In a departure from DN's usual format, this installment is devoted to the affairs of a single region and it will essentially examine only one single issue.

The problems of central and east central Europe were significant among the causes of the last two world wars. ("The last two" is a deliberate phrasing.) This rendition is unlikely to conform to what you have been taught in  school. The West's awareness, and the publications there, try to avoid "complicated" presentations. Therefore, Frances's "revanche," the compensatory drives of the "Kaiser," and then Germany's frustration for having lost too much, as well as Mussolini's annoyance because Italy had not gained enough, finally French-British appeasement of insatiable aggressors, stand in the foreground. Admittedly, only a fool would question the importance of these factors. The complaint is that by ignoring further fitting components, the historical picture presented becomes skewed. So are, accordingly, some of the contemporary analyses of the "Asia" (implying "unimportant" and "primitive") that, according to an old phrase, begins at the eastern city limits of Vienna.

Regardless of the full merits of the above point, eastern-central Europe's unresolved issues complicate regional affairs. Therefore, the stability of a preferably ignored  zone that is inserted between great powers is ignored. Consequently, dealing  with that region demands an ability to tolerate frustration. Non-coverage is one of the reasons. The other one is that the news presented to the global public is often distorted. In this case, ignorance finds its ally in prejudice. Finally, the news, if presented, is frequently bad and of little interest to the ultimately affected outside world. Keeping silent in the face of disinterest is, therefore, often the annoying lot of the commentator.

Regarding that  disinterest and bias, the narrative should be broken to illustrate the point. Take this case. A major American daily prints a long piece by a politically engaged native of a country in central Europe. He does so under the label of an impartial scholar. That status is exploited to make allegations that are, at best, debatable. A corrective response is contemplated. The endeavor is  hopeless. One episode of the discussion about "what is to be done" stands out. The person is a professor, and has also been one at a famous American  university. In addition, the man is a parliamentarian.

Furthermore, he has served a term as his country's Foreign Minister. After that, was an  ambassador — in Washington. You would conclude that, at least for the sake of curiosity, a measured note from his pen would be honored by inclusion into the letters-to-the-editor section of the paper. As in the case of other instances with other leading publications, there has not even been a notice of thanks and a brief rejection claiming lack of space.

Regardless of the official dogmas of the opinion-making  establishment, in recent weeks, several positive regional developments have taken place. In part, these are the result of elections. The events, if there is a follow up,  point to a trend. They suggest the smoothing of old enmities that distract from attending to burning and soluble problems. Add to that the realm of the economy. Attitudes are changing. From the strategies to attain welfare by extracting it from rich countries, the move is to creating wealth on one's own. Breaking with a temptation of the past, several countries of central Europe have decided to participate in the wealth-creating process rather than to draw benefits from the international welfare-system that the EU is not entirely reluctant to operate.

Oddly, the  rapprochement of countries separated from each other by their common boundaries and by their shared ethnic groups, begins to unfold against the prediction of the pundits. Recently, in Slovakia and in Hungary, nationally oriented democratic conservatives have taken power. Cautious speculation might foresee that Romania's Basescu could continue to grow to fit the pattern fully.

Especially in the case of Hungary, the negatively conditioned foreign press has predicted the worst. This forecast had its roots in the propaganda needs of the well-connected Socialists and the gullibility of foreign  journalists. The latter like to rely on leftists as their informers, rather than on the facts. Describing the new Premier Orban as a "Fascist" ignores that his two-thirds majority represents the disillusionment with the cleptocratic Left which, ruling by the right of birth, resents its rejection. It also overlooks  that there is, alongside unrepentant Communists, a "wrong right." With its  advocacy of a "Hungarists work-state" and the castration of undesirables, it has now become the government's most significant and loudest opposition. No wonder, as this movement considers Orban to be part of a "Zionist-KGB conspiracy" that must be "exterminated." The story about a Nazi and anti-Semitic take-over through Orban that the Socialists and their "Liberal" allies propagate holds true in one case only: if one agrees that anything that is not left of Joe Stalin is right-wing extremism.

"Sound mind, warm heart, cold blood" is the policy to follow, advocates Orban. Yes, the man is proud and sensitively independence minded. Therefore, he sent
the IMF home. The disagreement pertained not to the demand for spending cuts. Even without the IMF, Hungary agrees that a tightening and a cleaning up as
well as a tax cut are necessary. A flat tax is in the political pipeline. It was the IMF's insistence that it determine the details of deficit reduction that caused the disagreement. The PM claims that he is committed to  face the inherited mess and that he shall do so without cooking the books as had been the case elsewhere. Fudging due to the bitterness of the medicine is also out under the promised economic policy. Sharing the underperformance with 22 other states is no excuse. Although it does not want more IMF money, Budapest is confident that it will reduce the red ink to 3.8% of GNP. At the same time, it is found to be notable that Romania is allowed to have a deficit of 6.8% GNP and gets much more IMF support than Hungary, had it not been punished, could have received.

Regardless of the writer's long-standing reservations regarding Hungary's economic policies, the above seems to be a step in the right direction.

There is other good, in this case even joyous, news. Overcoming the spat with Slovakia's new government regarding the citizenship the Magyar minority seems to be in the making. The absurd language-use law of the  previously ruling Slovak ultras is discreetly steered toward oblivion. The fate of a suit will be telling. A Magyar village's amateur theater advertised a Hungarian play to be performed in Hungarian. Doing so, the organizers failed to carry on their flyer the required amount of information in Slovak. They were fined and went to court.

Ms. Radicova's government is a coalition. The Hungarian party "Hid-Most" (the Magyar and Slovak words for "Bridge," is part of the government. The new governments appear to inch toward cautious cooperation as fast as their peoples can be calmed to accept it. Meanwhile, the politically like-minded governors find that they assume comparable positions. Bratislava, like Budapest, has also asserted its economic independence. It did so by refusing — in a vote of 69:2 — to pay a large contribution demanded by Brussels to bail out Greece. Even if the EU has a "no bail-out rule," Slovakia's resistance is called a "lack of solidarity" by the angered centralizers.

Concurrently, Orban and Romania's Basescu seem to develop ties. Only a short time ago this would have been unthinkable, but they have appeared together at a
free summer university in a Hungarian location but in  Transylvania, that is, on Romanian soil. Not only did they not clash, in private they got along well. It would seem that Basescu might be moving as fast as his own radicals will let him toward the kind of autonomy for ethnics that  corresponds to western standards and practice. Therefore, the quality of the relationship is better than in the last ninety years. An appearance of Orban in a comparable setting in the Serbian province Voivodina/Vajdasag has also gone over well.

Moderate nationalists are in power that do not share the seizures of Germans that unthinkingly equate "national" and "patriotic" with "national" as in "National Socialism." As a result, they appear to have a potential. It is that besides the openly admitted commitment to and love for their kind, they are capable of assessing the national interest, which demands reconciliation based on the general boundaries of 1919. Meanwhile, not being addicted to collectivistic economic theories, free market policies can be pursed. Therefore, their strategy is to legitimize themselves domestically through earned economic success. If that works, there is no need to rely on the humiliation and domination of minorities and neighboring countries as a compensation for stagnation and poverty.

Lastly, making real peace is only possible if prejudices are overcome. Reconciliation involves concessions and these can make their architect suspect of "treason" and for "abandoning" the hallowed positions of "heroic ancestors." Governments that are openly national are in a position to overcome such suspicions and to banish rejectionist chauvinism to the nutty outer fringes of the political landscape.