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Conservatives Must Face Iraq Facts
by W. James Antle III
11 October 2004
The Duelfer report confirms that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction, was hardly engaged
in serious efforts to produce them and Saddam Hussein’s nuclear capabilities
were actually deteriorating rather than advancing.
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The Iraq Survey Group
headed by Charles Duelfer has released its report on the status of Iraqi
weapons programs and the results confirm what many had long suspected: When
the United States invaded, Iraq did not posses weapons of mass destruction,
was hardly engaged in serious efforts to produce them and Saddam Hussein’s
nuclear capabilities were actually deteriorating rather than advancing.
These findings contradict prewar statements by President Bush and top administration
officials, and seriously undercut the rationale for the Iraq war. In
an essay appearing in the New York Times on Sunday, Franklin Foer
observed that even many conservative intellectuals and journalists are now
entertaining second thoughts about the war, in some cases reaching conclusions
more consistent with the old right’s noninterventionist traditions.
But these doubts are not necessarily reverberating among the conservative grassroots. In fact, an October 6 CNN/USA Today/Gallup
poll found that 62 percent of self-described Republicans, a fair if imperfect
proxy for the rank-and-file right, believed that Saddam Hussein was personally
involved in the 9/11 attacks against America. Fully 50 percent believed
that the Iraqi dictator was personally involved in planning the attacks.
These are claims that the administration does not make and did not even endorse
prior to the war, although the campaign may not mind collecting votes based
on these misperceptions. Indeed, Steve Sailer has expressed concern that Karl Rove’s strategy may be to rely on the “dumbing down of Republicans” on these issues.
My readers are decent, thoughtful, patriotic Americans (and, of course, friends
of America in other countries). Many of you supported the Iraq war,
out of loyalty to the president and a sincere desire to keep the U.S. safe
from WMDs in the hands of madmen. Although I was skeptical of an Iraq
campaign from the beginning, I found persuasive many of the same arguments
that convinced you to support to the war -- so much so that I tempered my
opposition shortly before the invasion and declared myself undecided
on the question. More than the arguments, however, I softened my position
because I trusted and wanted to believe pro-war figures in the administration
I held in particularly high regard. But experience is sometimes kinder
to our doubts than our hopes.
The evidence is in and it has been gathering since Baghdad fell. According
to the Duelfer report, there were “no credible indications that Baghdad resumed
production of chemical munitions" after 1991, and “no direct evidence that
Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW [biological weapons] program.”
Contrary to warnings that Saddam had reconstituted his nuclear program and
was perhaps a year away from having weapons, the Iraqi nuclear weapons program
had been stopped in 1991 and the survey group found "no evidence to suggest
concerted efforts to restart” it.
It’s tempting to respond that virtually all the players, including leading
Democrats from Bill Clinton to John Kerry and every major Western intelligence
agency, believed that Iraq possessed WMDs. But some experts did have
doubts. And while there was a broad, if inaccurate, government consensus
on Iraqi WMDs, the notion that this constituted a risk serious enough to
justify immediate, preemptive war was a minority viewpoint. There were
also many uncertainties in the intelligence, partly as a result of limited
Western knowledge of the facts on the ground in Iraq after the first Gulf
War, and political assertions made on the basis of disputed intelligence
estimates. In short, long before we received the conclusive evidence
we have today there were sufficient doubts to call into question the wisdom
of war.
Without the weapons, there remain two primary conservative justifications
for the war. The first is the neoconservative dogma that democracy
in Iraq will promote democracy throughout the Middle East, altering the political
conditions that currently breed terror. But even if true, this does
not mean that the U.S. can necessarily effect this transformation militarily
through democratic nation-building. The second -- which appears to
be Duelfer’s own position -- is that the sanctions regime was eroding and
would have eventually ended, at which point Saddam would have been likely
to resume WMD production. Yet it is difficult to see why this much
more speculative threat would have required drastic, immediate and unilateral
action by the U.S. during a global war on terror with numerous other threats.
And the existence of myriad threats highlights the real problem: there are
opportunity costs in this dangerous world to being bogged down in a WMD-free
Iraq. Yes, presidents sometimes have to make decisions based on imperfect
intelligence. But there were substantial prewar doubts. We conservatives
have too often allowed this president to soft-pedal those doubts and, worse,
conflate the war aims with its actual results.
Many conservatives have been too slow to grapple with new data unfolding
on the ground in Iraq, preferring the comfort of familiar talking points.
But it is not disloyal to our brave troops, a thousand of whom have already
made the ultimate sacrifice for their country, to question the war.
Nor is this presidential campaign the wrong time to raise such questions,
for fear of helping Kerry, whose position on the war is indecipherable and
is otherwise banally liberal. In additional to the election, something
else is at stake: the credibility of conservatism as the guarantor of responsible
national defense.
William F. Buckley, Jr., who more recently confessed that the case for the
Iraq war was inaccurate and that in hindsight he would have opposed it, once
described conservatism as the “politics of reality.” If liberals are
seen by the American people as more realistic on Iraq, conservatives will
come to regret it -- eventually, if not on November 2.W. James Antle III is a primary columnist for Intellectual Conservative.com. He works as an assistant editor of The American Conservative magazine and is also a senior editor of EnterStageRight.com. The views expressed here represent his alone.
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