Germany’s September 18th election appears to have been a sensation too subtle to interrupt America’s weekend. Perusing before local sunrise on the internet the State-side sources I like to click on, only the WSJ “Opinion” has an analysis to offer.

The facts of the case are as simple as they are stunning. This morning everybody can claim that he won -- because the other guy lost. This means that the relatively conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the well-left-of-center Social Democrats (SPD) have 35% and 34% of the votes, respectively. Neither party’s logical partner has enough votes/seats to achieve a majority for their coalition. The pale-red SPD, however, could get a majority if it and the Greens would affiliate with the Left Party, as the re-labeled Communists are called. At least for now, both CDU and SPD proclaim that this they will never do. There are further pre-election professions of total refusals of cooperation posted on the bulletin board. Some of these are even credible. The Free Democrats (akin to US Republicans) will not govern with the SPD or the Greens. The CDU, as well as the SPD, have promised that they will not enter into a “Grand Coalition” with each other. Therefore, at least on paper, what concerns forming a government, it can be said that those who would cannot govern, and that those who are unable to do it, would like to hold power.

There is general agreement that “the voter” wants a CDU-SPD coalition. This is desired not in order to pursue, on the foundation of a creative compromise, reforms under a government of “national unity,” but to continue on the path the country kept stumbling along, in the accustomed manner. What the “people” want is a reform that overcomes the problems that make Germany the “sick man” of Europe. This reform should be so gradual as to be unperceivable, while the changes involved in mitigating the policies that cause stagnation should affect only the other fellow. Call it “change for you, the usual allotments for me.” This desire has a realistic nucleus. In trying to govern, a Grand Coalition, as they call it, will likely to be checkmated by the differences between its components. This assures the fearful of being shielded temporarily from the chills of the winds of change.

There is more. A Grand Coalition presupposes more than the unity of unfitting parts on the basis of a low common denominator -- everybody craving government jobs. Its unstated program, making a firm stand on the steep greased slope of a changing world, implies a commitment to achieve the impossible while doing little. However, the worse is that this morning setting up this coalition government has its chances eroding. Assuming her plurality, Ms. Merkel has claimed the right to form a government. In a parliamentary system this would make her, regardless of the partner, the Chancellor. Hardly had she spoken, Mr. Schröder, who as his country’s Clinton knows no shame, proclaimed that having only lost by a little (a million plus a few hundred thousand votes) he has a “mandate.” A mandate confers a moral right to form a government. Still, two Chancellors (the US equivalent is a Bush-Gore Presidency) will fly like a lead balloon. Therefore, since a CDU-FDP-Green coalition is, on account of the FDP’s resistance unlikely, the solution to this writer is for the SPD to negotiate in bad faith until it is demonstrated that no majority government excluding the Communists is possible. This would be accompanied by an agreement with the Greens to continue the hither course in the wrecking derby. Concurrently, through behind-the-scene concessions, the silent support of the Left Party will be bought. When the Red-Green government goes -- as it must -- before the legislature, the Red-Red(der)-Green votes will add up to a comfortable majority. In this case Schröder and Fischer continue in power. However, to govern decisively in the areas which demand emergency action they will be even less capable to move (because of the mortgage held by the Left Party) than before.

At this juncture, even an early-morning piece written in haste must make a few points. Point one is that in Germany it is not the system of elections, nor the party system that has failed. It is the voter who showed cerebral weakness. An example: most Germans did not understand the flat tax system proposed to them. Then there is the voter’s credulity, and that they exhibited an inability to evaluate the record -- which is that under the SPD unemployment rose by at least 25%. The electors proved unable to weigh programs and thereafter their majority demonstrated an unwillingness to accept personal sacrifices. Let us be honest: this crisis of democracy is not limited to Germany. (Example: Americans who are unable now to critically evaluate the components that went into the original decision to remove Saddam. Add a number of the decisions and the demagogic evaluations of the Katrina-caused crisis. Or think of Ms. Sheehan’s successful posturing.)

Point two. Looking into the future it should be categorically affirmed that people who are privileged to participate in free elections are responsible for the consequences of their choices. Trust me on this: the time when this principle will come in handy is approaching.

Point three. Germany is Western-Central Europe’s most important country. As in the Thirties, their choice affects through its radiation many (innocent) outsiders. As things stand, Germany has taken a stand in favor of more of the stagnation that will determine the EU’s future and the performance of the economy that uses the Euro as a currency.

Point four. The likely outcome of the election is a government under whose guidance the Atlantic will widen while the transatlantic alliance is weakened. In the pursuit of the kind of cheap successes that can be achieved in the coasting gear, an uncritical support of Russia that desires to re-establish her previous position in Eurasia, is to be expected. America’s Atlantic and global foreign policy will, as a consequence, not become easier.

Point five. Germany’s economic decline continues. The non-confidence of the capable will accelerate the process. Since those that are likely to govern the country are unlikely to know what to do, and if they are in the know will lack the means to act, the blame will have to be put where it does not belong. So the role of “international capital” and all the rest of the tired old evergreen song will be invoked as being responsible. A left-national shift of some of the parties and of the political culture will be an upshot. The impact on the US (to be blamed for all that goes wrong) and her foreign policy is easy to guess.

Point six. It is likely that in a future election those parties will do well that have the guts to refuse to participate in a government that is not unequivocally prepared to break with the hither Red-Green mismanagement of public affairs. The choice between power now, or credibility later, is a decision that might prove to be the decisive test of  the CDU/CSU’s spine.

George Handlery is an historian. He has lived and taught in Europe since 1976.

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