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The Fall of the Berlin Wall
Reviewed by Geoffrey Riklin
10 September 2004

The Fall of the Berlin Wall William F. Buckley's elegant essay traces the history of the Berlin Wall from the beginning of the Cold War through November 9, 1989, when thousands danced on it.

With all the insanity in the world, it’s too easy to lose track of the good things.  There’s no news like good news because good news is no news at all.  Human nature tends to focus on the bad.  William F. Buckley, Jr.’s new book The Fall of the Berlin Wall is therefore all the more welcome.  How quickly we can forget what a wonderful event that was, and how much better off the whole world is because of it. 

Buckley is a treasure, but when I read his works it’s often with sense of regret.  For all these years he’s often displayed two bad habits: his sentences have too many clauses, and he uses too many Greek and Latin garbage words.  (They’re garbage words because their English equivalents are usually sharper, and because they’re often foolishly obscure and therefore distract from the central points being made.)  This book marks a total break from those tendencies.  Stripped down to clear and simple prose, Buckley shows what an extraordinary writer he can be.  He has a certain liveliness, a sense of humor, a sense of the absurd.  He’s willing to express contempt for those who deserve it, but he doesn’t allow things to bog down by belaboring a point or telling the reader to feel a certain way when any sensible reader will already feel that way.

This elegant essay traces the history of the Berlin Wall from the beginning of the Cold War which led to the Wall’s inception on August 13, 1961, until the night of November 9, 1989, when thousands of people danced on it.  Buckley points out the awful state of Berlin in May, 1945, by which point 50,000 Berliners had been killed, a quarter of the housing destroyed, and tens of thousands of Soviet troops had occupied the city after the final battle in the European Theater.  Buckley sketches brief and damning portraits of the East German Communists, who were a bunch of shabby nonentities.  In the immediate aftermath of the war, the surviving Germans were mainly interested in finding their next meal, and in the chaos those who wished to move West could do so.  By 1953 many Eastern Germans were fed up with Communist rule, and that year saw a wave of strikes that the Communists crushed by killing hundreds.  The emigration from East to West continued, and in the decade after the war four million left the east. [p. 23]  In 1959 7500 Germans were fleeing Westward each month, and in 1960 this increased to 12,600 [p. 17]  In June of 1961, 20,000 fled [p.39]. 

By that point the leaders of the Warsaw Pact were alarmed on two main counts: the flow of people to the West was an embarrassment, and many of the best and brightest were among those leaving, and this had major implications for the East German economy.  By late 1961 the Communists were meeting and trying to figure out what to do, and their answer was the Wall, known in Commie-speak as the “Anti-Fascist Protective Rampart.”  Buckley points out that if the West had physically intervened in order to halt the construction, the East would have backed down.  But we had know way of knowing that. [p. 53].  As it was, a few American tanks tried to make a show of force but it amounted to nothing [p. 83].  The West had to content itself with a proclamation of moral victory, which is what you say when you’ve just been handed your head. 

For the next two years it was almost impossible for Westerners to visit the East, but in those days a major new activity became all the rage: tunneling.  Here Buckley does an excellent job telling a number of harrowing stories of people who engaged in that dangerous occupation.  In addition to the tunneling industry, there arose a major new form of trade.  From the early Sixties till 1989, West Germany purchased the freedom of 25,000 East German prisoners, at a cost of two billion dollars.  [p. 106] One wonders if this charming source of easy profits encouraged the East to imprison people who otherwise would have remained free.  Was it the only Eastern industry that actually showed good financial results? 

During the Wall’s tenure in defense of tyranny, a major evolution took place in Eastern Europe.  As Buckley states, people like the Czech leader Alexander Dubcek (of 1968’s Prague Spring) and Soviet dissidents like Alexander Solzenhitsyn and Andrei Sakharov weren’t shot.  Had Stalin and others of his generation still been in power, such dissidents would have been murdered.  In 1956 the Soviets had the ruthlessness to crush Hungary, and they sent in the tanks to subdue the quasi-pacifist Czechs (are they Europe’s most peaceful people?) in 1968.  But in 1977 a Czech dissident group -- Charter 77, which included Vaclav Havel -- arose and was suppressed.  Havel was imprisoned briefly and then harassed, but he wasn’t shot.  [pp. 128-9]  When dictatorships stop murdering people, the end is usually nigh.

This brings us to this book’s limitation.  In the latter part of the Nineteenth century and the first third of the Twentieth, Marxism had the power to move people to murderous fanaticism.  By the late Thirties the Marxist creed was rapidly dying in Europe, although it experienced a barbarous second life in other parts of the world.  Why did it come and go so fast?  Why did beliefs and perceptions change so profoundly?  As far as I’m aware, neither Buckley nor anyone else has offered a convincing explanation.  One might say that different generations usually have different beliefs, but the central elements of the British and American ideologies have scarcely changed or wavered for over two centuries.  Why are we so steadfast while others -- Nazis, Communists, Fascists, Pan-Arabists, etc. -- come and go?  While this short book gives us a fine narrative of events, it does not offer deeper explanations of such crucial questions, nor does it provide a picture of how people lived and worked during the Communists’ time in power in Eastern Europe. 

By March of 1985 the last of Stalin’s political offspring had bitten the dust (at least in Russia), and Mikhail Gorbachev came to power.  It’s probably fair to say that he did not intend to dismantle the Communist empire, but he showed himself to be a decent and practical man.  He therefore wound up with no choice but to say things like, “We are interested in eliminating the division of Europe ... and the gradual advancement toward a common European market.”  On the other side Reagan was saying “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”  [pp. 130-3]  In 1989 the Warsaw Pact disintegrated.  In May, Gorbachev ordered a reduction in Soviet forces in Hungary and East Germany, and Hungary opened its border with Austria.  On June 4 of that year Poland had a largely free election and Solidarity clobbered the Communists, and on August 17 Jaruzelski transferred power to Lech Walesa.  [pp. 141-8]  In October Gorbachev visited East Germany, where he said “Policies that affect the German Democratic Republic are decided not in Moscow but in Berlin.” [p. 157]  In other words, don’t look to us to save you.  On October 18 the old hack Erich Honnecker retired and was succeeded by Egon Krenz, who was young enough to have a future and didn’t want to be hanged from a lamppost.  On the evening of November 9, the boss of Berlin, Gunter Schabowski, held a press conference in which he said that “Permanent emigration is henceforth allowed across all border crossing points between East Germany and West Germany and West Berlin.”  At about eleven that evening Communism died.  [pp. 156-163]

Over the next few months all the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe fell, and only in Rumania was there a lot of violence.  Only in Russia did the Communist Party manage to maintain a twilight existence.  In August of 1991 some Communist clowns tried to stage a coup, but they held power for less than 48 hours.  [pp. 189-190]

In the defeat of Communism, Buckley himself deserves a share of the credit.  Few people in the West worked harder to rally the forces of anti-Communism.  For almost half a century Buckley was an important leader in the fight.  Everybody makes mistakes, and it’s fair to say that from the Sixties till the early Eighties he underestimated the decrepitude of the Soviet system, and he overestimated the appeal and importance of the Marxist ideology.  In reading some of his earlier work, I get the impression that he thought the Marxists were sailing to inevitable victory, and he only hoped to delay the awful day.  At times he was too tolerant of some people, notably Joe McCarthy.  Some of Buckley’s friends went insane or became insufferably eccentric or perverse.  But if you were to tote up his mistakes and compare them with his accomplishments, the balance sheet would be extremely favorable to WFB.      

The recent announcement of his step back from National Review was naturally a disappointment, but he’s pushing eighty and it’s best to take these decisions while you’re still on top of everything.  Let’s hope he keeps writing for a long time.  As I said before, his style in this book is excellent.  Here’s a little excerpt:

In 1960, American spy satellites spotted a new construction site about fifteen miles north of Berlin.  The area appeared solidly walled off, and the way in which the rows of excavations were configured suggested that what was being built was a missile-launching site.  CIA headquarters in Washington flogged the CIA team in Berlin to find out exactly what was going on.  The site was exceptionally well guarded, and CIA Berlin was nearing despair when one of the thousands of refugees at Marienfelde disclosed that he was the architect of the project.  From him the CIA learned that it wasn’t a missile site at all, it was Walter Ulbricht’s present to himself and his Politburo colleagues:  a self-contained residential compound near Lake Wandlitz, on the edge of the Bernau Forest. 

This was no rusticated park, with houses artfully scattered over the grounds.  Like Levittown and its imitators in postwar America, the Wandlitz houses were lined up in strict rows (which is what the satellites had observed) and were identical in floor plan.  They all had three stories (the third being for servants), a picture window in the living room, beige stucco on the outer walls.  Communal amenities included a swimming pool with a retractable glass roof, a banquet hall, tennis courts, a rifle range, and special shops with items not available to ordinary East Germans.  The whole thing was surrounded by a double concrete wall 12 feet high and guarded by 160 carefully selected troops. 

Not all of Ulbricht’s colleagues were pleased about moving fifteen miles out into the countryside.  Erich Mielke, who as minister of state security was chief of the Stasi, did not like being separated so far from his drinking buddies in the Pankow district of Berlin, and he enjoyed living in Hermann Goering’s old house.  But Mielke was given no choice, and he found a consolation in the move.  The basement of his new house was large enough to permit him his favorite recreation, besides drinking:  pistol target shooting.  If he could have managed to drink and shoot at the same time, one gathers he’d have been totally content. 

While Mielke was installing his target range, other Politburo members found more conventional ways of personalizing their homes.  For Otto Grotewohl, who had been a colleague and rival of Ulbricht’s ever since the first postwar East German regime, it was expensive carpets and sixteenth- and seventeenth-century furnishings.  Erich Honnecker was Politburo member for security and head of the Free German Youth, the GDR’s version of Moscow’s Young Pioneers or the Hitler Jugend.  He was a generation younger than Ulbricht and Grotewohl, and his tastes were more modern.  He had managed, on his Workers’ and Peasants’ salary, to acquire an impressive art collection, including a Picasso.  Deputy Premier and Minister of Defense Willi Stoph, a former artilleryman, covered his walls with antique swords and firearms.  Ulbricht was the most modest and bourgeois of the lot, his taste running to comfortable upholstered sofas, and lace doilies on the table, although he did have Venetian glass mosaics installed in the dining room floor. [pp. 46-48]

The Fall of the Berlin Wall is available on Amazon.com.

Geoffrey Riklin is a writer living in Detroit. A graduate of the University of Michigan, he also attended the London School of Economics, and has lived recently in Chile and Spain.

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