Institutions which depend on contracts from the government for their existences must face the fact that they have become de facto government agencies with government employees.

I was recently fired.

In most cases, there would be nothing particularly newsworthy about this. Every day thousands of people are told to leave their jobs for one reason or another. In these times, dismissals are often connected to the current financial crisis. It's a convenient excuse. However, this was not the case with me. As a matter of fact, my employer had plenty of money. They had so much money that they wanted to give me a gift. It was my refusing to accept the gift that resulted in my being fired. This is why I think my case is somewhat unique.

So who was this wealthy employer who was willing to give me a gift worth thousands of dollars? It just happens to be the biggest employer in the U.S. That's right. I worked for the U.S. government. Actually, that is only half right. I worked in Afghanistan for an NGO that is connected to the U.S. government through grants and contracts. But about that gift.

The gift was in the form of a consultant. I was told that I would be given a consultant to help me write the Medical English curriculum for Kabul Medical University. There was only one problem. I had already finished writing three-quarters of the curriculum so it seemed a little late to be giving me a consultant. Besides, with 30 years of international teaching and curriculum writing experience under my belt, it would be unlikely that a consultant, with less experience than I, would tell me much more than what I already knew. I, in fact, thought it was a great waste of taxpayer money. I told my boss that I thought a consultant would only get in the way. This was what got me into trouble.

My boss smiled at me and shook his head as if I were a naive child. Apparently, I had not understood. The consultant was a gift, he explained. This person was there to help me along not to get in my way. Surely, I would agree to accept this opportunity I was being given. Something in his insistence made me uneasy until it suddenly became clear where this was all coming from.

Let me explain. The characteristic that connected most of the Americans and Brits that I worked with was that they were anti-U.S. government types; individuals who, in younger days, had adhered to the ideals of fighting the establishment and protesting against the war in Vietnam. As their bureaucratic careers developed, however, pragmatism gradually replaced idealism until one day they found that they had become the establishment they so despised. This was a discomforting realization, to say the least, and, for psychological stability, the guilt it caused had to be circumvented through a certain form of self-deception. This was accomplished by speaking against the U.S. and the war at any opportunity. Like criminals who had participated in the same crime, it was this guilt that bonded my co-workers together. Besides, as NGO employees, they didn't really work for the government, did they?

In any event, the remnants of the ideals that they clung to could not be totally abandoned, since it was axiomatically clear to these NGO bureaucrats that it was the particular moral stance that emerged from these ideals which elevated them above all others of differing viewpoints. With this conviction and with the righteousness it engendered, it was easy for them to conclude that any actions they performed were not to be questioned, since the principles which guided their lives were unassailable. Thus, helping a fellow colleague with a stint as a consultant was simply a way to support others who held the same moral position as they did and, thus, justified any expense. In this light, my refusal to accept a consultant who bore their moral stamp of approval was seen as a rejection of morality.

Bureaucrats gain control of government programs by feeding on ideals. No doubt the program I was involved in began, as most do, as an attempt to reflect the sincere ideals of the American public. However, when bureaucrats implement programs, ideals are their first victims. This is because bureaucrats are interested in a somewhat different ideal; that is, doing whatever it takes to justify and protect their own roles within the program. The program no longer exists to fulfill the ideal, but to give them benefits. The program becomes the end in itself. Its continued existence equals their continued existence. To this end, a certain type of organizational structure is established which minimizes any risks to the bureaucrats running the program and the program itself. Buffers are put into place. For government organizations, risk is minimized by farming out the ideal to other organizations, like NGOs, that will "take the fall" if something goes wrong. Risks to management are minimized by delegating responsibility to other individuals. Consultants are valuable in this respect. They can easily be blamed if problems arise.

This self-preservation ethic leads to increasing organizational size and a corresponding growth in government. The larger the organization, the less likely it is that the original ideals generating programs will be attained. In fact, attaining these ideals would be counterproductive as this would result in the termination of the program. Organizational inertia is the ultimate result and the actual goal of all bureaucrats. Such inertia among government institutions has led to what I refer to as the fossilization of America: a growing loss of governmental flexibility and efficiency due to the structural rigidity of the organizations that support it.

Fossilization, as reflected in government growth, is not easy to measure since grants and contracts given to universities and NGOs are not usually included in such measurements. Yet, such grants and contracts are simply an attempt by government to hide its own morbid obesity from the American public. Institutions which depend on contracts from the government for their existences must face the fact that they have become de facto government agencies with government employees. Hiring workers who may be outspokenly anti-government does not alter this situation.

Once established, programs tend to persist because good bureaucrats know how to build in safeguards to prevent their termination. Thus, any attempt to slow such government growth by using normal political channels is doomed to failure. Rallying public support against big government will meet with other obstacles. As more and more people become directly or indirectly dependent on government money, fewer are willing to risk taking actions which may eventually affect their own lifestyles. This complacency is intensified by the normal human desire for a stable life and most workers are quite willing to follow the necessary rules, accept institutional inadequacies, and ignore withered ideals to attain it.

That said, all people, no matter how practical they may be, have an ember of idealism in their makeup. This ember begins to glow in the presence of truth. In other words, people inherently understand the difference between right and wrong. Charismatic, idealistic leaders have always made practical people confront and often reject a comfortable lifestyle for some greater principle. In fact, the average government worker may have a comfortable job without any psychological benefits. They may even find that they are suppressed, though bureaucratic design, by the very ideals they may have at one time supported. In this state of existential angst, they may subconsciously long for an idealistic leader who will fan those many embers of idealism into flames. They may secretly live in the hope that a fire of devastating purification will rise up to revive them. So it is that big government must be confronted. However, bureaucrats, who may once have been idealists themselves, are well aware of the power of idealism and are quick to stamp out any fires it may start. They know that every idealistic act has the potential to ignite a rebellion.

The last I heard, my former boss was working on the grand opening ceremony for a new computer room at a university in Kabul. All the important bureaucrats from other NGOs and the Afghan government were invited to attend. There would be banners, high-tech demonstrations, and abundant food for all those attending. It does not matter if the event is successful or not. A report will be written which will claim that it was. The process of writing a report is the process of self-glorification. Boiled down to its essence, the report is saying: "See what I did? See how useful I am? I hope you will let me keep my job."

There were always more reports generated than anyone could possibly read. Indeed, this situation would serve as a good excuse to form a new department which could extract the key information from all the reports and pass it on to Washington. It could be called the Office of Reporting on Reports, but that would not sound bureaucratically vague enough. It would be better to refer to it as the Office of Information Assessment. That way, no one would really know what the people within it were doing. But what would it matter if they really didn't know what they were doing? So much the better. It would give them a good excuse to hire some consultants to help out. For in the end, there is always an excuse for more government and it is why bureaucrats are such a prolific species.