The EU’s Europe (EU-rope), America and Security

Duly Noted by George Handlery.     January 21,
EU’s Europe (EU-Rope), America, and Security.
Contradicting the old hit song, not love makes the world turn around. Compatibility or hostility based relationships do that. A main axe of the past century, around which the world gyrated, had been the “transatlantic relationship”. That nexus was expressed by security agreements, such as NATO and by the US’ “special relationship” with England. Today, this factor of global politics is thinning out and myths replace hard-fact content.

The attempt to explain, forces the writer to bring up reluctantly expressed matters. The case demands that the “cat” be stroked against the growth of its hair. It is to the displeasure of the “stroker” and the feline.

We begin with the American component of Atlanticism. That compact’s purpose is to preserve its politically-economically progressive voluntarily participating entities. Newly, America’s governors lead from behind. The fashionable ideas of the political class have priority over actions that succeed if pursued vigorously. Here the inclination to rescind whatever proves to be “non-easy”, is disturbing. The country, inevitably a world leader, is carelessly led by a bipartisan elite. It is tolerated by a locally oriented public, distracted by trivia to the point that it loses sight of the national interest. A symptom of misdirection by popular consent, are the contestants for their party’s nomination. One of these is sufficiently honest to be outspoken but emotionally unqualified, while the other is insincere but steady.

However, the intended focus here is Europe as expressed by the EU which stumbles from one cow dropping into the other. Take the bungling of the Greece’ financial crisis which continues to fester. A five hundred million entity lacks the will to set terms to return a country of ten million to sanity. The response to Russia’s expansion is limited sanctions wrapped into signals that it is done reluctantly.

The migrant crisis is a special case. To quote Premier Orbán, a country that is unwilling to control its borders is no country, and a state that is unable to assert its laws is not sovereign, therefore it is not a state. Following an instinct to grandstand, an avalanche of migrants -PC demands that they be called refugees- have broken into Europe. The will lacked to enforce the EU’s rules, and so, a misguided assessment by Merkel created a problem that will worsen in time. Impotence is revealed by the inability to cope with the self-generated problem imposed by Germany. No wonder: in the ruling circles of the EU, weakness masquerades as a moral principle that puts a moral halo on polite surrender.
Furthermore, the Union is unable to cope with domestic and imported crime. This incapacity expresses less the vigor of the challenge than the extent of self-imposed restraints. Once impostors are cast by the elites -appointed to protect society- to be victims of society, not the criminal but his victim gets blamed. This happens by relying on doctrines developed by the intellectual camp followers of leaders that hold power. A contributory cause of paralysis is that excuses gain support through the correlation between “migrant background”, then “race”, and criminality. Therefore, mentioning criminality makes the source suspect of racist xenophobia, while the mindlessly extended victim status of misbehaving aliens, reinforces the creed that criminals express the inadequacy of the social order.

It is a crucial error of EU, that it trumpets the PC view about matters, that newly provoke a hitherto passive society’s resistance. Thereby, for the politically newly activated, failing and resented policies become associated with “Brussels”. That negative association is reinforced because, under attack, the EU clings more doggedly to the water-soaked life-raft represented by the reiteration of PC’s brainwash.

Alienation is accelerated by the clash of Brussels with a new patriotism. It is expressed by an east-west gap which is also a dispute between small and large member countries.

The past experience of Europe’s two halves diverges significantly. Unlike in the west, in the 19th century, Europe’s east was prevented by supranational empires to create states for its peoples. In itself, this upgrades the idea of the nation. Servitude and foreign bossing continued in modern times. Yes, the Nazis had subjugated most of Europe. However, the rule in the racially related west was a kindergarten compared to the eastern zone where, starting with the Jews, entire nations were marked for extermination. That made rule by great powers resented as it established the nexus of limited independence and extinction. Soviet rule -including the mass murder of ethnicities and classes- amplified the association between sovereignty and survival. All this explains much about the present’s clashing perspectives, because the west had been spared the degradation to colonial status by Moscow. Socialism expressed itself not through bayonets but in the form of nice Social Democrats.

A lesson of the past is to be wary of those great powers that signal an intent to impose their “guidance” over the cacophony of the “small fry” -meaning Germany and France. Take note of British complains directed at those that steer the EU. Suspicions are hardly alleviated when large member states are run by the left and when these preach that anything that smacks of a commitment to a newly liberated nation equals “fascism”.

A conflict grows between existing states that house peoples who feel unique, and those forces that wish to reduce the power of nation-states to create an “ever closer union”. The prospect of a united Europe without a European people, might not create much apprehension in the region’s west. However, in the eastern precincts, a new super-state that negates ethnic-cultural identity is alarming. The more so, since the lack of natural bonds to support ties must be substituted by bureaucratic centralization. Add a learned lesson; the lack of natural links is likely to be a motive to convert a federal facade into a system of rule by large members.

In its title we mentioned security. This is the time to discuss that ramification. Those that want to centralize Europe at the expense of its distinct components wish to extend their bureaucratic power. You might take this to imply, that the eagerness to broaden their authority is matched by a determination to protect the realm to be created. This is not so.

On the whole, official Europe’s potentates are, regarding imperiling external entities, either one- world internationalists, cultural relativists, or apologetic citers of past colonialism. The more assertive an alien force is, the more do these traits determine responses -even in cases that imply a threat to the indigenous way of life. Responding to the protection enjoyed during the Cold War, Europe is reluctant to defend itself because, subconsciously, it is convinced that “nothing bad can happen” to it. This has consequences for security policy.

Presently, the EU’s Europe is unwilling to defend itself once the threat is serious. Indeed, it tends to claim that, all cultures being equal, such a threat is fantasy-borne. Let it be added; a negated danger cannot be resisted.

Amidst the symptoms of the decadence that has accompanied the decline of other civilizations, a new alternative center is emerging within Europe. That cluster is the Visegrád Group -Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. (An extension, not only local, but from the western side of the line of demarcation, is in the making.) All these entities have a proud historical record. That, and the recent experience of life under tyrannies, makes them feel that they have something that deserves to be defended and that it needs protection.

Such a determination represents a potential to be utilized. Let it be assumed that America will find, thanks to a wise GOP candidacy, the will to reassume her leadership. If this materializes, the block of the fresh forces is a potential cluster of the “willing”. A series of bilateral commitments could provide Washington with a parallel to indulgent NATO. Keep in mind, the future is always unexpected and that it is bold innovation that enables the successful to cope with it. This is as true in business as it is in international relations.

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