Duly Noted

 by George de Poor Handlery  

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Elections are not about quotas. Violating agreements. Expand NATO? More "dialogue" instead of action. Security by joining the gang? Real weapons to protect against real foes. EU centralization and its fans. Foreign policy hopes and practical reality.

1. Investors, beware! Russia's rulers violate her financial and political agreements. For details contact BP, Georgia — more of the gullible to follow.

2. The consequences of the crushing of Georgia are still undergoing assessment. Clearly, the comfy luxury of no substantive reaction is one of the most consequential and risky among the imaginable scenarios. Prior to the crisis, NATO decided not to act on the Ukraine's and Georgia's membership. The motive was to spare Russia the supposedly provocative impression that she is being encircled. Looking into the future, the reasons for membership have gained in weight. So did the argument of those who will again plead to reject Georgia's candidacy — with implications for the Ukraine. The argument for keeping Tbilisi out is that Georgia's dowry includes an existing quarrel with Russia while her sovereignty is, as things are, curtailed by her ex-overlord.

3. Putting Georgia under NATO's umbrella also has points in its favor. These are the product of Russia's excesses in responding to Saakashvili's original mistake. This error was that he was unprepared to grant Ossetia the independence from Georgia that he rightly demands from Russia for his own land. Georgia needs protection as her situation is difficult due to her location, size, past status and reduced sovereignty. Still, at the time of the 1949 founding of the Alliance only its North American members were relatively "safe." The worst possible signal to Moscow would be to reject a country subjected to Russian pressure. In this case the sequel will be Kremlin action to have small exposed states (the Baltics?) be dropped by the alliance to pacify Russia in Munich-style. In addition, not accepting Georgia now amounts to an indirect acceptance of Russia's right to a cordon sanitaire in regions that she used to dominate — or wished to control.

4. There is a need to respond to Russia's domineering move in the Caucasus. The preferred answer could follow the fault line separating the alliance's new eastern members from its original Western components. Among the premises of the positions expected, we will find complex interacting bundles of considerations. Direct experience with Soviet domination will be important to explain who will prefer what. The sense of feeling directly threatened is likely to play an important role in shaping attitudes. Add to this that "old Europe" has lived and prospered undisturbed while under the protection of the westernmost member of the alliance. "New Europe" will be asking from these countries something they got used to not having to do even in their own behalf. It amounts to risking standing in the rain and giving up their shelter in order to protect Europe's center and east.

5. The possible reactions to the example and lessons provided by the Kremlin for the world's benefit in Georgia are three. 1. Stand around in torpor and hope that Russia "grows up." 2. Avoid further confrontations and humiliation by preparing for it. 3. Prepare for worst case scenarios by seeking Russia's protection by joining the gang. Expect a number of the pariahs of world politics that need affiliations to exploit this opportunity.

6. For one thing, Russia (the case also fits China) despises the sanctimoniousness of the West. At the same time Russia also covets the West's recognition of her as an equal. However, this recognition, if extended, is an expression of the pharisaic inclination of the West. To say the least, this circumstance greatly reduces the value of the equality that might be formally granted. If forthcoming, Western acceptance will not be an expression of Russia's economic or democratic-political performance. Much rather it will be a concession in response to Russia's demonstration that she pursues her historic goals with the old and proven brutally if need be.

7. The Georgian calamity leaves us with several insights. 1. Events have confirmed the paramount importance of the declining, and by its chief beneficiaries abused and neglected, transatlantic alliance. 2. Protecting Russian minorities in the "near abroad" might be used as an excuse by Moscow to intervene in countries harboring populations that can be declared to be Russian. 3a. The small countries on Russia's periphery can and must do more for their own defense. 3b. The tools of defense in this zone presupposes an inventory of classical weapons that are neglected by the emphasis on asymmetric warfare. These are rockets to fight armored divisions and missiles effective against advanced aircraft. Providing such weapons will expose their supplier to Moscow's massive pressure. The Kremlin will declare the delivery of such equipment to amount to a hostile act.

8. It appears that, in certain quarters, a debate fed by set-aside-mindedness is taking place. The "allocators" of justice ply their trade on the basis of quota placement earned by inborn traits. Some uncertainty prevails among our "guides" whether now a "woman's" or a "Black man's" election has the "correct" priority. Here a really radical idea: the purpose of an election is to select the best person to fit the office.

9. Liberal and internationalist America hopes that Obama's election will make it and the country well-liked. Caution is warranted. Indeed, many America-haters curse Bush because that is more PC than mentioning the country that elected him. Under Obama, the camouflage will fade. That will be as soon as the US does not adopt a policy of retreat and of "change-of-side" the country cannot afford and Obama is unlikely to support. Note that, with the choice of the Vice President, the candidate of change had intended to signal that continuity will play a role in his foreign policy.

10. A new era with more than a usual number of confrontations (Iran, China, Russia, Venezuela, and global Jihad) is ahead of us. How crisis-proof an American candidate for the Presidency might be is, therefore, a matter to ponder. Obama might have the ability to prevent a spat from growing into a crisis by bending as needed. He also shows the promise of getting out of a disagreement by his willingness to "lose feathers for peace." In some cases, depending on the adversary, either approach might serve the country and those sharing its way of life, adequately. There are, however, challenges that need to be met resolutely. In this case the firm "no" must be believed because of prior performance and the personal record of the President. This is the situation in which Obama is likely to do badly. You cannot get yourself out of a quarrel in which the other side seeks your great capitulation by going through a series of little surrenders. (N.B. Regarding "losing feathers": it is better to be the "plucker" than the "pluckee.")

11. Theoretically, there might be instances in which dozens of calculated appeasements might convince extremists to modify their goals and to revise the use of their means. This is guaranteed not to work if the fanatics have an ideology that declares the enemy cowardly, weak and predestined to submit. If this is the case, patient moderation and the attempt to reason is interpreted as the proof of the correctness of what their worldview says about the enemy. The logical result is heightened extremism and confirmed contempt. (P.S. North Korea's interrupted disassembly of her decrepit reactor anticipates the outcome of the US' elections. This makes it a concrete case that supports the generalization.)

12. Can one be a good person, a good European and an opponent the EU? The answer depends partly on how these terms are defined. Mainly, however, it depends on what the EU set out to be and what it is now and, furthermore, what its movers — not its citizens – wish it to become. As implied, the writer sees in the EU an organization created to protect the independence of the region's small states and even more its multitude of peoples. From what? From the forces of centralization. These desire to impose their own order by obstructing those forms of existence that history has created.

13. The EU, as defined by "Brussels," is the project of those who are frustrated because the dull masses are reluctant to follow them. An added attraction of the vision is that Brussels gives away jobs that pay well and confer bureaucratic power upon those who could not get it from their people.

14. One more thing! The show in Denver is over. One has to tip one's hat to acknowledge the dazzling fireworks produced there. However, fireworks dim as quickly as they burst. It is the less glamorous searchlight that can cut through the night. Significantly, Denver has failed to leave us with a beacon.

Culture: General, Foreign Affairs: Europe

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