Currently, Hungary gets more international attention than she might desire. The medias and the political élite of the Left tag the country as a rightist dictatorship. Egged on by Hungary’s Socialists, the EU threatens with sanctions. There is officious talk about toppling the Orbán government through economic strangulation. Lately, “bowing to power but not to the weight of arguments,” the Magyars submitted to Brussels’ demands. (Revealingly, the distorted and PC-adjusted version of this sentence is “we bow not before arguments but to force only.)

             The perceived inequity of the campaign has moved about 120 Professors- the Batthyány Society- to correct the distortions that influence international opinion. The original English version of the text has been slightly shortened and edited. (George Handlery)

 

This writing is an evaluation of the situation is Hungary in order to correct opinions abroad. The plea represents the opinion of the Batthyány Society. Our organization

is non-political, however, it shares the ideas embraced by the present government even if we might have reservations regarding its actions such as some economic measures.

 

In 2010, with a convincing majority, Hungary elected a conservative government. The senior member of the resulting two-party government is Fidesz/Young Democrats (YD). This is the only political force that emerged during 1989-90 that has neither been compromised nor eroded since then.

 

A thoroughly corrupt government preceded the tenure of the YD. It led the country into a credit crisis well before the ongoing global vicissitudes unfolded. In 2006, it received a second term by concealing the real condition of the country and by buying favors at the expense of future generations.

 

To explain the massive reversal of the people's will in 2010, an episode of the rule of the previous, socialist-liberal, government should be mentioned. After his re-election in 2006, Premier Gyurcsány held a “secret” speech before the Socialist MPs. He admitted that he had been unable to govern the country, that he had been lying to the electorate, and that he had deceived the EU by `hundreds of tricks'. In response, riots broke out which the police was unable to contain. Subsequently, on the 50^th anniversary of the 1956 uprising against Soviet domination, the police took revenge on the participants of a peaceful commemorative celebration. Riot Police beat up and seriously injured many participants -including an MP of the YDs. Those that were rounded up were tortured during their detention. This police terror was covered up by the orchestrated inaction of the judiciary. Up to now, there has been no international outrage nor has anyone been punished for his misdeeds.

 

The elections of 2010 brought much relief to the country’s vast majority. Nevertheless, concurrently an intense campaign is unfolding against the new Orbán government and, indeed, against the entire country. It reached a temporary plateau, during the Hungarian presidency of the EU in the first half of 2011. While the handling of European affairs has received broad recognition, the Left in the European Parliament and in the Commission raised heavy criticism against the conduct of our own affairs. In itself, that critique would be acceptable were it not in sharp contrast to the complainers’ earlier inclination to leisurely overlook the violations of the Socialist government after the admission of its deception of the EU and IMF. Meanwhile, the reproachful attitude towards Hungary has spread. For example, the American government has expressed its disapproval of the reform of the judiciary system. Regardless of the charges, the new framework grants a higher degree of independence to the judiciary than it had before. Contrary to some other countries, the Chief Justices are appointed not by the Government but after their nomination by the President of the Republic, by Parliament.

 

In another recent development, the rating agencies devaluate Hungary just when, with immense efforts, she is stabilizing her budget. Do we imply that foreign politicians and institutions are in collusion to damage this country? The case is too complicated to fit the charge. Beyond a doubt, the false allegations have their origin in this country and their DNA matches the fingerprints of the domestic opposition. Alas, hardly any influential foreign journalist understands Hungarian, and therefore, what they write about her reflects the distorted image supplied to them by their Hungarian informers.

 

The political elites’ and the international organizations' interpretation is considerably influenced by the press. Here one should be aware that the Socialist Party is a direct descendant of the Socialist Workers' Party, whose power had been reinstated by the Soviet Union in 1956 and was sustained by Moscow until 1990. To illustrate this assertion, we need to mention that up to1990 Mr. Gyurcsány had been a leading figure in the communist youth organization. Furthermore, he married the granddaughter of the arch-Stalinist, Apró, who served in the Politburo from 1946 to 1980.

 

The interests of the leftist press are intertwined with those of the former Communist power elite. During the period of “goulash communism”, these people developed links to their colleagues in the western press and institutions (possibly the intelligence services have also been involved). Consequently, they are still able to use these conduits to serve the interest of their cause.

 

Let us sum up the actual events during the Orbán administration tenure.

 

The most pressing task was to fend off the looming bankruptcy by balancing the budget and by curbing the growth of the escalating debt. The first measures brought relief and presented viable alternatives to paralyzing restrictions. Ultimately, however, these were no substitutes for the inevitably painful restructuring of the national economy and the administration. During socialist rule, the banks were encouraged to lure people into borrowing large sums in low-interest Swiss francs. The indebtedness of the citizens has grown enormously once the exchange rate of Swiss Franc rose by 40%. The rise of the foreign currency indebtedness of individual households also presented a dangerous legacy for the national economy. The unorthodox response of the government to cope with these problems conflicted with the interests of the mostly foreign-owned banks and the large enterprises. These reacted angrily and denounced the government at the receptive EU. However, by the end of 2011, a compromise was achieved between the government and the Banking Association. Both parties acknowledged their partial responsibility for the local crisis and agreed that they shall coordinate their actions to restore economic normalcy.

 

In the spring of 2011, a new constitution was passed. Although its text has parts that may be judged as pompous, we believe it provides a firm foundation for a democratic state based on the rule of law. This is precisely what most critics’ doubt. Allegedly, the guarantees against the misuse of power are inadequate as long as the government has a two-third majority in Parliament. Indeed, the nature of politics in Hungary as well as in other democracies implies that the majority will use its constitutional power to the extent that it may and, therefore, it is a fallacy to pronounce democracy as dead. For instance, in 1994 another two-third majority adopted an election law that ensured a leftist landslide in local elections. Furthermore, in 1989 the constituencies had been gerrymandered to favor the left. Newly the size of parliament has been reduced. Also in response to demographic changes, new election districts had to be created. Indubitably but legitimately, the new districts will favor the right.

 

We hold that the real danger for the misuse of power lies in the unfair application of any law, no matter how perfect it might be. A case to illustrate this was the police terror of the socialist government in 2006. One can understand the toughness of the ruling parties in the light of the horrific period that we underwent while the present opposition ruled. Good taste and civilized self-restraint cannot be imposed by legislation, but it will prevail in concrete cases when fairness demands it. Having said this, we do not mean to insinuate that all of the recent legislation has been perfect. There are also more than two dozen cardinal laws that complement the constitution, such as the law of citizenship, of the Constitutional Court, the election law, media law etc., promulgated in 2011. Furthermore, there are other critical cases of recent legislation although most of them rely on precedents; it required much effort to come up with the needed modifications of earlier decrees and to integrate these in a consistent system. This frenzied legislation has certainly led to mistakes -a condition that is not uncommon in Hungarian legislation. The hurried legislation has been self-imposed by having set the date of January 1, 2012 for the application of the new Fundamental Law. One can question the sense of the rush but it is certain that no irreparable damage has been caused. The legislative process is able to correct itself and it will do so when necessary.

 

A neat example for the assertion is provided by the case of the media law. The leftist press alarmed the world and the EU with the claim that the freedom of the press was about to be suppressed in Hungary. This happened before translations became available. But the European Commission found only two technical flaws, which were promptly corrected. At the end of 2011, the Constitutional Court completed a thorough revision and found a few points that could cause uncertainty in the praxis. These deficiencies are about to be corrected. But the proof of the quality of a regulation is its performance. The rules in the case of the Medias have become more transparent but the consumers of information notice no difference. Meanwhile the media and the press are as critical as ever and there are no examples of political retaliation, therefore, the regulations are functioning as intended.

 

During socialist rule governance had became chaotic and corruption prevailed. Towards the end of their tenure, many politicians of the ruling parties faced prosecution. However, progress was minimal, as the wheels of justice have always been churning very slowly in this country. Seeking an improvement, the preparation of the constitution went hand in hand with a reform of the legal system. The prosecution of all corrupt politicians and officials has gained momentum. So far, expressed in terms of convictions, the result has been meager. On the positive side, at least nobody can pretend that there is a danger of showcase trials. Even so, it is natural that resentment will rise when charges are raised against once protected public figures.

 

Initially, the government began by attempting to remedy the finances of the country without resorting to the help of the IMF. In doing so it bumped into too many and too

mighty opposing interests, which, in the context of the Euro crisis, impede extrication from the debt trap. Complicating matters, the hostility between the government and the governor of the National Bank is of long standing. No matter how much the fiscal

balance has improved, no matter how positive the balance of payment might be, under these conditions the rating agencies devaluate our credit-worthiness.  In response, the national currency also devalues and the public debt grows, if expressed in foreign currencies. Through this vicious circle, the financial difficulties grow more acute.

 

To sum up this evaluation, the present Hungarian government is proceeding against

a strong headwind. Much of the tempest’s strength originates from the internal opposition. Its attacks are accepted as credible abroad where subsequently the critique supplied is duly amplified. Ironically, the YD’s middle-of-the-road approach provokes the resolute disparagement by the local extreme right. Meanwhile, abroad the Orbán government is branded as being extreme right. Equally odd is that, measures that are denounced as “populist” are introduced in other countries without provoking international protests.

 

These denigrations receive wide publicity in the country. Surprisingly, the popularity of the ruling coalition has only eroded insignificantly and without any substantial gain of the approval rating of the rightist and the leftist opposition. Thus, the government would continue to retain a two-thirds majority.

 

We accept that it is difficult to understand Hungarian politics without knowing society’s

undercurrents that happen to be intertwined with a complicated history. The prejudices projected upon present-day Hungary by the manipulators of information are attractive for the political thinkers of the comfortable mainstream. Shrouded in these prejudices the situation looks temptingly simple, and as a result, a fact resistant and false judgment distorts the image of the country. In order for this to be overcome, we turn to our contemporaries of good faith, open mind and empathy for a hearing. In pleading for attention, we urge them to be receptive to consider those interpretations of Hungarian reality that might run counter to convention.

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Debrecen_Budapest_Szeged_Pécs, 5th January, 2012

Governing Board, Batthyány Society of Professors.