With all the insanity in the world, it’s too easy to lose track of the good
things. There’s no news like good news because good news is no news
at all. Human nature tends to focus on the bad. William F. Buckley,
Jr.’s new book The Fall of the Berlin Wall
is therefore all the more welcome. How quickly we can forget what a
wonderful event that was, and how much better off the whole world is because
of it.
Buckley
is a treasure, but when I read his works it’s often with sense of regret.
For all these years he’s often displayed two bad habits: his sentences have
too many clauses, and he uses too many Greek and Latin garbage words.
(They’re garbage words because their English equivalents are usually sharper,
and because they’re often foolishly obscure and therefore distract from the
central points being made.) This book marks a total break from those
tendencies. Stripped down to clear and simple prose, Buckley shows
what an extraordinary writer he can be. He has a certain liveliness,
a sense of humor, a sense of the absurd. He’s willing to express contempt
for those who deserve it, but he doesn’t allow things to bog down by belaboring
a point or telling the reader to feel a certain way when any sensible reader
will already feel that way.
This
elegant essay traces the history of the Berlin Wall from the beginning of
the Cold War which led to the Wall’s inception on August 13, 1961, until
the night of November 9, 1989, when thousands of people danced on it.
Buckley points out the awful state of Berlin in May, 1945, by which point
50,000 Berliners had been killed, a quarter of the housing destroyed, and
tens of thousands of Soviet troops had occupied the city after the final
battle in the European Theater. Buckley sketches brief and damning
portraits of the East German Communists, who were a bunch of shabby nonentities.
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the surviving Germans were mainly
interested in finding their next meal, and in the chaos those who wished
to move West could do so. By 1953 many Eastern Germans were fed up
with Communist rule, and that year saw a wave of strikes that the Communists
crushed by killing hundreds. The emigration from East to West continued,
and in the decade after the war four million left the east. [p. 23]
In 1959 7500 Germans were fleeing Westward each month, and in 1960 this increased
to 12,600 [p. 17] In June of 1961, 20,000 fled [p.39].
By that
point the leaders of the Warsaw Pact were alarmed on two main counts: the
flow of people to the West was an embarrassment, and many of the best and
brightest were among those leaving, and this had major implications for the
East German economy. By late 1961 the Communists were meeting and trying
to figure out what to do, and their answer was the Wall, known in Commie-speak
as the “Anti-Fascist Protective Rampart.” Buckley points out that if
the West had physically intervened in order to halt the construction, the
East would have backed down. But we had know way of knowing that. [p.
53]. As it was, a few American tanks tried to make a show of force
but it amounted to nothing [p. 83]. The West had to content itself
with a proclamation of moral victory, which is what you say when you’ve just
been handed your head.
For the
next two years it was almost impossible for Westerners to visit the East,
but in those days a major new activity became all the rage: tunneling.
Here Buckley does an excellent job telling a number of harrowing stories
of people who engaged in that dangerous occupation. In addition to
the tunneling industry, there arose a major new form of trade. From
the early Sixties till 1989, West Germany purchased the freedom of 25,000
East German prisoners, at a cost of two billion dollars. [p. 106] One
wonders if this charming source of easy profits encouraged the East to imprison
people who otherwise would have remained free. Was it the only Eastern
industry that actually showed good financial results?
During
the Wall’s tenure in defense of tyranny, a major evolution took place in
Eastern Europe. As Buckley states, people like the Czech leader Alexander
Dubcek (of 1968’s Prague Spring) and Soviet dissidents like Alexander Solzenhitsyn
and Andrei Sakharov weren’t shot. Had Stalin and others of his generation
still been in power, such dissidents would have been murdered. In 1956
the Soviets had the ruthlessness to crush Hungary, and they sent in the tanks
to subdue the quasi-pacifist Czechs (are they Europe’s most peaceful people?)
in 1968. But in 1977 a Czech dissident group -- Charter 77, which included
Vaclav Havel -- arose and was suppressed. Havel was imprisoned briefly
and then harassed, but he wasn’t shot. [pp. 128-9] When dictatorships
stop murdering people, the end is usually nigh.
This
brings us to this book’s limitation. In the latter part of the Nineteenth
century and the first third of the Twentieth, Marxism had the power to move
people to murderous fanaticism. By the late Thirties the Marxist creed
was rapidly dying in Europe, although it experienced a barbarous second life
in other parts of the world. Why did it come and go so fast?
Why did beliefs and perceptions change so profoundly? As far as I’m
aware, neither Buckley nor anyone else has offered a convincing explanation.
One might say that different generations usually have different beliefs,
but the central elements of the British and American ideologies have scarcely
changed or wavered for over two centuries. Why are we so steadfast
while others -- Nazis, Communists, Fascists, Pan-Arabists, etc. -- come and
go? While this short book gives us a fine narrative of events, it does
not offer deeper explanations of such crucial questions, nor does it provide
a picture of how people lived and worked during the Communists’ time in power
in Eastern Europe.
By March
of 1985 the last of Stalin’s political offspring had bitten the dust (at
least in Russia), and Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. It’s probably
fair to say that he did not intend to dismantle the Communist empire, but
he showed himself to be a decent and practical man. He therefore wound
up with no choice but to say things like, “We are interested in eliminating
the division of Europe ... and the gradual advancement toward a common European
market.” On the other side Reagan was saying “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down
this wall!” [pp. 130-3] In 1989 the Warsaw Pact disintegrated.
In May, Gorbachev ordered a reduction in Soviet forces in Hungary and East
Germany, and Hungary opened its border with Austria. On June 4 of that
year Poland had a largely free election and Solidarity clobbered the Communists,
and on August 17 Jaruzelski transferred power to Lech Walesa. [pp.
141-8] In October Gorbachev visited East Germany, where he said “Policies
that affect the German Democratic Republic are decided not in Moscow but
in Berlin.” [p. 157] In other words, don’t look to us to save you.
On October 18 the old hack Erich Honnecker retired and was succeeded by Egon
Krenz, who was young enough to have a future and didn’t want to be hanged
from a lamppost. On the evening of November 9, the boss of Berlin,
Gunter Schabowski, held a press conference in which he said that “Permanent
emigration is henceforth allowed across all border crossing points between
East Germany and West Germany and West Berlin.” At about eleven that
evening Communism died. [pp. 156-163]
Over
the next few months all the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe fell, and
only in Rumania was there a lot of violence. Only in Russia did the
Communist Party manage to maintain a twilight existence. In August
of 1991 some Communist clowns tried to stage a coup, but they held power
for less than 48 hours. [pp. 189-190]
In the
defeat of Communism, Buckley himself deserves a share of the credit.
Few people in the West worked harder to rally the forces of anti-Communism.
For almost half a century Buckley was an important leader in the fight.
Everybody makes mistakes, and it’s fair to say that from the Sixties till
the early Eighties he underestimated the decrepitude of the Soviet system,
and he overestimated the appeal and importance of the Marxist ideology.
In reading some of his earlier work, I get the impression that he thought
the Marxists were sailing to inevitable victory, and he only hoped to delay
the awful day. At times he was too tolerant of some people, notably
Joe McCarthy. Some of Buckley’s friends went insane or became insufferably
eccentric or perverse. But if you were to tote up his mistakes and
compare them with his accomplishments, the balance sheet would be extremely
favorable to WFB.
The recent announcement of his step back from National Review
was naturally a disappointment, but he’s pushing eighty and it’s best to
take these decisions while you’re still on top of everything. Let’s
hope he keeps writing for a long time. As I said before, his style
in this book is excellent. Here’s a little excerpt: