While most of the world has its attention focused on the global war on terror, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues its moves toward regional domination in Asia.  The PRC has announced that it would exchange nuclear strikes with the U.S. in the event of a military confrontation.  Its army and navy have embarked on an unprecedented modernization effort, and the PRC’s economic policy seems almost mercantilist in the way that it is amassing American dollars and consuming world steel and oil. 

To understand the PRC’s ambitions in the Far East, it is necessary to understand the guiding principle of its foreign policy, commonly called the One China principle.  This policy has been reinforced and communicated to the international community with the passage of an anti-secession law by the National People’s Congress, which authorizes the use of force by the PRC against Taiwan if it moves toward formal independence.  If it is the desire of Beijing to maintain cordial and stable relations with the United States and in the Taiwan Strait, it must acknowledge that its “One China” principle is no longer a viable option. 

The One China Principle is the policy formally advocated by Beijing that states that there is only one China, and both mainland China and Taiwan are part of that China.  In Beijing’s view, there exists only one geographical region of China, which was split into two Chinese states (the PRC and ROC) by the Chinese civil war.  Now that the civil war is over, Beijing’s official policy, in regards to Taiwan, is that this one China should be united under one government.  

Since 1949, Beijing has regarded the PRC as the sole legitimate government of all of China, and regards Taiwan as merely a renegade province whose political evolution towards democracy has been safeguarded by the U.S. nuclear deterrent.  The PRC believes it is not yet able to survive a nuclear confrontation with the U.S. if it makes moves to take Taiwan by force; as a result, it continues to bide its time and is determined to wait until circumstances permit the unification of Taiwan by military means. 

In the PRC’s view Taiwan cannot possibly be a sovereign nation.  It is merely a province that belongs to mainland China.  The PRC also applies this policy to territories in Tibet, Mongolia and Manchuria.  In essence, the One China Policy is a political ideology that announces to the world that the PRC expects to acquire more territory than it presently holds.

Acknowledgment of the One China Policy is a requirement for all nations that seek diplomatic relations with the PRC.  Countries that have diplomatic relations with Beijing recognize that the “Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of all of China... and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.”  

In the case of the United States, the One China Policy is outlined in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, which states that the “United States acknowledges that Chinese, on either side of the Taiwan Straits, maintain that there is but one China.  The United States does not challenge this position.”   The consequence of this policy is that the United States does not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and affairs of state between the ROC and the U.S. are handled via private organizations such as the American Institute in Taiwan or the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei.    
       
The current trend of nationalism and self-determination in Taiwan, as a separate and distinct identity from those Chinese on mainland China, started rather recently with the 1988 election of ROC President Lee Teng-Hui.  The first ethnic Taiwanese to hold top office, his election signaled to the PRC the increasing “Taiwanization” of the government elite.  This landmark event served to end the relatively cordial period that had existed between the PRC and the ROC for approximately seventeen years.  As a result of this change in the status quo, Beijing renewed its aggressive stance and policies with regard to the subject of Taiwanese reunification.

The PRC disliked President Lee’s democratic reforms for many reasons.  First of all, they feared that a democratic liberal system of government so near the mainland would challenge the Chinese Communist Party’s control.  In addition, Lee’s reforms punctuated the brutal suppression of the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square.  They showed the major differences and attitudes of the two states on the subject of free government and human rights.   Most significantly, Beijing feared that Lee’s policies would lead to the creation of either two Chinas or a sovereign Taiwanese state. 

As for Taipei, it would not, under any circumstances, accept the premise that Taiwan was merely a renegade province of mainland China.  Concession to such a premise would undo the political reforms that had begun in the late 1970s and remove from power any administration that considered it valid.  In addition, the Taiwanese populace did not acknowledge, as legitimate, the tenets of Marxist-Leninist or Maoist thought.  The populace benefited from the improvements in the quality of living brought about by western style capitalism.

Taiwan’s political reforms and the evolution of a concrete Taiwanese identity will undoubtedly continue.  As a result, Taiwan’s electoral politics will continue to showcase the concept of an independent Taiwan; and its elections will continue to reflect the nation-building process. 

If Beijing wishes to maintain the international status quo and be accepted as a member of the international community, it must acknowledge that its “One China” principle is no longer a viable option.  In addition, the Bush administration must take a long, hard look at its current policy in regards to Taiwan.  If it is to stand squarely behind its National Security Strategy, the Shanghai Communiqué must be renounced, the Taiwan Relations Act reinforced, and the PRC’s One China Policy officially declared as invalid.

Born in Salem, New Jersey, Michael A. Esparza is a 34 year old Officer of the U.S. Navy. He is also an International Studies Major with a Minor in Asian Studies.

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