians collaterally) with heavy firepower and moved toward holding ground and winning the “hearts and minds” of the Iraqi population. One would have thought it would not have taken the U.S. military so long to relearn this lesson after the searing experience of the Vietnam War.
Finally, and maybe most important, the U.S. decided to negotiate with (Moktada al-Sadr and his Shi’i militia) and pay off (the Sunni guerrillas) enemies to get their forces to quit attacking U.S. troops. U.S. politicians, thinking it is not macho to do either, have either downplayed these factors or preferred to refer to the latter by euphemism. The former is especially embarrassing to the politicians because the United States has criticized the new Pakistani government for negotiating with, instead of fighting, the Taliban and other Pakistani militants, while the U.S. government has pursued the same strategy in Iraq with the al-Sadr Shi’i militia. The latter is embarrassing because it is considered wimpy to pay off, rather than do battle, with your enemies.
Make no mistake: paying off your enemies is always a better and cheaper strategy than expending the blood and treasure to fight them. For example, if Abraham Lincoln had offered the South compensated emancipation of its slaves — which he had advocated before becoming president — before the Civil War started, he might have avoided the killing of more than 600,000 Americans (38,000 of whom were African-American) in a war that provided freedom for blacks only in name.
Yet paying off enemies to reduce the violence is not a long-term solution to stability in Iraq. In that part of the world, if you quit making the pay offs or conditions change in such a volatile and fractured society, violence could quickly escalate again. The reconciliation occurring in Iraq is largely cosmetic and forced by U.S. pressure. It is analogous to two sets of parents arranging a marriage between two young people who don’t get along and locking them up in a room together until they like each other. To get out of the room, they will go through the motions of amity, but probably will eventually end up divorced.
If the United States is smart, it will avoid the consequences of the likely future divorce among Iraqi groups and move toward Obama’s tendency to declare victory and start leaving while things are going better. Such a policy would leave a better chance of U.S. forces avoiding the likely coming storm of resumed violence. If the United States wants to give Iraq the best chance of stability in the post-U.S. era, it should use its withdrawal to negotiate a radically decentralized government in which exiting armed militias maintain security in their own autonomous regions.
Above all, the U.S. should avoid John McCain’s conclusion that the surge worked in Iraq and should be tried in Afghanistan. Obama and McCain are engaged in a bidding war to see how many U.S. troops they can add to another lost war in Afghanistan, which has even lower prospects for future stability than Iraq. The Taliban are much more ideological and militant than most of the Sunni guerrillas in Iraq and far less likely to agree to be paid off. Also, the Taliban have a sanctuary (Pakistan) that the Sunni guerrillas in Iraq never had.
The al Qaeda that threatens the United States is in Pakistan, not Afghanistan or Iraq. The U.S. occupation of Afghanistan merely helps al Qaeda gain support in Pakistan. Thus, the U.S. should withdraw all of its forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and concentrate on dealing with al Qaeda in Pakistan.
Republished with permission of the Independent Institute.
ieland@independent.org
http://www.independent.org
Read more articles by Ivan Eland
It's hard to maintain the fiction that the improved situation in Iraq is a cosmic coincidence when even Lanny Davis, the man who still defends Bill Clinton's improprieties in office to this very day, admits the surge was a success.
By the way, dropping the A-bomb on Japan had nothing to do with ending WWII. It was the decision of the Soviet Union to declare war on Japan three days before they surrendered.
See. I can re-write history too.
Comment by Phillip Ellis Jackson | July 29, 2008
The opposition needs to go back to "War isn't the answer" and not try to explain itself any more than that.
Let's see here: aggressive offensives are a bad idea in war, and we should not try to take the fight to the enemy in Afghanistan in a similar manner?
In fact, we should get out Afghanistan and chase terrorists in Pakistan, because that's where they all are.
I'm no military expert, but wouldn't even Mr. Eland realize that the terrorists fled Afghanistan to take refuge in Pakistan because we sent troops into Afghanistan? Will not the terrorists return to Afghanistan once we leave Afghanistan and move our troops/effots to Pakistan?
Even the most inept police department sends somebody to cover the back door when they bash in the front. I certainly hope Mr. Eland doesn't consider himself a military strategist.
The troop surge in Iraq has created a stumbling block for the anti-war gang. It was being sold that we could not win, which is to say we cannot be effective militarily, which of course would be an argument against fighting in the first place. The surge shows military effectiveness.
Let's not forget we were supposed to go down in defeant in Afghanistan. The Soviets failed after years of fighting, and we would fail against the power of the Taliban and lose more soldiers than we did in the Vietnam War, it was said. We overran the Taliban in a bit over three months.
Betting against the capabilitiy of U.S. forces and losing time and again should mean the most vocal of the anti-war crowd ought to think more before engaging the jaw. No chance.
Comment by nick adams | July 29, 2008
Nick: Weren't you paying attention? Eland comes to his armchair conclusions about "dealing with Pakistan" (exactly WHAT does that mean — invade their country and bomb them or just pay them off not to attack us?) by "Using logic". It's why he undoubtedly supported having US troops go into Laos and Cambodia in the 1960s because that's where the enemy was, and why he undoubtedly supported MacArthur crossing into China and using the A-Bomb against them during the Korean War.
Somehow, I think his particular brand of logic would have been against these two actions too. Eland isn't arguing that the surge wasn't successful as much as he's trying to assert that any military action, in virtually any circumstance, is unwarranted, period.
I guess I can understand and appreciate his conclusions. There's absolutely nothing in Eland's view of the world worth fighting to protect or preserve.
Comment by Phillip Ellis Jackson | July 29, 2008
Elland's argument seems to be that 1) it's possible other factors caused the decrease in violence in Iraq, so therefore the surge was unsuccessful. 2) One of these factors involves "bribing" factions, which is not ethical.
It is always the case that political developments have many causes and it is likely the cause–in part–of the current decrease in violance has something to do with private negotations between factions in Iraq. Does Elland, however, really believe that greasing palms could have brought about the current decline in violence–without the surge? The surge and the greasing of palms go hand in hand and while Elland may sniff at unsundary aspects of Iraqi (and American!) politics, the creation of stability in Iraq is hardly a process that can be brought about wholly under US control. What is clear is that without the surge, other factors could hardly could have brought about the current decline in violence on their own.
Elland offers a strange argument against the surge being effective, asserting that 1) because the violence in IRaq isn't returning as US troops are withdrawn, that 2) one may infer they weren't responsible for the decline in violence in the first place. This argument rests on the assumption that force by definition cannot be effective. It is a belief of Elland's, not an argument.
Obama has no plan for Iraq, other than his MOVE.ORG mantra that the war is an utter failure and that the troops should be immediately withdrawn. This was George McGovern's position on Vietnam in 1972 and the stability brought about by the "surge" in US ground engagement in SOuth Vietnam in late 1968 and 1969 was wasted. Rapid American troop withdrawal from 1970-1972 destabilized South Vietnam and congress' reckless cutting off S. Vietnam from support by US air power in 1973 was the final blow. The further collapse of Indochina need not be rehearsed here.
Comment by Nathan Alexander | July 29, 2008
Ivan says that the Surge didn't work because…well, he says it didn't work, and there's really no deeper anaylsis than that. Like all of his articles on Iraq, Mr. Eland screams about how right he is…even though the facts have never supported his position.
And even if the surge is a success…which he grants passingly, it doesn't matter because the war was still a bad idea to begin with. Evan if he is right…so what? In the real world, everybody makes bad choices. It's undoubtably true that getting pregnant at 16 is a bad choice, but by the time you're pointing this out to a new mother…it's now also irrelevant. The issue of if you should becomes moot once you do. And the question becomes not what should i have done…but what do i do now?
Mr. Eland shows his grasp of history by saying "If only we'd have paid the south for the slaves, all that unpleasantness could have been avoided." That's bunk. The south saw their authority as being eroded, and decided to leave the union. War could've been avoided if the South hadn't fired on Fort Sumpter. But this act of needless agression fired up Northern tensions and made war pretty much unavoidable. But why let the facts get in the way of history…when Mr. Eland doesn't even look at facts in the present.
Comment by WolvenBear | July 29, 2008
I am not quite sure what to say in regards to Mr. Eland's bizarre theorems.
Mr. Eland maybe, just maybe, the violence ended because we were killing the "insurgents" with such great facility. It was estimated that there were 25,000 insurgents in Mosul and Northern Iraq before the surge. Now it is estimated that there is less then 1,200.
Mr. Eland, General Petraeus, and his surge were successful because that did the time honored military tactic of taking the fight to the enemy. As in killing them with a great efficiency. Wars are won for many reasons, but the one and most absolute way to know you have victory is to have one of your soldiers standing on his ground and no one is opposing your soldier.
That is what has happened in Iraq. Bribing people never works. You have to have a stick along with your carrot. The carrot was come out and stop fighting we will allow you back into the life structure of Iraq. If you don't we will kill you.
That is what happened. It is very simple live or die. Petraeus knew this and he executed it with brilliance.
Comment by jfking | July 29, 2008
Another exercise in non-logic using feelings instead of facts. Was the surge successful? Facts on the ground make it clear that the surge worked. Is Iraq out of the shadow of anarchy? No! Is it time to leave yet? No. How long should we stay? Tough question to answer. Think of Bosnia, Korea, Japan, Germany, etal. Have we come home from them? No. I would like to see us bring all forces home to address our borders, however there are security concerns that require some presence overseas.
Are we doing poorly in Afghanistan? Depends on where you get your information. From main stream propagandizers on Air Obama we are doing poorly. Interesting that I hear different things from marines on rotation and some correspondents (with actual military background and experience to help them filter what they see) things are much better. Military web sites seem to agree with the correspondents and actual troops so I am inclined to put more belief in these sources rather than the tainted media.
By the way for those interested I have some interesting links and personal contacts.
Comment by Mickey G | July 30, 2008
Mickey,
We are losing in Afghanistan like we were losing in Iraq before the surge. Which is to say, we're having some problems…things aren't 100% perfect, and that's being blown up into "The sky is falling! We're losing."
And I'd love to see your links.
Comment by WolvenBear | July 30, 2008