I apply your standard to you, sarcasm fully engaged, and you miss it completely. Your world view, full of moral judgments, is only different from mine in particulars, not application. Irony is often lost on the ironic.

“I do not hold them tightly.” Now that is funny. 20 comments in and your fighting for your rhetorical life, and you are not holding them tightly? More irony.

What is clear from your paragraphs is that you have come nowhere near understanding what I mean when I talk about the meaning of being a person of principle, knowing one’s weaknesses and strengths, and recognizing that one must rely on others to point out where one might be fooling one’s self. This all is a bad thing somehow. Instead, you thow out perjoratives like “fundamentalist,” engage in the logical fallacy of appealing to authority (Descartes) to convince yourself that you can figure out if you are deceived or not. Apparently, no one else is needed. Fine for you, not for me. I don’t trust myself.

I figured that sooner or later the veneer of civility would disappear from your presentation. Reading conprehension dissolves, tangents develop, and suddenly, here we are at an impasse.

It was fun, but not anymore.

Don’t you think it’s kind of funny, as I do, that after all your bluster about not being like jihadists, you turn right around and agree that to hold tightly to one’s beliefs, as you acknowledge that you do, is to be ‘just like jihadists’?

Would an observer’s ridicule, directed toward Mountain Man, be justified, when after all I’ve said about avoiding moral certitude, the best response you can muster is that I’ve constructed a certitude of my own, and that to have this certitude is bad, since it’s ‘just like the jihadists’? Has there ever been a more blatant self-indictment?

Let me be clear: I am not certain that my views are the best, and I do not hold to them tightly. That’s why I subject them to critical analysis, both from you and from myself. I could be wrong that moral certitude is dangerous. If I can make any contribution to this exchange, let it be this: one can either allow for the possibility that they might be mistaken, or not. One can either view the subjection of beliefs to revision as a virtue, or not. One can either view self-criticism as an indicator of intellectual maturity, or not. One can either close the door to thoughtful consideration, or leave it open.

No, being compared to jihadists is not a compliment, really, or you wouldn’t have tried to attach the comparison onto me. Hell, I may actually be just like a Jihadist – I’ll look into it. You, however, flatly reject the comparison, and will not look into it. You’re offended by the comparison because you are certain that your fundamentalism is very different from that kind of fundamentalism.

Which makes your comment about the nature of deception all the more ironic; one really doesn’t know when they’re deceived. Descartes’ contribution on this front is worth revisiting. Introspection, as Descartes demonstrated, happens to be the very thing that helps you figure out if you’re being deceived. It has nothing to do with different ‘brands of introspection,’ as you suggest; introspection just is what it is. It’s not surprising that you’re so resistant to the idea. It’s heavy stuff.

Anyhow, it’s quite clear from your paragraph about what my ‘real problem’ is that you are nowhere close to understanding my arguments about certitude versus flexibility. Your missing the point may have more to do with my inability to state my thoughts clearly than with your inability to grasp them. One thing I can say, however, is that people who are really interested in learning – more than in defending – rarely have trouble understanding what is under discussion. They want to know.

1) I said nothing about giving consideration to the ‘many interpretations and opinions out there.’ If you want to understand what I meant, you wouldn’t make up stuff like that.

2) Nor would you have interpreted my statements as asserting that a ‘real thinking person makes judgements about nothing and accepts everything.’ That’s pretty much the opposite of what I wrote. Read what I wrote, not what you want me to have written.

3) My exact words were: “I’m very hard and fast regarding murder, but not very hard and fast regarding killing.” You imply that I think people “should walk around all day wondering if murder is really wrong.” Do you have any appreciation for the difference between ‘murder’ and ‘killing’? Did you notice that I drew the distinction?

Thanks again for your comments. They are definitely helping me sharpen my iron.

For some reason you value only your brand of introspection. I suppose because I don’t walk around all day wondering if murder is really wrong, or if lying is ok if the Nazis are coming for my family, then I’m not introspective enough for you. OK, fine. You win.

Perhaps you do not understand the nature of deception: If you’re deceived, you don’t know it. No amount of introspection will change that.

It seems your real problem is that there are so many grey areas, so many points of view, so many interpretations and opinions out there, they all apparently should receive equal weight and equal consideration. Certitude, on the other hand, is viewed with suspicion. No one can be so sure about things. That isn’t nuanced, it isn’t open-minded, it isn’t LIBERAL.

However, a real thinking person, a truly evolved personality, apparently makes judgments about nothing, accepts everything, and can be pursuaded about anything. Except certitude, of course.

Ironically, you have constructed for yourself a certitude of your own, colored by your own preconceptions, tailored to your worldview, and just as tightly held on to as mine. You too are just like jihadists.

I’m not comparing you to jihadists, I’m comparing your commitment to your beliefs to the jihadists’ commitment to their beliefs. It’s fundamentalist certitude that I’m pointing out, not you individually.

And we’re both thinking people. Come on. I appreciate that you don’t readily suffer fools or ‘contenance’ thoughtless people, and only want to sharpen your iron with those who are wiser, more moral, and overflowing with virtue, but dude, you’ve been writing a lot these past couple of days, so I know you don’t really think I’m not a thinking person. I’m trying to avoid personal insults, you should try, too. On the other hand, I also realize that it’s kind of gratifying to take a jab at a liberal, so I don’t really mind that much. I know it’s fun. But I’m more interested in the comparison of ideas, say, the idea of morality…

‘Morality itself cannot change, by definition,’ you say. I would be very interested in reading what you have to say about what you mean when you use the word ‘morality.’ I think you’re using a very broad term to refer to very specific kinds of actions. What is it about morality that makes it unchangeable?

Should we make a distinction between the ‘unchangeability of moral obligation’ and the ‘changeability of moral structure’?

Do you think a distinction can be drawn between action ‘tokens’ and action ‘types,’ that is, the act of killing someone at a specific time and place (token) versus capital punishment in general, murder in general, over time, etc. (types)? It seems to me that the very reason we have different classifications for types of killing is because killing is wrong in some situations, and we call that ‘murder,’ while killing is right in some situations, and we call that ‘capital punishment.’ The act of lying, I think, is wrong in most situations, but is right in some situations, say, in order to protect a child from a kidnapper. But you must realize that I’m talking about very specific instances of lying and killing; it would be a mistake to jump from saying that someone who thinks this way about specific action tokens necessarily does so for all action types, and so that person is therefore untrustworthy or morally irresponsible. In speaking only of act tokens of lying and killing, nothing has been said about act types such as doing business or abiding by the laws of marriage. Although claiming that what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in terms of specific act tokens at specific times appears to establish a more general principle of ‘moral relativism’ to act types, it does not establish that, so there is no good reason to think that this principle will necessarily lead to dishonesty in business or infidelity in marriage. Quite the contrary, and this is the broader point, namely, that each situation (each act token) demands awareness, vigilance, thoughtfulness, and a sensitivity to the complexities of life’s situations; automatic aherence to simplistic prescriptions for types of actions may prohibit an individual from fulfilling their moral obligations in regards to certain action tokens. I would argue that human relations would improve if people approached ‘morality’ with this type of hightened sensitivity.

You have framed morality as a matter of core belief that must not be compromised or be determined in any way by contextual demands. All I’m trying to point out is that life is so complicated that it requires us to be careful, and being careful means making sure we’re not behaving as moral automatons, but as attentive persons attuned to life’s complexities, responding to them in a spirit of humility and thoughtfulness.

It isn’t problematic that you won’t compromise your core beliefs, say, in that situation where someone wanted to kill you (though I’m not sure what your core belief in this situation would be), but I do think it would be problematic if you weren’t willing to subject your core beliefs to critical self-analysis at the theoretical level, say, to consider whether they might call for refinement. This is what I’m saying certitude prevents.

In regard, then, to reason, while I don’t think it should be held up as the final arbiter for human behavior, I do think it’s a good place to start. It helps us appreciate crucial distinctions. Perhaps you could explain to me, for instance, how you see the distinction between ‘intrinsic virtue’ and ‘value.’ More specifically, do all actions have moral value? If they do, would we be able to attribute a value judgement to the use of reason? Would the use of reason then have ‘intrinsic virtue’?

I am not ‘committed to reason’ in the sense that you’re using it. The use of reason does not equal for me what your ‘core beliefs’ equal for you. While I do see it as a useful methodology, it doesn’t make sense to treat it as some sort of all-encompassing, obligatory moral principle. Therefore I will allow for some irrationality, and only seek to be mostly reasonable, and though I’m very hard-and-fast regarding murder, I’m not very hard-and-fast regarding killing, as I explained earlier. But I am committed to abiding, as well as I can, by the guidelines of reason and logical argumentation when engaged in philosophical debate.

To rely on others – to whom you grant permission, of course – to ‘call you down at any time,’ is not to engage in introspection. My question is, do you ever call your own self down? Awareness of one’s fallibility is not the same as taking action to curb its effects.

And about quoting you out of context, sorry about that. But no, context isn’t everything, to answer your question. When I say that some actions are right or wrong depending on their context, I’m thinking of ‘context’ as roughly synonymous with ‘temporal-spatial situation.’ Quoting somebody ‘out of context,’ unfortunate as it is, is more of a literary situation.

“…there are many different opinions (right or wrong) about what it means.” That’s true, but that doesn’t change the fact that morality itself cannot change, by definition. If morality is changeable, subjective, or negotiable, it ceases to be morality, by definition. “Thou shalt not kill” is a moral precept that is not hard to understand. Therefore, I shall not kill. What governments do, or soldiers, or prison officials when they carry out the death penalty, those are separate matters. But murder is always wrong. Therefore, I do not murder.

“…you have a starting point for debate that provides you with no way of knowing when you’re mistaken about certain matters.” You cleverly shift my words into something I did not say. When I said, “There is no particular intrinsic virtue to arriving at a conclusion using reason,” notice I did not say that reason has no value. I qualified it in terms of the foibles and limitations of individual minds. Reason is simply a logical process, based on one or more premises, used to arrive at a conclusion. If those premises are faulty, even flawless logic will yield a faulty conclusion. This ought to be fairly obvious.

You quoted me as saying that morality is uniquely individual, which is quite correct in context. The full quote: “Morality is uniquely individual, but morals can be expressed corporately, (i.e., in societies, governments, and corporations). However, only individuals can be immoral or moral. Governments and businesses are simply tools that express the morality of the individuals who hold power within them.” So, the context is that only people can behave morally, governments and corporations cannot, for they are not moral agents (people who can choose right and wrong). Context is everything, isn’t it?

“It seems like principles and beliefs are the very kinds of things that should be up for negotiation – reasoned negotiation…” It’s problematic that I will not compromise my core beliefs? What compromise could there be with evil? Someone bent on murdering me, maybe I should say, “Hey, let’s sit down and discuss this. Would you accept maybe just cutting off my leg instead of killing me?”

If a person will compromise their core beliefs, then that person has no core beliefs. You are committed to reason. Will you compromise on reason and allow a little bit of irrationality? So then you are only mostly reasonable? How hard-and-fast are you regarding murder? Will you murder given the right circumstances? How about cheating on your wife? Lying on your tax return? After all, there could be mitigating benefits that outweigh the small compromise, right?

I haven’t shut the door on introspection. Because I know I am a fallible human being, and painfully aware of this fact, I have established relationships with men I respect who have permission to call me down at any time. You are not one of those people. You might try to suggest to me that it’s ok to keep the wrong change given to me by the store clerk, but stealing is always wrong. You have no moral authority to insist otherwise.

Especially since your morality is negotiable. That means that tomorrow your morality might be different. Some clever person my employ flawless logic with you that justifies behavior that was unacceptable the day before. And you think my unwillingness to compromise my core beliefs is a problem? Really?

I submit to you that I would rather negotiate with a person who I know is honest, trustworthy, and means what he says. I know that such a conversation will be productive. “As iron sharpens iron, so one man sharpens another” I will only obtaining sharpening from those who are wiser than me, more moral, and overflowing with virtue.

But moral relativists, who could trust them? Who would enter into a business arrangement with them? Who would trust them with their lives?

I resent being compared with a jihadist. Murders, women abusers, haters. That’s what holding on to core values means to you? I thought you were a thinking person, I guess I was wrong.

I looked through the posts from one of the links in your last comment. You are an enthusiastic debater!

I want to clarify this matter of context and morality. You have argued that ‘morality doesn’t change,’ but I think the word ‘morality’ is too vague, since there are many different opinions (right or wrong) about what it means. In terms of ‘right actions’ and ‘wrong actions,’ my argument is that an action that is ‘wrong’ in one situation may be ‘right’ in another situation, so that leads me to believe that morality is not context-independent. You raised the context of legality, and to that I would agree with you that what is legal (prostitution or slavery) is not necessarily right. As you know, there are many, many other kinds of contexts other than legality. In this sense, hypotheticals with potential moral ambiguities do, in fact, highlight the difficulties with trying to maintain a single standard for right and wrong in all situations. Even though one of the Ten Commandments instructs us not to kill, we still do it under certain circumstances. Killing is wrong in some contexts and right in others. There is no universally applicable ‘moral’ standard that can be applied to killing, and I think this helps us understand the problems with oversimplifying the moral code.

One thing that has emerged in reading your posts is that you seem to think that ‘morality’ is a simple issue. It may be simple for you, but there’s no reason to think that just because it’s simple for you then it should necessarily be simple for everybody else. I will say more about this in a bit…

But first, some general thoughts…

Logical consistency is something very few people maintain. I definitely include myself here, so it doesn’t seem honorable for me to point out someone else’s logical shortcomings when I have plenty of my own. But what I can do is look for errors in thought patterns, deductions, inductions, etc., wherever possible, regardless of their source. Anyone who critiques the ideas of someone else opens themself up to criticism of the same kind, so that they make themselves vulnerable to being guilty of the very same errors they point out elsewhere.

Having said that, I must take issue with your approach to logic and reasoning. After a few days of reading your comments, both here and from other posts, it has become clear to me that you have a starting point for debate that provides you with no way of knowing when you’re mistaken about certain matters. Here’s what I have in mind…

If you start here: “There is no particular intrinsic virtue to arriving at a conclusion using reason.”

You allow yourself to make assertions like: “If morality can be changed, it is not morality,” while also claiming that “Morality is uniquely individual…” [from 6/27/07].

And you end up here: “What we are talking about here is principles, core beliefs, the things that are not up for negotiation.”

This seems very problematic. It seems like principles and beliefs are the very kinds of things that should be up for negotiation – reasoned negotiation, that is – so that fallacious principles or untenable beliefs can be adjusted.

By shutting the door to further introspection, you completely close yourself off from ever being able to know if you’re wrong. Defiant certitude is the easy way. Reasoned negotiation is the difficult way.

I’m not impressed by peoples’ ability to speak to a host of political and theoretical issues when they do not accept from the outset that they might be wrong about a lot of things. If their starting point is, “Reason should not guide our decision-making process; morality is absolute, unchanging, and self-evident; people are unable to improve their character (only God can do that); if I think I know something is true, then the matter is settled, I know it’s true and won’t change no matter what,” then not only is there no debate, but there is also very little chance that someone who holds these views would make much progress in terms of continually refining their belief system. It is a recipe for intellectual stagnation.

Jihadists are ‘grounded in their beliefs and committed to their core principles,’ which is the very reason why a popular prescription among some conservatives for dealing with them in large numbers involves the use of force; these people simply can’t be dealt with.

Consider the possibility that those who are the most self-assured about the rightness of their beliefs are the very same ones who cannot be negotiated with.